Interim Management Statement

Hansa Trust PLC 25 January 2008 Hansa Trust PLC Quarter ended 31 December 2007 Investment Managers Report During the three months under review, the time weighted return of the portfolio was -4.74% (including income and after the payment of the interim dividend of 3.5p per share) and -5.84% excluding the investment in Ocean Wilsons. The Ordinary and 'A' Ordinary share prices fell by 17.73% and 17.98% respectively as both classes of shares traded to a wider discount to their net asset value. This compares with a rise of 1.68% in the company's benchmark and a fall of 0.30% in the FTSE All-Share Index (including income) over the quarter. The major negative contributors to the 49.3 pence per share loss were BRIT Insurance Holdings -13.0p and Ocean Wilsons Holdings -7.0p. The largest positive contributors were BG group +8.9p and resolution +6.0p. Quarter to 31 December 2007 Ordinary Shares 'A' Ordinary Shares Quarter Year to Date Quarter Year to Date NAV Total Return -5.04% -4.55% -5.04% -4.55% Share Price Total Return -17.39% -24.73% -17.63% -17.28% For much of the past six months the major company indices, led by big cap international stocks like the miners and oil-relateds, have suggested that the credit squeeze was primarily limited to the financial markets. This was reflected by the sell-off in bank shares as the underlying problems of uncertainty about the true value of asset-backed securities and counter party risk lingered on, leaving banks reluctant to lend to one another, with the resultant lack of liquidity in financial markets. In the middle of December, in an unprecedented move, the Bank of England, US Federal Reserve, European Central Bank, Bank of Canada and Swiss National Bank provided facilities worth billions of dollars to the money markets by way of auctions on much more flexible terms as to the mix of the securities offered by the banking fraternity as collateral. Since September, Middle Eastern and East Asian sovereign wealth funds have made a succession of investments in four US banks, thereby strengthening their balance sheets, namely Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley and Merrill Lynch. However it has become increasingly clear that it may take a long time for the banks to restore their mutual trust and confidence in one another and it has become increasingly fanciful to assume that the deleveraging in the banking sector, the very engine for credit creation, would not have an effect on the broader economy. Stockmarkets took fright early on this month amid deepening fears of a recession in the world's largest economy, after a closely watched report showed American unemployment climbing to its highest level in two years while the ISM Index of manufacturing activity contracted sharply. Here in the UK, fears that the credit crunch was also spilling over into the wider economy were highlighted by the Bank's report on tightening credit conditions as banks are curtailing lending activity and tightening lending standards, while Bank of England data showed mortgage approvals fell for a fifth month in a row in November, hitting their lowest levels in almost three years. The pressure on the housing market is intensifying as consumers find both the availability and price of mortgage debt off-putting against a background of dwindling disposable income, as a result of five interest rate increases between June 2006 and July 2007, along with increases in energy and food prices. In a nutshell, after the credit-fuelled boom in domestic demand and asset prices, the UK economy now faces a hangover, with slowing credit growth, tightening lending standards, falling property prices and the spectre of rising unemployment. The December study by the Recruitment and Employment Confederation and KPMG found that permanent job appointments have risen at the weakest rate for four and a half years as businesses become more nervous about the credit squeeze, while billings for temporary workers increased at their slowest pace for twenty months, adding to speculation that the labour market could be reaching its peak. It is likely that the corporate sector will react to any slowdown by taking action to protect margins and profit share in the economy by shedding labour and boosting productivity, which could herald redundancies in some sectors. Any resultant rise in unemployment could produce both a sharper slowdown and policy response from the MPC. Even though a semblance of normality has recently returned to the interbank market, the knock-on effects to the real economy of the credit crunch appear to becoming more severe. The January trading updates among the UK retailers all show a slowing consumer trend as well as demonstrating the high level of operational gearing in the sector. Sectors deemed exposed to the credit crunch such as property and consumer related stocks have been hammered, while investors are swift to punish any company whose figures or trading outlook disappoints, particularly in the case of smaller illiquid stocks. Significant Holdings - either those more than 5% of Gross Assets (inc.Income) or Top Ten Holdings (%): Ocean Wilsons Holdings 31.2 Resolution 11.3 BG Group 3.4 BRIT Insurance Holdings 2.9 Scottish&Southern Energy 2.8 BP 2.6 Eni 2.3 Ark Therapeutics 2.3 BHP Billiton 2.2 Hargreaves Services 2.1 Total 63.1 No. of Holdings 58 Analysis of Assets (£m): Total Investments 237.9 Net current assets/(liabs) -2.3 Total assets 235.6 Short-term borrowing 2.4 Net assets (ex Income) 233.2 Gearing 1.00% Net Cash 0.0 Sector Analysis (%): Strategic 31.2 Smaller Cap / AIM 22.5 Natural Resources 13.0 Closed Life Funds 11.3 Property (inc.Commitments) 7.7 Large Cap 6.0 Utilities 4.7 Insurance 3.9 Mid Cap 3.0 Investment Trusts 1.6 Hedge 0.2 of which Unquoted 5.7 There are NO Listed Investment Company holdings where the investee company has a policy that does not limit them to investing less than 15% of gross assets in other listed Investment Companies and there are no material changes to the most recent price and Net Asset Value(%): Share Price on £100 (£): Ordinary 'A' Ordinary 1 Year 88.40 97.10 3 Years 170.20 175.60 5 Years 366.20 367.00 10 Years 360.70 371.90 Performance Statistics (%): Fin.YTD 1 Yr 3 Yrs 5 Yrs 10 Yrs Net Asset Value (Ex Income) -5.7 7.7 82.9 225.2 251.4 Tot.Return on Net Asset Value(#) -4.5 9.0 90.1 247.2 301.0 Benchmark 5.1 6.8 20.1 33.9 74.6 Share Price - Ordinary -25.6 -11.6 70.2 266.2 260.7 Tot.Return on Ordinary Shs (#) -24.7 -10.5 76.9 293.2 317.2 Share Price - 'A' Ordinary -18.3 -2.9 75.6 267.0 271.9 Tot.Return on 'A'OrdinaryShs(#) -17.3 -1.6 82.9 295.0 334.0 FTSE All-Share Index 0.1 2.0 36.3 73.6 36.3 Tot.Return on FTSE All-Share (#) 2.5 5.6 51.7 108.5 89.3 Market Data Share Price NAV Ex.Inc.(p) (Discount) / Premium Gross Yield (p) (%) (%) Ordinary 835.00 971.65 (14.1) 1.4 'A' Ordinary 835.00 971.65 (14.1) 1.4 FSA - Standardised Performance Information 12 mths Period (Bid to Bid) 2002Q4 to 2003Q4 to 2004Q4 to 2005Q4 to 2006Q4 to 2003Q4 2004Q4 2005Q4 2006Q4 2007Q4 Total Return %age - Ord 41.20 59.34 49.79 27.54 -11.15 Total Return %age - A.Ord 39.45 54.93 45.22 23.39 -2.25 Fund Details Fund John Alexander of Hansa Capital Partners LLP Manager: Launch Date: 1912 (name changed to Hansa Trust in October 2001) Investor UK Growth Sector: Capital 8,000,000 Ordinary shares of 5p Structure: 16,000,000 'A' non voting Ordinary shares of 5p Year End: 31st March Dividend: Final - ex date June, payment date August Interim - ex date and payment date December Directors: R.A. Hammond-Chambers, Chairman W.H. Salomon, Lord Borwick, Prof. G.E. Wood Ownership Board of Directors and connected parties own or are interested in 52.5% of the Ordinary shares. Managers: Hansa Capital Partners LLP - authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) Management Maximum of 1.00% per annum (payable by the Trust) Fee: Benchmark: 3 year rolling average composite of 5 year Govt.Bond Yield (with interest being re-invested semi-annually) + 2% from 1 April 2003 Investment To achieve growth of shareholder value Hansa Trust PLC invests in a Goals, portfolio of special situations, where individual holdings or Policy and specific sectors may constitute a significant proportion of the Benchmark portfolio or that of the equity of the companies concerned. This investment approach may produce returns which are not replicated by movements in any market indices. Performance is measured against an absolute benchmark derived from the three-year average rolling rate of return of the five year government bond with interest being re-invested semi-annually, plus 2 percent. Investments are intended to add value over the medium to longer term through a non-market correlated, conviction based investment style. FSA It is the stated policy of the Board not to limit investments in Investment Investment Companies to less than 15% of gross assets as detailed Restriction: in the FSA Listing Rules Chapter 21.20 (i) # NOTES: - Total Returns on Net Asset Value (Ex.Income) and Shares has been sourced from unaudited internal management information and from the Close WINS Investment Trusts database, and assumes that all dividends are re-invested. Other than Standardised Performance Information prices quoted are mid price and performance returns are mid to mid. Net Asset Value per share is calculated in accordance with the guidelines of the Association of Investment Companies in that income received by the company in the period since the last annual accounts is excluded. Total net assets are stated inclusive of income received. Hansa Trust PLC is a member of the Association of Investment Companies. Risk warning The information provided here has been issued by Hansa Capital Partners LLP, which is regulated by the Financial Services Authority. Share and performance information has been compiled by Hansa Capital Partners LLP. Past performance is not necessarily a guide to future performance as market and exchange rate movements may cause the value of shares and income from them to fall as well as rise, and an investor may not get back the amount invested. Investment Trust share prices may not fully reflect underlying net asset values. The spread on Investment Trusts typically averages 1-2% each way on the mid-market price (the price halfway between the bid and offer prices). However, investors wishing to invest in Hansa Trust 'A' shares should note that the market for these shares is at times quite illiquid which leads to a large spread between the buying and the selling prices, the bid to offer spread. For example, for the 'A' shares, as at 31 December 2007 the bid to offer spread was 2.42%*. * Source: Bloomberg This information is provided by RNS The company news service from the London Stock Exchange
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