Final Results

Lindsell Train Investment Trust PLC
19 April 2002



Objective of the Company

To maximise long-term total returns subject to the avoidance of loss of absolute value and with a minimum objective to
maintain the real purchasing power of Sterling capital, as measured by the annual average yield on the 2.5% Consolidated
Loan Stock.

Financial highlights

Performance comparisons since establishment (22 January 2001 - 31 March 2002)
Middle market share price per ordinary share                    +21.5%
Net Asset Value per ordinary share                               +4.7%
Net Asset Value per ordinary share (adjusted for launch          +5.9%
expenses)
Benchmark*                                                       +6.1%
MSCI World Index (Sterling)                                     -16.3%
UK RPI Inflation                                                 +2.0%

Performance comparisons in the first performance period (22 January 2001 - 31 March 2001)
Middle market share price per ordinary share                    +14.0%
Benchmark*                                                       +1.0%

Performance comparisons in the second performance period (1 April 2001 - 31 March 2002)
Middle market share price per ordinary share                     +6.6%
Benchmark*                                                       +5.1%

* The index of the annual average yield on the 2.5% Consolidated Loan Stock between the relevant dates


Chairman's Statement

The share price of your Company has risen in value since establishment by 21.5% and by 6.6% since 31
March 2001. The net asset value rose by 4.7% and 4.3% over equivalent periods. The benchmark, as
illustrated on the previous page, rose by 6.1% and 5.1% respectively. This represents a satisfactory
outcome from the perspective of the share price exceeding the benchmark (the investment objective) but
that should be tempered by the realisation that over the long term the performance of the net asset value
('NAV') is likely to be the best indicator of the Company's success. As this has lagged the benchmark
over both periods there is some catching up to do.

In fairness the Manager deserves a plea for mitigating circumstances as over the last year returns from
the asset classes that they would normally invest in have been particularly disappointing. World
equities, as measured by the MSCI world index (in Sterling) fell by 5.9%, Global Bonds, as measured by
the JP Morgan Global Bond Index (in Sterling) rose by 0.4% and Sterling cash (annual average 1 month
LIBOR rate) rose by 4.6%. In light of these figures achieving a 4.3% advance in NAV is a satisfactory
outcome.

However it is important to remind shareholders that the NAV performance included the rise in the
Directors' estimate of the value of Lindsell Train Limited. Lindsell Train is valued with reference to
the formula detailed under 'Shareholder information' on page 11 of the placing memorandum. The value
represented the change in the simple average of three different valuation methodologies last updated at
the beginning of January. The Directors' policy is to adjust the value of Lindsell Train Limited at the
beginning of each calendar quarter.

5% of funds under management. Lindsell Train had £102m of funds under management at the end of December.
Value per share from this methodology was £1,926.

Book Value. Lindsell Train's unaudited book value at the end of December was £166 per share.

Earnings. The deemed earnings yield for the calculation was 7.99% (the annual average 2.5% Consolidated
Loan Stock yield plus 3%). The 3 month moving average of Lindsell Train's annualised monthly earnings
(less performance fees) in December was £43.50 per share which, when divided by the deemed earnings
yield, generated a value by this methodology of £544 per share.

The simple average of these calculations was £879 per share, a rise of £779 or 779% from the value at
cost. This contributed £519,000 (or 29%) to the total rise of £1,785,000 in the value of the NAV, before
expenses, since establishment.

Another contributor to the performance of the NAV was the Lindsell Train Japan Fund. The Company invested
just under 15% of its assets in the Fund on its establishment in May 2001. The Fund is designed to take
advantage of investment opportunities in Japan investing both long and short. In doing so it was able to
generate returns of 14.6% (in US Dollars) even though the market declined by 32.6%, as measured by the
TOPIX Index (in US Dollars). This illustrates the effectiveness of investing in alternative assets or
hedge funds, albeit measured over a short period of time. The Company further increased its allocation to
hedge funds with its investment in the Lindsell Train Global Media Fund. A small proportion of the Japan
Fund was sold to finance this and to bring the weighting in each to 12.5%, totalling 25% of the NAV, the
maximum permitted at cost. The Company's investment in Lindsell Train Funds in addition to contributing
£421,000 (or 24%) to overall returns helped to provide Lindsell Train with more critical mass in the
early stage of its development thereby nurturing the business of what could be the Company's most
important asset. (In doing so there was no double charging of fees on The Funds and no double counting of
assets in the funds-under-management calculation for valuing Lindsell Train Limited.)

The remaining £845,000 of value was generated by quoted equity, bond and cash investments, which the
Manager will describe in greater detail in the Manager's report overleaf.

The gross gain in value was reduced by the costs of running and establishing the Company. These amounted
to £844,000 and include performance fee payments of £309,000 and establishment expenses of £217,000. All
expenses have been charged to the revenue account. The Company generated a small profit of £50,000 for
the period since establishment. As the profit is lower than the maximum amount the Company could retain
under investment trust regulations, the Directors' propose paying no dividend for this financial period.
The Directors' policy is to retain as much profit as is permissible under investment trust regulations in
their belief that this policy is likely to be most tax efficient for the majority of investors in the
Company.

R Swire
Chairman
19 April 2002



Investment Managers' Report

Investment Portfolio

This is only our first annual review of the Company's investment strategy and portfolio, yet we already
feel that we are beginning to repeat ourselves, not that we regard consistency as in any way a bad thing.
Most of the investment issues we raised in the Interim Report remain alive, so far as we are concerned
and all the conclusions we arrived at then are unchanged. None of the investments we made in the first
year of the Company's life have been sold, excepting some short-dated government bonds for liquidity
purposes. Only three new investments have been made during 2002 and two of these effectively only
increased our exposure to existing positions. The shape of the portfolio has not altered materially,
although, as discussed below, we have added some debt to the structure. In other words, as we hope we
communicated to our investors, from the prospectus onwards, we do have genuinely long-term, strategic
views about asset prices and the outlooks for individual companies and once we have committed ourselves
to these views we hold them stubbornly. We hate selling successful investments and our primary response
to a temporarily unsuccessful investment is to look for an opportunity to buy more. Above everything
else, we are conscious of our fallibility when making tactical, short-term trades and acutely conscious
of the drag that transaction costs represent on long haul returns. Our inclination, therefore, is to keep
all such activity to a minimum, an inclination that we have stuck to through the life of the Company to
date. So, for better or for worse, we advise investors to expect the review which follows to be
reminiscent of that conducted at the interim and to act as a preview of the next report after this. Don't
expect much change, indeed worry if there is radical change, because that would mean that we had decided
that we are badly wrong about something.

Investment Review

Our starting point for portfolio construction is not an analysis of expected trends in economies, nor
even capital markets, though, of course, we are not immune from having views about the progress of each.
Rather, we analyse and select investments based on our assessment of whether they will enable us to meet
our minimum objective, that of outpacing the annual average yield on the 2.5% Consolidated Loan Stock,
currently 5.1%, with the minimum of risk.

It is fair to say, however, that we do harbour one macro-economic conviction and that that conviction is
reflected in the structure of the portfolio. The Company could still perform perfectly adequately if our
conviction turns out misplaced, but for us to generate exceptional returns for shareholders the view
needs to be a sound one. The conviction is that inflation in the developed world is likely to remain
surprisingly low for a surprisingly long time. What we mean by 'surprisingly low' is lower than the
inflation expectation built into the spread between the redemption yields on long dated conventional
government bonds and long dated index linked or inflation protected government bonds. The current implied
inflation expectation in the UK for the next 30 years is 2.9% pa (5.0%-2.1%) and in the US 2.4% pa
(5.9%-3.5%). By 'surprisingly long' we mean that we expect inflation to undershoot these market-derived
forecasts for a decade or more. In our view investors and consumers are going to get used to inflation of
between -1% and +1% pa. Until this level is regarded as 'normal', as it has been for most of financial
history, there is an opportunity in the capital markets, we believe.

The opportunity is two-fold. First, to profit from a further rerating of the highest quality, longest
dated fixed interest stock. Such a rerating commenced as long ago as 1982, when the US 30-year bond yield
peaked at 13.9% and has continued, with periodic setbacks associated with economic growth spurts, ever
since. An example of such a setback in this solidly established bull market for long bonds is current
market action. US yields today have retraced from the lows of last year, as evidence of recovery has
mounted. However, at a fraction below 6.0%, the 30-year yield is already approaching the 6.7% peak of the
last cycle, back in January 2000. We would be very surprised if the economic conditions of the immediate
aftermath of the Millenium, of combined capital and consumer spending boom, were to be repeated for a
very long time and therefore believe that government bond investors are being unduly pessimistic.
Straight government bonds, both US and UK, account for 29.6% of the Company's NAV, while quasi-bonds, two
preference shares and one convertible bond, make up another 13.2%.

This fixed interest opportunity is not, as some might expect, based on any conviction that bonds will
necessarily continue to outperform equities, as they have done over the past two years. Nor are we
convinced that returns from equities are certain to be lower in nominal terms than were generated in the
1980s and 1990s. It is simply that we expect a relatively low risk asset class, namely the highest
quality government bonds, to do well and to beat our investment hurdle. We want a substantive exposure to
such an opportunity before we consider riskier alternatives. If we are wrong about the course of US
inflation, some of the resulting investment pain could be mitigated by our holding of the US
inflation-protected bond, nearly half of our US bond position, which we expect to deliver acceptable
returns in any inflation environment. If we are wrong about the course of UK inflation our gilts holdings
will suffer, but we assume that Sterling would most likely weaken against the Dollar, which would be a
not trivial compensation, given our 52% total exposure to US Dollar assets.

Second, surprisingly low inflation should also benefit the type of equities that we are attracted to. Our
focus is primarily on companies possessed of durable, preferably immortal, business franchises. We like
these franchises to be growing, although current rates of growth are not as important to us as confidence
in the long-term sustainability of returns on equity. In our view, low growth, but secure franchises will
pay us attractive dividends and may deliver capital gain, if we are correct and bond prices do rise,
while secure franchises, which are growing to boot, should deliver exceptional returns, as their real
rate of growth accelerates and real returns on equity rise. Of the roughly 40% we have invested in quoted
equities, 12% is committed to low growth, enduring franchises, AG Barr, Wolverhampton & Dudley and
Wolters Kluwer, while 28% gives us exposure to businesses with higher real growth potential, Dow Jones,
Cadbury, HBOS, Glenmorangie, Nintendo and Reuters/Instinet. In addition, the 'long' exposures in the two
Lindsell Train funds tend to be made up of similar companies, meaning that the Investment Trust's net
exposure to 'our' kind of equity is higher than is immediately apparent.

Investment Activity

Here we highlight notable recent activity within the portfolio or events that challenge our views about
existing holdings.

One important development for the Company is our move to gear its balance sheet. As this report is
written we have borrowed £2.3m or 11% of NAV. Both Nick Train and Michael Lindsell (of the Investment
Manager) have lived through enough investment history to understand how dangerous debt can be and are
watching a debt-driven tragedy for the investment trust industry unfold even now. However, the quality of
our assets, the income they generate and our relatively modest and floating cost of borrowing, which we
expect to be lower in two years time, all encourage us to believe the current level of gearing is readily
supportable and can create value for shareholders. For instance, the debt is matched by the investment we
have made in two preference shares, which both offer a franked income yield higher than our cost of
borrowing. Thus we create a positive cost of carry, with the potential to earn capital gains if long bond
yields fall. We will borrow more, if we find assets that offer similar certainty of risk-adjusted return.

There are three new holdings. First, the HBOS 9.25% Irredeemable Preference Shares. We established this
position rather than adding to our existing Halifax Preference stock, because the new shares offer a
slightly higher yield and because of their irredeemability, which means they offer greater appreciation
potential when interest rates fall. Both stocks offer a yield comparable to that on a poor quality
corporate bond, say 9.0% gross, but are issued by one of the soundest credits in the UK financial
services industry. Your Company's total exposure to HBOS is now high, at 14%. Unfortunately we find no
other preference shares that, in our view, match the HBOS issues for credit quality. It goes without
saying that we are confident in the financial stability of HBOS, but the scale of our exposure makes us
most circumspect and sensitive to any deterioration in outlook.

Next, we made a 5.0% investment in the 'A' and 'B' shares of Glenmorangie, the last independent, quoted
Scotch single-malt whisky distiller. We believe the company is a wonderful store of value, with its
eponymous malt, which is still only very early into the exploitation of its potential as a global brand,
as well as other valuable properties, including Ardbeg, which really is the most delicious of all the
Islay malts. The share register is dominated by two holders - a family trust and Brown Forman Inc, the
distiller of Jack Daniels, which now owns 25% of the 'A' shares. Other shareholders, like us, must,
therefore, share similar ambitions and time horizons as these two strategic investors. We do, but
recognize that the success of this investment will become apparent over years, not the next few quarters
and that the shares are illiquid and susceptible to being ignored by investors for long periods. Indeed,
we were able to take advantage of the illiquidity of the stock to acquire our stake. Glenmorangie's
shares have recently been ejected from the FT Small Companies Index, because of low trading volumes. Some
investors who take indices literally have been forced to sell their shares, driving the price of the 'A'
shares down from £8.00 to £5.85, where we purchased our interest.

Finally, we have established a holding in a Daily Mail convertible bond, with a 2.5% coupon maturing in
2004. This bond is unusual, because it converts not into shares of the Daily Mail and General Trust, but
into the shares in Reuters that the Daily Mail has held on its balance sheet as a strategic investment
for many years. In truth the conversion terms mean that Reuters share price will have to rise
dramatically before the bond offers much equity value, although our view of the true worth of that
company means that such a gain is not impossible over the remaining two and a half years of the life of
the instrument. Meanwhile, the bond will generate a total return of over 4.0% per annum through to
redemption, so long as the Daily Mail does not default, a remote threat, we believe. The bond therefore
offers a certain, adequate return, with an option on a substantial recovery in Reuters' stock, which we
believe is possible.

Reuters itself has been the one really serious error of, being charitable, investment timing, that we
have made for the Company. We have lost 2.75% of NAV in the shares and its associated, quoted subsidiary
Instinet. We misjudged the extent to which the downturn in the investment banking industry would hit
Reuters' valuation, though, in our opinion, this downturn is not so relevant for the intrinsic value of
the company. The cycle will turn. However, we may also have misjudged the intensity of competition
confronting the company and missed a secular as well as cyclical problem. This makes us nervous. Yet it
remains easy to underestimate the strengths of Reuters. It has the largest installed base in its
industry, generates cash, has no debt and expenses £300m per annum on new product development. In our
experience, bad companies almost never become good companies. Unfortunately, the reverse does not hold
true and it is regrettably common for good companies to become bad ones. Nonetheless, Reuters has been
such a good company, for so many decades and its strategic flexibility is so great, that we are reluctant
to abandon it, especially after a 66% fall in price.

Conclusion

The strategy made modest amounts of money for our shareholders last year, through a hostile set of market
circumstances when losing money was disconcertingly easy. What the current strategy will not do is
generate an exciting return if equity markets embark on a sustained bull run. Yet we do not intend to
alter the current asset disposition, nor indeed vary the stock positions. This is not because we are
fantastically bearish of equity markets, although we do believe that recovery expectations are too high,
but because we place such a high value on protecting our clients' and our own capital. Of course, we must
take some risk simply to protect the real, post tax value of the capital entrusted to us and, indeed, we
have, by leveraging the Company, by purchasing long dated bonds and via the various stocks and fund
strategies. However we have not and do not intend to take as much risk as a policy of attempting to
maximise returns at all times and all costs would require. Our hope is that investors who share these
objectives will not only support the value of your company, but also the other Lindsell Train investment
mandates. If the Investment Management company were to prosper further, an enormously contingent 'if', of
course, then your investment trust might generate more exceptional returns on its net assets than the
current, rather risk-averse, strategy could deliver on its own.

N Train
Trust Manager
19 April 2002

The Lindsell Train Investment Trust plc
Statement of Total Return incorporating the revenue
account for the period end 31 March 2002
                                                            Revenue           Capital          Total
                                                              £'000             £'000          £'000
Gains on investments                                              -               727            727
Exchange differences                                              -                64             64
Gains on forward sales of Yen                                     -               112            112
Income                                                          882                 -            882
Investment management fees                                    (425)                 -          (425)
Other expenses                                                (383)               (5)          (388)

Net return before
finance costs and taxation                                       74               898            972
Interest payable and similar
charges                                                        (20)                 -           (20)

Return on ordinary
activities before tax                                            54               898            952
Tax on ordinary activities                                      (4)                 -            (4)

Return on ordinary
activities after tax for the financial period                    50               898            948

Dividends in respect of equity shares                             -                 -              -

Transfer to reserves                                             50               898            948

Return per Ordinary Share (pence):                            24.88            448.97         473.85

All revenue and capital items in the above statement derive from continuing operations.
The revenue account in this statement represents the profit and loss account of the Company for the
financial period.


Balance Sheet as at 31 March 2002
                                                                                                £'000
Fixed assets
Investments                                                                                    23,104
Current assets
Debtors                                                                      1,093
Cash at bank                                                                    53
                                                                             1,146
Creditors: amounts falling due within one year                             (3,302)
Net current liabilities                                                                       (2,156)
Total assets less current liabilities                                                          20,948
Capital and reserves
Called up share capital                                                                            50
Share premium account                                                                          19,950
                                                                                               20,000
Capital reserve - realised                                                                        156
Capital reserve - unrealised                                                                      742
Revenue reserve                                                                                    50
Equity shareholders' funds                                                                     20,948
Net asset value per Ordinary Share:                                                           £104.74


Cash Flow Statement for the period ended 31 March 2002
                                                                                                £'000
Net cash inflow from operating activities                                                         127
Returns on investments and servicing of finance                                                  (11)
Financial investment                                                                         (22,274)
                                                                                             (22,158)
Equity dividends paid                                                                               -
                                                                                             (22,158)
Financing                                                                                      19,783
Decrease in cash                                                                              (2,375)
Reconciliation of net cash flow to movement in net debt
Decrease in cash in the period                                                                (2,375)
Exchange movements                                                                                 64
Opening net debt                                                                                    -
Closing net debt                                                                              (2,311)
Reconciliation of movements in shareholders' funds
                                                                                                £'000
Opening shareholders' funds                                                                         -
Arising on issue of Ordinary Shares 22 January 2001                                            20,000
Net revenue for the period                                                                         50
Capital surplus for the period                                                                    898
Closing shareholders' funds                                                                    20,948


Notes
1. The statutory accounts for the period ended 31 March 2002 will be finalised on the basis of the financial
information presented by the Directors' in this preliminary announcement and will be delivered to the Registrar of
Companies following the Company's Annual General Meeting. Copies will be sent to shareholders shortly and will also
be available for collection from the Company's Registered Office at 77a High Street, Brentwood, Essex CM14 4RR.

2. The net asset value per Ordinary Share is based on net assets at 31 March 2002 of £20,948,000 and on 200,000
Ordinary Shares in issue at 31 March 2002.

3. Returns per Ordinary Share:
The calculation of the Revenue Return per Ordinary Share of 25 pence each is based on net revenue on ordinary
activities after taxation of £50,000 divided by 200,000 Ordinary Shares being the weighted average number of
Ordinary Shares in issue during the period.
The calculation of the Capital Return per Ordinary Share of 25 pence each is based on net capital gains for the
financial period of £898,000 divided by 200,000 Ordinary Shares being the weighted average number of Ordinary
Shares in issue during the period.

4. It is the intention of the Directors to conduct the affairs of the Company so that it satisfies the conditions
for approval as an investment trust company set out in Section 842 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988.

5. The Directors do not propose to pay a dividend for this financial period.



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