Interim Management Statement

Hansa Trust PLC 10 August 2007 Hansa Trust PLC Quarter ended 30 June 2007 Investment Managers Report During the quarter under review, the Net Asset Value return per Ordinary and 'A' non-voting Ordinary shares amounted to 61.2p, a rise of 4.9% (Ex.Income), while the share price of the Ordinary shares fell by 1.3% with its premium to net asset value narrowing from 9% to 2.5% (Ex. income), and the share price of the 'A' non-voting Ordinary shares rose by 0.7% with its discount to net asset value widening from 0.7% to 4.7% (Ex. income). Quarter to 30 June 2007 Ordinary Shares 'A' Ordinary Shares Quarter Year to Date Quarter Year to Date NAV Total Return 5.79% 5.79% 5.79% 5.79% Share Price Total Return -0.53% -0.53% 1.61% 1.61% Equities generally made good progress over the quarter as markets became more optimistic about the outlook for global growth and the FTSE All-Share Index rose by 4.6% over the period. Global economic output growth remains robust while US economic activity has seen a recovery. Against the background of rising oil prices and fast money supply growth, central banks have become more determined to check inflationary expectations. While cost pressures from the labour market are not intensifying, the MPC remains concerned about rising inflation risks related to strong demand supporting margin rebuilding and rising pricing power. Rapid economic growth, limited spare capacity, and indications that businesses are poised to raise prices have heightened inflationary risks, or as the MPC puts it, 'most indicators of pricing pressure remain elevated'. Hence their decision to continue raising interest rates to engineer a reduction in demand and slow spending. However, although general concerns about inflation have increased, the sharp rise in medium and longer dated bond yields also has a lot to do with rising real yields, not nominal yields; more a reflection of synchronised global economic growth than a general fear regarding reigniting inflation. The wall of worry for the markets to climb has grown higher. Interest rates have been rising since mid-2004, but slowly and from ultra-low levels, as markets became more optimistic about the outlook for global growth, and central banks became more determined to check inflationary expectations, against the background of rising oil prices and fast money supply growth. Only now is global money supply growth starting to slow, serving to choke off liquidity, the oxygen of financial markets. The sell-off began in the US when investors were unnerved by signs that the problems in the subprime mortgage market were spreading to conventional loans, followed by the news that two of the biggest private equity deals of the year, namely the buy-outs of Alliance Boots and Chrysler were running in to difficulties, raising concerns that tighter credit conditions could derail the buy-out boom that has done much to support stock prices on both sides of the Atlantic. Facing increasingly choppy credit markets, investors are wondering if this is a short-term blip as the market digests recent credit market woes, or if this is the start of a full blown credit crunch ? Corrections are usually swift, while major downward moves tend to be slow and drawn-out. This has all the characteristics of a swift, sharp and relatively small correction. The excesses have mostly taken place in the mortgage, subprime, and other credit-lending areas, and it is these excesses which are now being squeezed out of the financial system. This is healthy. Here in the UK it looks like the current 5.75% overnight interest rate is high enough to soak up some of the UK's liquidity flood, to use an unfortunate analogy. The tide of rising house prices seems finally to have crested, with a minimal 0.3% average price increase in June, according to Hometrack. Wider credit spreads and lower share prices work like higher interest rates in discouraging excess investment and asset price bubbles. Meanwhile markets are swinging around to the din of US housing woes and cries of the beginning of the end of the private equity boom. It's very noisy out there and we suspect most of the bad news is already in the price. Put simply, we are facing a short-term financial liquidity crisis correction, a bit like October 1998, and we are not facing a full-blown economic liquidity crisis. The real economy out there is performing strongly. The correction lies within the financial sector and concerns anything there which has been bought on leverage and which suffers negative cash flow. Corporate balance sheets are on the whole in very rude health, and earnings yields, especially compared to bond yields, remain very attractive. We do not anticipate much higher borrowing rates and a monetary crunch which could cause serious financial stress, since inflation remains relatively tame. Hence we are not expecting a sustained widening in corporate spreads which could put an end to M&A and private equity transactions, although the pace of deals may slow, which is no bad thing. The secular forces of globalization and ensuing efficiency gains suggest that corporate profitability is likely to stay higher and for longer than investors expect. Capitalist economies tend to surprise in two ways, namely by their ability to generate productivity growth and depress costs, and by the flexibility and elasticity of their credit systems. Therefore we expect M&A and private equity transactions to continue because it is still very attractive to use debt to buy buoyant and sustainable corporate cash flows, particularly if there are cost savings and efficiencies to be gained by putting businesses together. The Board of Ocean Wilsons Holdings and the Board of Wilsons Sons decided to proceed with the flotation of Wilson Sons Ltd in April. Ocean Wilsons Holdings received approximately U$206m of proceeds and retains a 58.25% interest in the enlarged share capital of Wilson Sons Ltd. The IPO creates two distinct business arms for Ocean Wilsons Holdings Ltd, namely a majority shareholding in Wilson Sons Ltd, the newly listed company owning the Brazilian business, and the management of a U$300m portfolio of international investments. The IPO gives more visibility for Wilson Sons Ltd and access to capital to fund the accelerated growth of the Brazilian business, while also allowing Ocean Wilsons Holdings to realise value for shareholders through the sale of a minority shareholding in Wilson Sons whilst preserving a controlling and ongoing listed interest. Good for all parties. UBS have now taken up coverage of Ocean Wilsons Holdings, while ABN-AMRO and Credit Suisse have taken up coverage of Wilson Sons. Analysts are pencilling in Brazilian GDP forecasts of 4.6% for 2007, low inflation, a continuing improvement in the trade balance surplus, and a strong currency. Significant Holdings - either those more than 5% of Gross Assets (inc.Income) or Top Ten Holdings (%): Ocean Wilsons Holdings 31.5 Resolution 9.0 BRIT Insurance Holdings 3.9 Ark Therapeutics 2.9 JPM Sterling Cash Fund 2.3 BP 2.3 Scottish&Southern 2.2 Energy BG Group 2.2 Hargreaves Services 2.2 Eni 2.1 Total 60.6 No. of Holdings 58 Analysis of Assets (£m): Total Investments 257.7 Net current assets/ 1.7 (liabs) Total assets 259.4 Short-term borrowing 0.0 Net assets (ex Income) 259.4 Gearing 0.00% Net Cash 6.0 Sector Analysis (%): Strategic 31.5 Smaller Cap / AIM 24.0 Closed Life Funds 9.0 Natural Resoirces 9.0 Large Cap 6.3 Utilities 5.8 Property 7.4 (inc.Commitments) Insurance 4.6 Mid Cap 3.1 Cash Funds 2.3 of which Unquoted 4.6 There are NO Listed Investment Company holdings where the investee company has a policy that does not limit them to investing less than 15% of gross assets in other listed Investment Companies and there are no material changes to the most recent price and Net Asset Value(%): Share Price on £100 (£): Ordinary 'A' Ordinary 1 Year 146.30 141.70 3 Years 306.50 286.10 5 Years 357.40 327.00 10 Years 477.60 475.70 Performance Statistics (%): Fin.YTD 1 Yr 3 Yrs 5 Yrs 10 Yrs Net Asset Value (Ex Income) 4.9 41.9 145.6 205.6 324.2 Tot.Return on Net Asset 5.8 43.7 155.9 227.9 385.3 Value(#) Benchmark 1.7 6.7 20.2 34.5 76.7 Share Price - Ordinary -1.3 46.3 206.5 257.4 377.6 Tot.Return on Ordinary Shs -0.5 48.0 219.4 285.1 454.1 (#) Share Price - 'A' Ordinary 0.7 41.7 186.1 227.0 375.7 Tot.Return on 'A'OrdinaryShs 1.6 43.5 198.9 253.2 457.0 (#) FTSE All-Share Index 3.7 14.7 52.7 50.4 55.8 Tot.Return on FTSE All-Share 4.6 18.7 70.1 80.6 116.6 (#) Market Data Share Price NAV Ex.Inc.(p) (Discount) / Premium Gross Yield (%) (p) (%) Ordinary 1108 1080.79 2.5 1.1 'A' Ordinary 1030 1080.79 -4.7 1.2 FSA - Standardised Performance Information 12 mths Period (Bid to 2002Q2 to 2003Q2 to 2004Q2 to 2005Q2 to 2006Q2 to Bid) 2003Q2 2004Q2 2005Q2 2006Q2 2007Q2 Total Return %age - Ord -12.88 39.30 68.16 23.09 47.91 Total Return %age - -15.74 38.13 61.97 24.78 43.55 A.Ord Fund Details Fund Manager: John Alexander of Hansa Capital Partners LLP Launch Date: 1912 (name changed to Hansa Trust in October 2001) Investor Sector: UK Growth Capital Structure: 8,000,000 Ordinary shares of 5p 16,000,000 'A' non voting Ordinary shares of 5p Year End: 31st March Dividend: Final - ex date June, payment date August Interim - ex date and payment date December Directors: R.A. Hammond-Chambers, Chairman W.H. Salomon, Lord Borwick, Prof. G.E. Wood Ownership Board of Directors and connected parties own or are interested in 52.5% of the Ordinary shares. Managers: Hansa Capital Partners LLP - authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) Management Fee: Maximum of 1.00% per annum (payable by the Trust) Benchmark: 3 year rolling average composite of 5 year Govt.Bond Yield (with interest being re-invested semi-annually) + 2% from 1 April 2003 Investment Goals, Policy and Benchmark To achieve growth of shareholder value Hansa Trust PLC invests in a portfolio of special situations, where individual holdings or specific sectors may constitute a significant proportion of the portfolio or that of the equity of the companies concerned. This investment approach may produce returns which are not replicated by movements in any market indices. Performance is measured against an absolute benchmark derived from the three-year average rolling rate of return of the five year government bond with interest being re-invested semi-annually, plus 2 percent. Investments are intended to add value over the medium to longer term through a non-market correlated, conviction based investment style. FSA Investment Restriction: It is the stated policy of the Board not to limit investments in Investment Companies to less than 15% of gross assets as detailed in the FSA Listing Rules Chapter 21.20 (i) # NOTES: - Total Returns on Net Asset Value (Ex.Income) and Shares has been sourced from unaudited internal management information and from the Close WINS Investment Trusts database, and assumes that all dividends are re-invested. Other than Standardised Performance Information prices quoted are mid price and performance returns are mid to mid. Net Asset Value per share is calculated in accordance with the guidelines of the Association of Investment Companies in that income received by the company in the period since the last annual accounts is excluded. Total net assets are stated inclusive of income received. Hansa Trust PLC is a member of the Association of Investment Companies. Risk warning The information provided here has been issued by Hansa Capital Partners LLP, which is regulated by the Financial Services Authority. Share and performance information has been compiled by Hansa Capital Partners LLP. Past performance is not necessarily a guide to future performance as market and exchange rate movements may cause the value of shares and income from them to fall as well as rise, and an investor may not get back the amount invested. Investment Trust share prices may not fully reflect underlying net asset values. The spread on Investment Trusts typically averages 1-2% each way on the mid-market price (the price halfway between the bid and offer prices). However, investors wishing to invest in Hansa Trust 'A' shares should note that the market for these shares is at times quite illiquid which leads to a large spread between the buying and the selling prices, the bid to offer spread. For example, for the 'A' shares, as at 30 June 2007 the bid to offer spread was 1.36%*. * Source: Bloomberg This information is provided by RNS The company news service from the London Stock Exchange
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