Final Results

RNS Number : 1448U

Hansa Trust PLC

18 June 2009

 



HANSA TRUST PLC

Preliminary Announcement of Results

for the year ended 31 March 2009

Hansa Trust PLC announces its Preliminary Results for the year ended 31 March 2009

Financial Highlights	Year ended 31 March 2009 (unaudited)	Year ended 31 March 2008 (audited)
Net Asset Value - Total Return	(30.2%)	(10.5%)
Performance Benchmark	6.7%	6.8%
Capital return per equity share	(294.8p)	(116.2p)
Revenue return per equity share	18.3p	13.8p
Net asset value per equity share	635.0p	924.5p
Total dividend per equity share for the year	18.0p	13.0p
Total income (£000's)	6,479	5,541
Revenue before taxation (£000's)	4,474	3,448

A final dividend of 14.5p per share (amounting to £3,480,000) is to be proposed on 30 July 2009 at the Annual General Meeting. This dividend will be paid out of the Company's revenue reserves of £5,324,000.

Ex-dividend date: 24 June 2009

Record date: 26 June 2009

Payment date: 10 August 2009

The following are attached:

• Chairman's Statement

• Group Income Statement

• Statement of Changes in Equity-Group and Company

• Balance Sheet for the Group and Company

• Cash Flow Statement

• Notes

For further information please contact:

Peter Gardner        Hansa Capital Partners LLP        020 7647 5750

Chairman's Statement

THE YEAR'S RESULTS:

NAV:     - 31.3% to 635.0p per share

Our year to 31 March 2009 proved to be frustrating (and very disappointing) in that we didn't do better and in that we lost money for shareholders. Of course there will be years when we lose money, that is the nature of investing but good investment managers are concerned about preservation of capital as well as earning returns and that is what was frustrating about the year's net asset value loss. The importance of preservation of capital is one of the reasons that the Company's benchmark is based on a fixed interest return. By contrast to the fall in our net asset value of 30.17% total return basis - our benchmark returned a positive 6.7%. In any good year a fixed interest benchmark can prove easy to beat, but over the long term (five or even ten years) it is a lot tougher (more of which below). The UK stock market (the FTSE All-Share Index) fell 32.2%.

As is his wont, John Alexander, our portfolio manager, has done an excellent job in writing his Investment Manager's Report (to be published with the annual report) laying out the course of the year's events (economic and financial), the activity and performance within the portfolio and then finally his view of the stock market outlook. While it makes quite sombre reading, your board believes that it is a realistic assessment of the difficulties that the stock market, investors generally and he, as our portfolio manager, face in looking after our affairs. John covers the background to the year and its various - largely negative - influences on our net asset value - so I won't go into it any further.

OCEAN WILSONS:

Value of Holding:    -33.3% at £48.6m.

Our largest holding, of which shareholders will be well aware, is the investment we have in Ocean Wilsons, a Bermuda based company with two lines of business - its 58.25% holding in Wilson Sons (a Brazilian operator of ports, tugs and other maritime services) and its subsidiary, Ocean Wilsons (Investments) (a portfolio company with investments largely focused on companies operating in the higher growth economies). The value of our holding accounted for 31.9% of our total assets at the end of the year. 

Investors generally discovered that there was nowhere to hide during the past year and that included investing in Brazil, whose BOVESPA stock market index declined by 29.5% (expressed in £s). Ocean Wilsons' share price declined by one third, which cost our net asset value 101.3 p per share, reduced to 93.3 p per share by the dividend we received from our holding. In return terms the two parts performed rather differently; the share price of Wilson Sons declined by 39.0% (expressed in £s) but the investment portfolio, aided by not investing some of the cash raised in the previous year, lost 21.2%. We continue to be excited by the prospects for Brazil generally and Wilson Sons' port operations specifically and by the prospects for good returns from Ocean Wilsons (Investments) portfolio of companies operating in higher growth economies. I should also emphasise that, although the size of the holding (£48.6m) represents a considerable one company risk within the portfolio, we regard it as an important diversification from the risks of UK plc and its stock markets.

DIVIDEND

+38.5% to 18.0p per share

Our investment income for the year rose by £0.9m to £6.5m (16.9%). The portfolio benefitted from some good increases in dividend income during the course of the year, most notably from the holding in Ocean Wilsons, from which we received £1.9m, an increase of £0.8m or 69.0%. The investment management fee fell (£0.6m) but there was no benefit this year from any VAT reclaim (£0.7m), while other costs and taxes were £0.3m lower - all of which ended up with distributable profits after tax increasing by £1.1m or 32.8% to £4.4m (18.3p per share).

I would not normally go into the detail of the revenue account but these increases were material and the subsequent final dividend we are recommending to shareholders - 14.5p per share - means that the total dividends for the year would amount to 18.0p per share. In a year when capital losses were significant, it is at least some small compensation that shareholders should receive a much larger dividend. I should, however, re-emphasise that the portfolio is managed for capital growth so that the amount of income generated will vary with whatever happens to be in the portfolio in any given year. As a consequence the dividend can rise or fall in any given year, although over the very long term it should rise as the general level of dividends grow.

SHARE PRICE PERFORMANCE:

Ordinary shares:              -37.8% to 510p per share;              Discount to NAV: 19.7%

'A' Ordinary shares:        -39.9% to 490p per 'A' share;        Discount to NAV: 22.8%

It is, I am afraid, a feature of investment trusts that discounts at which their share prices sell in relation to their underlying net asset values tend to rise in bear markets. The discount on the Ordinary shares increased from 11.3% to 19.7% during the course of the year - with the result that Ordinary shareholders suffered a loss in the value of their shares of even more than that stemming from the fall in the net asset value. The numbers for the 'A' Ordinary shares were somewhat similar, the discount increasing from 11.8% to 22.8%.

It is difficult to attribute any particular reason for this decline other than to note that the discount of the Trust has varied quite a lot over the years and the latest experience is not enormously different from that of previous bear markets. The Board understands that there are many investors who do not like such discount volatility because it affects their short term performance, the level of their fees and their track records. For such investors the shares of Hansa Trust may therefore not be a suitable investment. The Company is run for the long-term shareholder whose return will depend very largely on the performance of the portfolio and the returns it earns (not on the volatility of its discount). Over the long-term the change in the level of the discount does not tend to add or subtract materially from shareholder returns. The table below provides a breakdown of shareholders' return over the course of the year:

Attribution of Shareholders' Return                    

                                                                               Ordinary shares                        'A' Ordinary shares

Change in the NAV                                                 - 289.5p                                   - 289.5p

Change in the premium/discount                       - 20.5p                                      - 35.5p

Dividends                                                                + 18.0p                                     + 18.0p

Shareholders' Return                             - 292.0 p (- 35.6%)           - 307.0p (- 37.7%)

LONG-TERM TOTAL RETURNS:

5 Years: NAV: +59.6%; Benchmark: +33.5%; FTSE A-s Index: - 9.3%  

Ordinary share price: +57.1%; 'A' Ordinary Share Price: +52.9%

Forgive me if I reiterate the long-term nature of the goal of the Company - to earn above average returns over the long-term, which the Board adjudges to correspond to rolling five year periods. As can be seen from the figures above, the net asset value has risen by nearly one half (59.6%), an annualised rate of 8.3% per annum; it compares with the return of our benchmark (the three year rolling average return of a five year government bond plus 2%) of 33.5% or 6.0% per annum. The question of the appropriateness of our fixed interest benchmark is raised from time to time at our Annual General Meetings. Apart from the fact that, in attempting to achieve positive returns for shareholders, having a positive return benchmark is the obvious comparator, fixed interest investments do sometimes outperform equities over longish periods; much as in the fable of the tortoise and the hare, the former is often rather hard to beat. Indeed over the last ten years our fixed interest benchmark has risen by 71.4% while the FTSE All-Share index total return has fallen 31.4% (our net asset value total return, by the way, rose 157.4%).

We are also asked from time to time how the rest of the portfolio - excluding the holding in Ocean Wilsons - has performed. I am happy to report that the numbers there are positive. Over the last five years the net asset value (ex Ocean Wilsons) per Hansa share has risen by 20.9%, not as good as our benchmark (+33.5%), but certainly better than the market which fell 9.3%. Indeed even over this last ghastly year, the net asset value (ex Ocean Wilsons) outperformed the stock market (- 30.3% v. - 32.2%).

The Listing Rules of the London Stock Exchange require boards of directors of investment companies to review the ongoing engagement of the manager. We, the independent directors of Hansa Trust, have no difficulty in concluding that it is very much in your interests that Hansa Capital, our manager, remains as the Company's manager. It isn't just the excellent long-term returns - important though they undoubtedly are - but it is also the excellent management and administration of the Company's affairs generally that persuades us we are in good hands. It is appropriate for us, on behalf of all shareholders, to thank William Salomon, John Alexander, Peter Gardner and all their colleagues at Hansa Capital for all they do for us and the returns they have earned for us over the years. Thank you.

LLOYDS BANKING GROUP

At the beginning of our year our sixth largest investment was in Lloyds TSB Group (now renamed Lloyds Banking Group ('Lloyds')). The rationale for owning the shares was that, although it had, like most banks, a highly leveraged balance sheet, the bank had - by and large - not made the bad and (at times) highly irresponsible loans and investments other banks had made. In those circumstances its relatively stronger balance sheet gave it a material competitive advantage over its rivals. It looked as though it had been sensibly managed. That was until it acquired HBOS (Halifax Bank of Scotland). In acquiring HBOS it may now have made an even worse investment than that of the Royal Bank of Scotland when it bought the Dutch bank, ABN AMRO. It is your Board's view - and judging by the 78% decline in its share price over the course of the bid, it was also the stock market's view - that the acquisition has crippled the business of Lloyds and it is not impossible that it turns out to be fatal. We will see. The performance of the share price alone should have sent a warning signal to the bank's board of directors. But it appears not to have done; indeed the directors appear to have remained in denial.

The reason for raising this in my Chairman's Statement is that your Board was actively involved in correspondence with the board of Lloyds in an attempt to persuade the board that not only was it not in the interest of Lloyds shareholders to acquire HBOS, but also that it would prove to be very injurious to the value of Lloyds and its shareholders. So far that does appear to be the case: its stock market value has been decimated, it is now not paying a dividend and finally it had to resort to financial support from the government in order to survive. A quote from the Report of the House of Commons Treasury Committee included in its comments the following:

• 'The merger between Lloyds and HBOS has been described in some quarters as a 'shotgun wedding'.'

• 'Lloyds Group Chief Executive Eric Daniels conceded that the merger proceeded swiftly on the basis of relatively little due diligence …'

• 'Nevertheless, from the evidence we have received, if the merger has had injurious consequences for Lloyds TSB we consider that the responsibility for this lies primarily with the Lloyds Board.'

Your Board of Directors became concerned that the board of one of its largest investee companies was about to commit an enormous blunder. In the spirit of Lord Myners, who has been urging investors to become more active in telling boards of companies how to run their businesses (on the whole not a sensible proposition), we wrote to Sir Victor Blank, Lloyds' chairman; we did not benefit from the courtesy of a reply from him but rather we received a short and rather curt response from someone else. Not, I would have thought, a sensible way to treat the legitimate concerns of a shareholder.

When we concluded that Sir Victor Blank seemed unlikely to acknowledge, let alone respond to our letter, I wrote, on behalf of the Hansa Trust Board, to another Lloyds' director, Ewan Brown; he is an eminent banker from Edinburgh whom I have known for many years. While he was courteous enough to acknowledge receipt of the letter and assure me that the concerns I had raised had been dealt with by the board, he passed the letter on to someone else to answer. Sir Victor Blank was copied in on all of the correspondence.

Your Board of Directors is very angry about what has happened. The value of our holding of 1.2m shares declined from £5.4m to £0.8m during the year - we consider in the main because of the behaviour and decisions of the Lloyds' board. We think their actions indicate that the board of Lloyds Banking Group is contemptuous of the views of its shareholders, that the letters we did receive made certain assertions at least one, the issue of due diligence, concerns us greatly. The reasons for the merger appear to us to be all about getting bigger, not better and finally that their standards of governance (involving sound business judgements and taking responsibility for decisions) appear lamentable (box ticking apart, of course).

It leaves us with a decision to make regarding our holding of 1.2m shares. We could, may be we should, just sell it, consigning it to the 'good riddance to bad rubbish' out tray. But we believe that this issue should not be allowed to rest.  William Salomon attended the recent AGM held in Glasgow at which he aired your Board's views and concerns. He also, on your behalf, voted against the re-election of Sir Victor Blank as a director and against the remuneration report. However both these resolutions were passed following support from the Government and the block votes of investing institutions. We feel we should - both as a duty towards our own shareholders and also as a matter of good shareholder practice - see what we can do to retrieve some of the value for the losses we have incurred. We are examining what, if any, other courses of action may be available to us.

ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING:

30th July 2009 at 11.30am at the Washington Hotel, Curzon Street.

The Annual General Meeting will be held at the Washington Hotel, Curzon Street, London (Green Park tube station) at 11.30am on Thursday 30 July 2009. Your attendance is important to us because it gives us, the Directors and Management, the chance to hear your views, concerns and suggestions.  Please, please come and join us.  John Alexander will give his usual presentation of the events of the past year and the prospects for the current one. Following the formal AGM you will have the chance to meet the Directors and the Management should you wish to do so.

OUTLOOK

Shorter-term very difficult to assess but longer-term optimistic

(a) Shorter-term risks:

John's assessment of the Market Outlook in his Investment Manager's Report is comprehensive but, in summary, amounts to the short strap line above; 'shorter-term very difficult to assess but longer-term optimistic'. In the previous two years the strap line had read 'short-term cautious, long-term bullish' but I fear that the word 'cautious' proved to be rather too bullish! In the first paragraph of my statement on the outlook last year (written some three months before the Lehman Brothers bomb went off), I left no doubt about the gravity of the situation; it was quite a pessimistic opening paragraph and yet it turned out to be a lot short of the mark. Each year the Directors meet for a strategy session during which we look at the outlook for stock markets and the risks inherent in them and we consider how best to take advantage of the opportunities and mitigate the risks. We identify those risks within the Report of the Directors (to be published with the annual report); last year we highlighted the risks of global recession, of rising inflation, of incompetent government (particularly in the UK), of the spreading of the bad debt crisis and of falling corporate profits. While inflation was rearing its ugly head, it was quickly knocked on that ugly head by the financial crisis, which in the short-term, at least, is thoroughly deflationary. The rest came to pass. I do not think we were complacent about them but we simply didn't imagine the consequences of what was unfolding would be anything like as dramatic as they proved to be.

In assessing the risks we now face we are rather more sanguine. Certain of last years risks - recession, incompetent Government, a broad based financial crisis and falling corporate profits - are now events (rather than risks). The major risk we face is that the polices of this incompetent, untrustworthy and populist Government, involving a truly massive economic pump priming financed by huge increases in the National Debt, don't work and that we end up with a long period - rather akin to that which Japan endured in the 1990s and early 2000s - of deflation and no economic growth (if we are lucky) or in extremis of depression (if we are unlucky). In May 1939 Mr Morgenthau (Secretary to the US Treasury) described the results of America's economic policies in the 1930s thus: 

'We have tried spending money. We are spending more than we have ever spent before and it does not work … We have never made good on our promises … I say after eight years of this administration we have just as much unemployment as when we started … and an enormous debt to boot.

Given that this financial crisis is debt induced and given that this Government's idea of a cure is to incur yet more debt, the scenario above is not far-fetched. In truth the Government's policies appear to us to be aimed squarely at trying to win the next election with no care of their consequences; the recent budget made financial assumptions which are widely regarded as fanciful but the policies behind which - if those assumptions are not realised - will aggravate an already grave situation.

However the rather more common view in the City is that the Government's extravagance will kick start the economy, will overcome the recession, but will inevitably result in high rates of inflation. That too is a plausible outcome but not necessarily more realistic than the other one. The problem with high rates of inflation, as with deflation, is that they are both very difficult to control. In neither scenario is lasting and real wealth created.

It is very difficult to know which of these two scenarios will play out. Hence the 'Shorter-term very difficult to assess ...' The risks investors generally face is that the process of getting the economy on to an even keel is drawn out, made all the more difficult because savers, who naturally re-liquify the financial system, are being punished with almost non-existent interest rates, cut dividends and (in some cases) higher taxes. What is reasonable to assert is that in any highly indebted society, company, stock market, etc there will be high levels of volatility in their performance; we live in a highly indebted society and it is getting worse. So we can expect even more volatility than we have become used to - involving for us periods of severe rises and falls in stock market values over short periods of time. 

(b) Longer-term opportunities:

The old Chinese adage that risk has two components - danger and opportunity - surely applies to these highly risky and turbulent times. One day - probably later rather than sooner - there will have been a thorough cleansing of the financial system with the bad debts and bad assets written down - or even off - and a much less indebted society. That then will provide the background for healthy economic and thence corporate growth. Given the severity of the financial mess that exists in Britain, other parts of the world are likely to recover earlier than Britain. Given the international nature of the business of most of the larger companies quoted on the London Stock Exchange, those companies should benefit earlier than those wholly dependent on the UK economy.

The countries with high savings and investment rates, with stable and sound government, with a good work ethic, with good demographics and finally with good educational standards are those that will fare best over the longer-term. While no country is perfect in all of these respects China fits most of this bill best. Much as we have suggested in the past, China, along with other emerging market economies, is likely to emerge as the driver of global economic growth and those British companies exposed to that growth directly or indirectly are likely to provide their shareholders with good returns. Ocean Wilsons is particularly well positioned to take advantage of this.

In respect to home grown opportunities in Britain, much will depend on the result of the forthcoming general election and then on the efficacy of the Government that follows this one. The present Government has done so much to kill off the many excellent aspects of the British economy it inherited in 1997, that it will inevitably take time to rebuild them. It looks as though a Conservative Government is likely to be returned and, if David Cameron and his colleagues have the necessary courage to do what's needed rather than what's popular (not a given) and do it with a modicum of efficiency, then good investment opportunities will emerge domestically, particularly amongst smaller companies.

Most of all I would like to stress that opportunities need to be found. They are not found following the index hugging herd nor the portfolio churning traders but rather through proper investment thinking about what is going on and identifying the long-term opportunities that others ignore. That is what William, John and their colleagues have been good at, along with providing an investment portfolio for shareholders that they cannot easily reproduce for themselves. That more than anything else gives your Board the confidence to believe that Hansa Trust can earn good positive returns for its shareholders over the long-term.

Signature

Alex Hammond-Chambers
Chairman

Group Income Statement

For the year ended 31 March 2009

	Revenue	Capital	Total	Revenue	Capital	Total
	2009	2009	2009	2008	2008	2008
	£000	£000	£000	£000	£000	£000
Losses on investments	-	(72,631)	(72,631)	-	(28,112)	(28,112)
Gain on derivatives	-	1,891	1,891	-	221	221
Exchange gains/(losses) on
currency balances	-	1	1	-	(1)	(1)
Investment income	6,479	-	6,479	5,541	-	5,541
	6,479	(70,739)	(64,260)	5,541	(27,892)	(22,351)
Investment Management fee	(1,276)	-	(1,276)	(1,838)	-	(1,838)
Write back of prior years' VAT	-	-	-	674	-	674
Other expenses	(616)	-	(616)	(729)	-	(729)
	(1,892)	-	(1,892)	(1,893)	-	(1,893)
Profit/(loss) before finance costs
and taxation	4,587	(70,739)	(66,152)	3,648	(27,892)	(24,244)
Finance costs	(113)	-	(113)	(200)	-	(200)
Profit/(loss) before taxation	4,474	(70,739)	(66,265)	3,448	(27,892)	(24,444)
Taxation	(87)	-	(87)	(144)	-	(144)
Profit/(loss) for the year	4,387	(70,739)	(66,352)	3,304	(27,892)	(24,588)
Return per Ordinary and 'A'
non-voting Ordinary share	18.3p	(294.8p)	(276.5p)	13.8p	(116.2p)	(102.4p)

The total column of this statement represents the Group's Income Statement, prepared in accordance with IFRS. The supplementary revenue and capital return columns are both prepared under guidance published by the Association of Investment Companies.

All revenue and capital items in the above statement derive from continuing operations.

Statement of Changes in Equity - Group

For the year ended 31 March 2009

		Capital				Capital
	Share	redemption	Retained		Share	redemption	Retained
	capital	reserve	earnings	Total	capital	reserve	earnings	Total
	2009	2009	2009	2009	2008	2008	2008	2008
	£000	£000	£000	£000	£000	£000	£000	£000
Net assets at 1 April	1,200	300	220,378	221,878	1,200	300	247,966	249,466
Loss for the year	-	-	(66,352)	(66,352)	-	-	(24,588)	(24,588)
Dividends paid	-	-	(3,120)	(3,120)	-	-	(3,000)	(3,000)
Net assets at 31 March	1,200	300	150,906	152,406	1,200	300	220,378	221,878

Statement of Changes in Equity - Company

For the year ended 31 March 2009

		Capital				Capital
	Share	redemption	Retained		Share	redemption	Retained
	capital	reserve	earnings	Total	capital	reserve	earnings	Total
	2009	2009	2009	2009	2008	2008	2008	2008
	£000	£000	£000	£000	£000	£000	£000	£000
Net assets at 1 April	1,200	300	220,378	221,878	1,200	300	247,966	249,466
Loss for the year	-	-	(66,352)	(66,352)	-	-	(24,588)	(24,588)
Dividends paid	-	-	(3,120)	(3,120)	-	-	(3,000)	(3,000)
Net assets at 31 March	1,200	300	150,906	152,406	1,200	300	220,378	221,878

  Balance Sheet of the Group and Company

as at 31 March 2009

	Group	Group	Company	Company
	2009	2008	2009	2008
	£000	£000	£000	£000
Non-current investments
Investment in subsidiary	-	-	635	637
Investments at fair value through
profit and loss	139,027	235,366	139,027	235,366
	139,027	235,366	139,662	236,003
Current assets
Trade and other receivables	1,150	2,398	1,150	2,398
Cash and cash equivalents	12,452	251	12,452	251
	13,602	2,649	13,602	2,649
Current liabilities
Trade and other payables	(223)	(16,137)	(858)	(16,774)
Net current assets/(liabilities)	13,379	(13,488)	12,744	(14,125)
Net assets	152,406	221,878	152,406	221,878
Capital and reserves
Called up share capital	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200
Capital redemption reserve	300	300	300	300
Retained earnings	150,906	220,378	150,906	220,378
Total equity shareholders' funds	152,406	221,878	152,406	221,878
Net asset value per Ordinary and
'A' non-voting Ordinary share	635.0p	924.5p	635.0p	924.5p

  Cash Flow Statement

for the year ended 31 March 2009

	Group	Group	Company	Company
	2009	2008	2009	2008
	£000	£000	£000	£000
Cash flows from operating activities
Loss before finance costs & taxation	(66,152)	(24,244)	(66,152)	(24,244)
Adjustments for:
Realised gains on investments	(13,181)	(6,646)	(13,181)	(6,646)
Unrealised losses on investments	85,812	34,758	85,814	34,759
Effect of foreign exchange rate changes	(1)	1	(1)	1
Interest paid	-	-	-	-
Decrease in current asset investments	-	-	-	-
Decrease/(increase) in trade and other
receivables	1,248	(1,661)	1,248	(1,661)
(Decrease)/Increase in trade and other payables	(114)	42	(116)	41
Taxes paid	(87)	(144)	(87)	(144)
Purchase of non-current investments	(6,974)	(42,801)	(6,974)	(42,801)
Sale of non-current investments	30,682	22,256	30,682	22,256
Net cash inflow/(outflow) from
operating activities	31,233	(18,439)	31,233	(18,439)
Cash flows from financing activities
Interest paid on bank loans	(113)	(200)	(113)	(200)
Dividends paid	(3,120)	(3,000)	(3,120)	(3,000)
(Repayment)/drawdown of loans	(15,800)	15,800	(15,800)	15,800
Net cash (outflow)/inflow from
financing activities	(19,033)	12,600	(19,033)	12,600
Increase/(decrease) in cash and cash equivalents	12,200	(5,839)	12,200	(5,839)
Cash and cash equivalent at 1 April	251	6,091	251	6,091
Effect of foreign exchange rate changes	1	(1)	1	(1)
Cash and cash equivalents at 31 March	12,452	251	12,452	251

INCOME

	Revenue  2009		Revenue  2008
	£000		£000
Income from listed investments
Dividends	3,474		3,840
Overseas dividends	2,454		1,564
	5,928		5,404
Other operating income
Placement and underwriting income	-		25
Interest receivable on AAA rated money market funds	487		108
Other interest receivable	64		4
	551		137
Total income	6,479		5,541
Total income comprises:
Dividends	5,928		5,404
Interest	551		112
Other income	-		25
	6,479		5,541

DIVIDENDS PAID

	Revenue		Revenue
	2009		2008
	£000		£000
Amounts recognised as distributions to equity holders in the year:
Final dividend for 2008: 9.5p (2007: 9.0p)	2,280		2,160
Interim dividend for 2009: 3.5p (2008: 3.5p)	840		840
	3,120		3,000

We set out below the total dividends paid and proposed in respect of the financial year, which is the basis on which the requirements of Section 842 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 are considered. The Company's revenue available for distribution by way of dividend for the year is £4,389,000 (2008: £3,305,000).

	Revenue		Revenue
	2009		2008
	£000		£000
Interim dividend for 2009: 3.5p (2008: 3.5p)	840		840
Proposed final dividend for 2009: 14.5p (2008: 9.5p)	3,480		2,280
	4,320		3,120

The proposed final dividend is subject to approval by shareholders at the Annual General Meeting and has not been included as a liability in these financial statements.

Notes:

1.     This Preliminary Announcement is not the Company’s statutory accounts. It is an abridged version of the Company’s full draft accounts for the year ended 31 March 2009, which have not yet been approved, audited or filed with the Registrar of Companies.

 

2.     The full draft accounts for the year ended 31 March 2009 have been prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) and using the same accounting policies as those in the last published annual accounts, being those to 31 March 2008.

 

3.     Statutory accounts for the 12 months ended 31 March 2008 have been delivered to the Registrar of Companies and received an audit report which was unqualified, did not include a reference to any matter to which the auditors drew attention without qualifying the report, and did not contain statements under Section 237 (2) and (3) of the Companies Act 1985.

 

Hansa Capital Partners LLP - Company Secretary

18 June 2009

 

END

 

 

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