Interim Management Statement
Hansa Trust PLC
10 August 2007
Hansa Trust PLC
Quarter ended 30 June 2007
Investment Managers Report
During the quarter under review, the Net Asset Value return per Ordinary and 'A'
non-voting Ordinary shares amounted to 61.2p, a rise of 4.9% (Ex.Income), while
the share price of the Ordinary shares fell by 1.3% with its premium to net
asset value narrowing from 9% to 2.5% (Ex. income), and the share price of the
'A' non-voting Ordinary shares rose by 0.7% with its discount to net asset value
widening from 0.7% to 4.7% (Ex. income).
Quarter to 30 June 2007 Ordinary Shares 'A' Ordinary Shares
Quarter Year to Date Quarter Year to Date
NAV Total Return 5.79% 5.79% 5.79% 5.79%
Share Price Total Return -0.53% -0.53% 1.61% 1.61%
Equities generally made good progress over the quarter as markets became more
optimistic about the outlook for global growth and the FTSE All-Share Index rose
by 4.6% over the period. Global economic output growth remains robust while US
economic activity has seen a recovery. Against the background of rising oil
prices and fast money supply growth, central banks have become more determined
to check inflationary expectations.
While cost pressures from the labour market are not intensifying, the MPC
remains concerned about rising inflation risks related to strong demand
supporting margin rebuilding and rising pricing power. Rapid economic growth,
limited spare capacity, and indications that businesses are poised to raise
prices have heightened inflationary risks, or as the MPC puts it, 'most
indicators of pricing pressure remain elevated'. Hence their decision to
continue raising interest rates to engineer a reduction in demand and slow
spending.
However, although general concerns about inflation have increased, the sharp
rise in medium and longer dated bond yields also has a lot to do with rising
real yields, not nominal yields; more a reflection of synchronised global
economic growth than a general fear regarding reigniting inflation.
The wall of worry for the markets to climb has grown higher. Interest rates have
been rising since mid-2004, but slowly and from ultra-low levels, as markets
became more optimistic about the outlook for global growth, and central banks
became more determined to check inflationary expectations, against the
background of rising oil prices and fast money supply growth. Only now is global
money supply growth starting to slow, serving to choke off liquidity, the oxygen
of financial markets. The sell-off began in the US when investors were unnerved
by signs that the problems in the subprime mortgage market were spreading to
conventional loans, followed by the news that two of the biggest private equity
deals of the year, namely the buy-outs of Alliance Boots and Chrysler were
running in to difficulties, raising concerns that tighter credit conditions
could derail the buy-out boom that has done much to support stock prices on both
sides of the Atlantic. Facing increasingly choppy credit markets, investors are
wondering if this is a short-term blip as the market digests recent credit
market woes, or if this is the start of a full blown credit crunch ?
Corrections are usually swift, while major downward moves tend to be slow and
drawn-out. This has all the characteristics of a swift, sharp and relatively
small correction. The excesses have mostly taken place in the mortgage,
subprime, and other credit-lending areas, and it is these excesses which are now
being squeezed out of the financial system. This is healthy. Here in the UK it
looks like the current 5.75% overnight interest rate is high enough to soak up
some of the UK's liquidity flood, to use an unfortunate analogy. The tide of
rising house prices seems finally to have crested, with a minimal 0.3% average
price increase in June, according to Hometrack. Wider credit spreads and lower
share prices work like higher interest rates in discouraging excess investment
and asset price bubbles. Meanwhile markets are swinging around to the din of US
housing woes and cries of the beginning of the end of the private equity boom.
It's very noisy out there and we suspect most of the bad news is already in the
price.
Put simply, we are facing a short-term financial liquidity crisis correction, a
bit like October 1998, and we are not facing a full-blown economic liquidity
crisis. The real economy out there is performing strongly. The correction lies
within the financial sector and concerns anything there which has been bought on
leverage and which suffers negative cash flow. Corporate balance sheets are on
the whole in very rude health, and earnings yields, especially compared to bond
yields, remain very attractive. We do not anticipate much higher borrowing rates
and a monetary crunch which could cause serious financial stress, since
inflation remains relatively tame. Hence we are not expecting a sustained
widening in corporate spreads which could put an end to M&A and private equity
transactions, although the pace of deals may slow, which is no bad thing. The
secular forces of globalization and ensuing efficiency gains suggest that
corporate profitability is likely to stay higher and for longer than investors
expect. Capitalist economies tend to surprise in two ways, namely by their
ability to generate productivity growth and depress costs, and by the
flexibility and elasticity of their credit systems. Therefore we expect M&A and
private equity transactions to continue because it is still very attractive to
use debt to buy buoyant and sustainable corporate cash flows, particularly if
there are cost savings and efficiencies to be gained by putting businesses
together.
The Board of Ocean Wilsons Holdings and the Board of Wilsons Sons decided to
proceed with the flotation of Wilson Sons Ltd in April. Ocean Wilsons Holdings
received approximately U$206m of proceeds and retains a 58.25% interest in the
enlarged share capital of Wilson Sons Ltd. The IPO creates two distinct business
arms for Ocean Wilsons Holdings Ltd, namely a majority shareholding in Wilson
Sons Ltd, the newly listed company owning the Brazilian business, and the
management of a U$300m portfolio of international investments. The IPO gives
more visibility for Wilson Sons Ltd and access to capital to fund the
accelerated growth of the Brazilian business, while also allowing Ocean Wilsons
Holdings to realise value for shareholders through the sale of a minority
shareholding in Wilson Sons whilst preserving a controlling and ongoing listed
interest. Good for all parties. UBS have now taken up coverage of Ocean Wilsons
Holdings, while ABN-AMRO and Credit Suisse have taken up coverage of Wilson
Sons. Analysts are pencilling in Brazilian GDP forecasts of 4.6% for 2007, low
inflation, a continuing improvement in the trade balance surplus, and a strong
currency.
Significant Holdings - either those more than 5% of Gross Assets (inc.Income) or
Top Ten Holdings (%):
Ocean Wilsons Holdings 31.5
Resolution 9.0
BRIT Insurance Holdings 3.9
Ark Therapeutics 2.9
JPM Sterling Cash Fund 2.3
BP 2.3
Scottish&Southern 2.2
Energy
BG Group 2.2
Hargreaves Services 2.2
Eni 2.1
Total 60.6
No. of Holdings 58
Analysis of Assets (£m):
Total Investments 257.7
Net current assets/ 1.7
(liabs)
Total assets 259.4
Short-term borrowing 0.0
Net assets (ex Income) 259.4
Gearing 0.00%
Net Cash 6.0
Sector Analysis (%):
Strategic 31.5
Smaller Cap / AIM 24.0
Closed Life Funds 9.0
Natural Resoirces 9.0
Large Cap 6.3
Utilities 5.8
Property 7.4
(inc.Commitments)
Insurance 4.6
Mid Cap 3.1
Cash Funds 2.3
of which Unquoted 4.6
There are NO Listed Investment Company holdings where the investee company has a
policy that does not limit them to investing less than 15% of gross assets in
other listed Investment Companies and there are no material changes to the most
recent price and Net Asset Value(%):
Share Price on £100 (£): Ordinary 'A'
Ordinary
1 Year 146.30 141.70
3 Years 306.50 286.10
5 Years 357.40 327.00
10 Years 477.60 475.70
Performance Statistics (%): Fin.YTD 1 Yr 3 Yrs 5 Yrs 10 Yrs
Net Asset Value (Ex Income) 4.9 41.9 145.6 205.6 324.2
Tot.Return on Net Asset 5.8 43.7 155.9 227.9 385.3
Value(#)
Benchmark 1.7 6.7 20.2 34.5 76.7
Share Price - Ordinary -1.3 46.3 206.5 257.4 377.6
Tot.Return on Ordinary Shs -0.5 48.0 219.4 285.1 454.1
(#)
Share Price - 'A' Ordinary 0.7 41.7 186.1 227.0 375.7
Tot.Return on 'A'OrdinaryShs 1.6 43.5 198.9 253.2 457.0
(#)
FTSE All-Share Index 3.7 14.7 52.7 50.4 55.8
Tot.Return on FTSE All-Share 4.6 18.7 70.1 80.6 116.6
(#)
Market Data Share Price NAV Ex.Inc.(p) (Discount) / Premium Gross Yield (%)
(p) (%)
Ordinary 1108 1080.79 2.5 1.1
'A' Ordinary 1030 1080.79 -4.7 1.2
FSA - Standardised Performance Information
12 mths Period (Bid to 2002Q2 to 2003Q2 to 2004Q2 to 2005Q2 to 2006Q2 to
Bid) 2003Q2 2004Q2 2005Q2 2006Q2 2007Q2
Total Return %age - Ord -12.88 39.30 68.16 23.09 47.91
Total Return %age - -15.74 38.13 61.97 24.78 43.55
A.Ord
Fund Details
Fund Manager: John Alexander of Hansa Capital Partners LLP
Launch Date: 1912 (name changed to Hansa Trust in October
2001)
Investor Sector: UK Growth
Capital Structure: 8,000,000 Ordinary shares of 5p
16,000,000 'A' non voting Ordinary shares of 5p
Year End: 31st March
Dividend: Final - ex date June, payment date August
Interim - ex date and payment date December
Directors: R.A. Hammond-Chambers, Chairman
W.H. Salomon, Lord Borwick,
Prof. G.E. Wood
Ownership Board of Directors and connected parties own or
are interested in 52.5% of the Ordinary shares.
Managers: Hansa Capital Partners LLP - authorised and
regulated by the Financial Services Authority
(FSA)
Management Fee: Maximum of 1.00% per annum (payable by the
Trust)
Benchmark: 3 year rolling average composite of 5 year
Govt.Bond Yield (with interest being re-invested
semi-annually) + 2% from 1 April 2003
Investment Goals, Policy and Benchmark To achieve growth of shareholder value Hansa
Trust PLC invests in a portfolio of special
situations, where individual holdings or
specific sectors may constitute a significant
proportion of the portfolio or that of the
equity of the companies concerned. This
investment approach may produce returns which
are not replicated by movements in any market
indices. Performance is measured against an
absolute benchmark derived from the three-year
average rolling rate of return of the five year
government bond with interest being re-invested
semi-annually, plus 2 percent. Investments are
intended to add value over the medium to longer
term through a non-market correlated, conviction
based investment style.
FSA Investment Restriction: It is the stated policy of the Board not to
limit investments in Investment Companies to
less than 15% of gross assets as detailed in the
FSA Listing Rules Chapter 21.20 (i)
# NOTES: -
Total Returns on Net Asset Value (Ex.Income) and Shares has been sourced
from unaudited internal management information and from the Close WINS
Investment Trusts database, and assumes that all dividends are
re-invested.
Other than Standardised Performance Information prices quoted are mid
price and performance returns are mid to mid.
Net Asset Value per share is calculated in accordance with the guidelines of the
Association of Investment Companies in that income received by the company in
the period since the last annual accounts is excluded. Total net assets are
stated inclusive of income received. Hansa Trust PLC is a member of the
Association of Investment Companies.
Risk warning The information provided here has been issued by Hansa Capital
Partners LLP, which is regulated by the Financial Services Authority. Share and
performance information has been compiled by Hansa Capital Partners LLP. Past
performance is not necessarily a guide to future performance as market and
exchange rate movements may cause the value of shares and income from them to
fall as well as rise, and an investor may not get back the amount invested.
Investment Trust share prices may not fully reflect underlying net asset values.
The spread on Investment Trusts typically averages 1-2% each way on the
mid-market price (the price halfway between the bid and offer prices). However,
investors wishing to invest in Hansa Trust 'A' shares should note that the
market for these shares is at times quite illiquid which leads to a large spread
between the buying and the selling prices, the bid to offer spread. For example,
for the 'A' shares, as at 30 June 2007 the bid to offer spread was 1.36%*. *
Source: Bloomberg
This information is provided by RNS
The company news service from the London Stock Exchange