Final Results

Lindsell Train Investment Trust PLC 27 May 2005 THE LINDSELL TRAIN INVESTMENT TRUST PLC Objective of the Company The objective of the Company is to maximise long-term total returns subject to the avoidance of loss of absolute value and with a minimum objective to maintain the real purchasing power of sterling capital, as measured by the annual average yield on the 2.5% Consolidated Loan Stock. Highlights for the year Performance comparisons 1 April 2004 - 31 March 2005 Middle market share price per Ordinary Share +25.6% Net Asset Value per Ordinary Share ** +19.1% Benchmark * +4.7% MSCI World Index (sterling) +5.8% UK RPI Inflation (all items) +3.2% * The index of the annual average yield on the 2.5% Consolidated Loan Stock between the relevant dates ** Adjusted to include the payment of the dividend Chairman's Statement The share price* of your Company rose 27%, more than the 19% rise in the net asset value ('NAV')* and well in excess of the benchmark of 4.7%. It proved a good year for creating value for shareholders. I am glad to report that at the end of March 2005 the total NAV* return since the Company's inception in January 2001 was 23% which exceeds the rise in the benchmark over the same period (excluding adjustments for the payment of performance fees) of 21%. Unfortunately the shares have traded on a discount to NAV all year with the result that the market value of the Company still lags behind this measure of performance. The Directors would obviously prefer to see the share price trading in line with the NAV and recognise that the buyback powers they have could help bring this about but are equally reluctant to countenance a contraction in the size of the Company at this juncture of its development. Most of this year's gains come from the narrow list of equities the Company owns. Besides the near doubling of the share prices of Glenmorangie A and B in response to LVMH's purchase, Wolverhampton and Dudley* advanced 38%, AG Barr* by 44% and Cadbury Schweppes* by 26%. As all these positions began the year at more than 5% of NAV, their rises had a material contribution to the performance of the Company. At the other end of the scale, the only disappointment was Dow Jones* that by March 2005 had fallen 20%. It was fortunate the Manager trimmed the position by a quarter in May 2004, so by the year end it only accounted for 1.5% of the NAV of the Company. All but one of the long term fixed interest holdings beat the benchmark and in aggregate they performed far better due to the strong performance from the HBOS and Halifax Preference Shares* that generated a total return of 16% and 17% respectively. This year's performance was all the more pleasing when compared to the returns from equities in general as measured by the MSCI index in Sterling that advanced only 5.8% over the year. Apart from the effects of market movements, the sales to effect the small reduction in gearing last May and the takeover of Glenmorangie (both discussed in the interim statement) activity this year was focussed on building equity positions in Diageo and to a lesser extent Reed Elsevier. At the end of March 18% of NAV was invested in Lindsell Train managed funds. The Lindsell Train Japan Fund and the Lindsell Train Global Media Fund both generated satisfactory returns in calendar year 2004 of 12% and 16% respectively. However, in the first three months of 2005 the Funds fell 2% and 4% respectively. The Company's holding in the Finsbury Growth and Income Trust ('FGIT'), where Lindsell Train acts as the discretionary investment advisor, performed especially well in 2005 with its share price* rising 36%, outperforming by 23% the UK benchmark index and beating all other UK funds in its competitive universe. This performance was instrumental in helping to eliminate FGIT's share price discount to NAV and more recently has contributed an expansion of the mandate through issuance of new shares. The performance of your Company was enhanced by 32% total return from its 25% holding of Lindsell Train Limited. The Directors value the business at the equivalent of 2.1% net funds under management of £171 million as at December 2004 (excluding LTIT's interest), and a 5.5% historic dividend yield on a dividend that increased from £50 to £74.50 or 50%, representing 6% of the gross revenues of the Company. It is encouraging to note that most of Lindsell Train's mandates are achieving good performance. The UK long equity strategy had a banner year beating the index by 15%. As mentioned above both long/short strategies performed better than their peers. The Japan long only mandate had an encouraging first 14 months beating its benchmark index by 11% as at March 2005. As I have mentioned before, the prospects for future business are primarily governed by performance. With performance having improved over a broad front I would hope Lindsell Train will have increasing success in adding assets under management in the year ahead. On the basis of the Directors' dividend policy of retaining as much income as allowable, a dividend of 155p per share is proposed, a rise of 7% on last year. In the last year the profits of the Company had to bear the increased cost of financing debt, the interest rate on which began the year at 4.6% and ended it at 5.5%. Following the sale of Glenmorangie, debt service became less of a burden as net debt fell from 24% of net assets at its peak to 7% in March 2005. Following a second year of good performance, the Company is achieving what it set out to do. Growth of the Company's NAV since its inception has proved reassuringly resilient in difficult times and has generated appreciable absolute returns once the environment turned more benign whilst outperforming and exhibiting little, if any, correlation to equity market indices. At the same time the 25% investment in Lindsell Train has begun to contribute meaningfully to both overall returns and more specifically the income of the Company. The Directors believe there is more potential from both aspects of the strategy and expect a wider body of investors to appreciate the aims and aspirations of the Company which should help to narrow the current share price discount to NAV. It is with disappointment that I accepted the resignation of Michael Lindsell as a Director of the Company to enable it to comply with changes to the FSA Listing Rules. I and the Board look forward to continuing a close working relationship with Michael in his capacity as a director of the Investment Manager, Lindsell Train Limited, and to his re-joining the Board at sometime in the future. * Adjusted to include dividends R M Swire Chairman 27 May 2005 Investment Manager's Report Conscious of the gradual pace of change in both the strategy and the portfolio of the Company, we limit ourselves to only a brief recapitulation of the judgements that underpin the portfolio asset allocation as we are aware of the risk of repeating ourselves. However, we offer a fuller review of the opportunities we see for individual holdings. Investment Strategy As this is written, in early May, global equity markets have delivered, at best, modest returns in the calendar year to date. The US, Japanese and Asian equity markets are all down, in the case of the United States by over 3.0%, while the UK and Europe have registered gains, excluding income, of less than 2.0%. Meanwhile, government bond prices are up. German bond yields have recently hit record lows, while the long-dated US Treasury bond we hold in your portfolio has a capital gain in 2005, before income, of nearly 3.5%. We take this recent history as confirmation of our often repeated view that during a sustained period of surprisingly low inflation, as most would accept is the current experience of the developed world, government bonds can generate surprisingly competitive returns relative to equities. And the fact is that since the inception of your Company, in January 2001, government bond returns have crushed those from global equity markets. Looking forward, we still expect a further leg-up in the price of high quality government bonds, associated with an eventual marked decline in Anglo-Saxon consumers' appetite to borrow and spend. In an ideal world and we are conscious that the capital markets rarely permit investment strategies to be executed 'ideally', we hope to sell out of the bulk of our bonds at higher prices, during a period of relative disenchantment with equities. In conclusion, your portfolio has delivered competitive returns since its launch, up to and including last year - returns well in excess of the equity market averages, from a 'balanced' mix of assets. Recent events confirm us in our conviction that a combination of carefully selected individual equities, government bonds and funds - such as comprise your portfolio - gives us the best chance of delivering further competitive returns. Portfolio Review Government Bonds and Preference Shares Alan Greenspan worried earlier in 2005 that apparently low US long bond yields present a 'conundrum' and many UK capital market strategists describe the yield basis of the gilt market as a 'bubble'. Notwithstanding these concerns, government bond prices have been creeping up, as well as paying yields, which although low by the standards of the last 20 years, are at least positive and ahead of inflation. It seems to us that gradually rising prices, in the face of blanket scepticism are a pretty good indication that government bonds remain in a bull market. The time to worry about them, we think, will be after a pronounced consumer slowdown, rather than during its early stages, such as may well be the case currently, with, for example, the increasingly obvious effects on retail sales of UK house prices falling for 10 consecutive months. Our holdings remain of the longest dated, or in the case of the gilts, irredeemable, offering the best prospect for further material capital gain, if we are correct and yields continue to decline. The preference shares have met our hopes for them, of producing a high net annual income, nearly 7.0% on our book cost and steady capital appreciation. We see more to come and were intrigued by the failed attempt by HBOS to buy back for cancellation one of the preference shares we own. Institutions, including us, rejected the proposal, for the excellent reason that if we had sold the shares back to HBOS we would not have been able to reinvest the proceeds into any other paper offering a comparable yield with equivalent security (confirming the undervaluation of the issue, we think). There is a happy ending, because HBOS returned with a superior proposal - to roll the preference stock in question into a new issue, identical in every way, with one exception - a higher coupon. Lindsell Train Limited Managed Funds There is a discussion of the performance of these holdings in the Chairman's Statement. As the investment manager, we welcome the diversification and the return potential that the fund investments offer. The Japan Fund holding is valuable for Lindsell Train Investment Trust shareholders, we believe, because it offers access to a portfolio designed to benefit from certain developments in Japanese capital markets that 12 months ago would have been regarded as far-fetched by most experts on the region, but that today look increasingly plausible. I judge that this fund has more potential for gain than almost any other investment in the portfolio. The Media Fund gives exposure to a rapidly changing industry and some rapidly growing companies. The Finsbury Growth and Income Investment Trust generates a useful and growing income for your Company, delivered by a set of assets that represent our favourite opportunities amongst UK equities. Equities On balance we are delighted by the recent performance of the Company's equity portfolio, although we regret the loss of Glenmorangie to a bid during the course of the year, at a price that looks full only in the context of the next couple of years' earnings. Nonetheless, enough has gone wrong in our equity book to remind us how fraught many investors have found stock selection, even after the recovery in markets. In particular, Dow Jones has proven a very poor use of capital since we committed to it during 2001/2. The shares have fallen 20% on book cost for two prime reasons. First, the advertising cycle has not recovered in a way beneficial to this company, which relies on rising animal spirits on Wall Street and in the technology industry for its marginal growth, which, as yet, has not materialised. More important, we are disappointed that Dow Jones has been unable to demonstrate strong value creation from its Internet properties, which we believe should be important destinations for those seeking information about the US capital markets. The company has changed its Internet strategy recently and we look to a better harnessing of the 'Wall Street Journal' franchise. Nonetheless, Dow Jones shares have become very undervalued, we think and with no balance sheet risk and a dividend yield of nearly 3.0% we are looking to add to the position. Nintendo, too, has been a disappointment, still showing a loss on our original investment, albeit rallying 46%* to March 2005 from its low in May 2003. We back Nintendo to innovate and generate profitable growth from the video-gaming industry, which is young and has terrific prospects. The company's new 'DS' console is indeed innovative and selling extremely well, as the share price has acknowledged. We blush less fiercely today at the valuation of our investment in Reuters, the shares having staged a dramatic recovery, but they will need to double again before we can regard the investment a success. We think such a doubling is possible, though, as the current management, which has rightly earned respect for its achievement in rationalising Reuters' business portfolio, turns to generate growth out of the three exceptional franchises at the core of the company - the news gathering service, its dominant liquidity pool in currency trading and Reuter's lock on trading platforms across most of the world's leading investment banks. Our more successful stock selections have tended to be of a type - in companies with dependable, cash generative businesses and little or no exposure to the economic cycle (although this should not be taken to imply that Dow Jones, Nintendo and Reuters are not inherently cash-generative business models - they are). A.G. Barr, Cadbury Schweppes, Diageo, Reed Elsevier and Wolverhampton & Dudley all share these characteristics. Barr and Wolves, in particular, have rewarded their shareholders with strong dividend growth derived from well-executed business strategies. We have been fortunate to access these investments at such high starting dividend and earnings yields. An unexpected acceleration in Reed's dividend growth at the recent final results has provided the catalyst for a rerating of this company's stock, although only up 1%* from last March to 6 May 2005 and we expect more. Cadbury and Diageo have also performed well in 2005 and are holdings we have been able to add to over the last six months in a timely fashion. Both are now very significant portfolio positions. We believe that the merger between Procter & Gamble and Gillette, announced in January 2005 was a significant event for the global consumer branded goods industry and presages more consolidation at much higher prices than prevail in the stock market. Pernod's subsequent approach for Allied Domecq seems to confirm this belief. In this case, both Cadbury and Diageo appear to us to be valued well below their strategic worth (and A.G. Barr, a most unlikely merger candidate, is absurdly cheap). In the meantime, both have opportunities for organic growth, which with operating profit margins in the mid-twenties, will likely prove as value-creating for owners as it has in the past. Gearing The payment of the Glenmorangie monies significantly reduced the Company's borrowings, to 7% at the end of March 2005, conveniently at a time when increases in short term rates had made gearing more expensive than at any stage of its life. The resultant reduction in interest costs increases the Company's dividend paying potential. Nonetheless, we would prefer to be somewhat more highly leveraged, if that was the result of our identification of several investment ideas that promised total returns well in excess of our cost of borrowing. As always, we are tracking a number of opportunities and will alert shareholders in the monthly reports if and when we commit to any. *Adjusted to include dividends N Train Investment Manager Lindsell Train Limited 27 May 2005 THE LINDSELL TRAIN INVESTMENT TRUST PLC Statement of Total Return incorporating the revenue account for the year ended 31 March 2005 2005 2004 Revenue* Capital Total Revenue* Capital Total £'000 £'000 £'000 £'000 £'000 £'000 Gains on investments - 3,417 3,417 - 2,029 2,029 Exchange differences - (37) (37) - (68) (68) Gains on forward currency - 72 72 - 24 24 contracts Income 864 - 864 775 - 775 Investment management (106) - (106) (92) - (92) fees Other expenses (116) (1) (117) (111) (2) (113) Net return before finance 642 3,451 4,093 572 1,983 2,555 costs and taxation Interest payable and (208) - (208) (159) - (159) similar charges Return on ordinary 434 3,451 3,885 413 1,983 2,396 activities before tax Tax on ordinary (3) - (3) (6) - (6) activities Return on ordinary 431 3,451 3,882 407 1,983 2,390 activities after tax for the financial year Dividends in respect of (310) - (310) (290) - (290) equity shares Transfer to reserves 121 3,451 3,572 117 1,983 2,100 Return per Ordinary £2.16 £17.25 £19.41 £2.03 £9.92 £11.95 Share: All revenue and capital items in the above statement derive from continuing operations. * The revenue account in this statement represents the profit and loss account of the Company for the financial year. Balance Sheet as at 31 March 2005 2005 2004 £'000 £'000 Fixed assets Investments 25,272 24,182 Current assets Debtors 1,021 907 Cash at bank 796 7 1,817 914 Creditors: amounts falling due within one year (3,503) (5,082) Net current liabilities (1,686) (4,168) Total assets less current liabilities 23,586 20,014 Capital and reserves Called up share capital 150 150 Special reserve 19,850 19,850 20,000 20,000 Capital reserve - realised 1,124 (33) Capital reserve - unrealised 2,068 (226) Revenue reserve 394 273 Equity shareholders' funds 23,586 20,014 Net asset value per Ordinary Share: £117.93 £100.07 Cash Flow Statement for the year ended 31 March 2005 2005 2004 £'000 £'000 Net cash inflow from operating activities 639 585 Returns on investments and servicing of finance (214) (153) Financial investment 2,383 (1,522) 2,808 (1,090) Equity dividends paid (290) (260) Increase / (decrease) in cash 2,518 (1,350) Reconciliation of net cash flow to movement in net debt Increase / (decrease) in cash in the year 2,518 (1,350) Exchange movements (37) (68) Opening net debt (4,074) (2,656) Closing net debt (1,593) (4,074) Reconciliation of movements in shareholders' funds 2005 2004 £'000 £'000 Opening shareholders' funds 20,014 17,914 Net revenue for the year 431 407 Dividend (310) (290) Capital surplus for the year 3,451 1,983 Closing shareholders' funds 23,586 20,014 Notes The statutory accounts for the year ended 31 March 2005 will be finalised on the basis of the financial information presented by the Directors in this preliminary announcement and will be delivered to the Registrar of Companies following the Company's Annual General Meeting. Copies will be sent to shareholders shortly and will also be available for collection from the Company's Registered Office at 77a High Street, Brentwood, Essex CM14 4RR. The above results at 31 March 2004 are an abridged version of the Company's full accounts which received an audit report that was unqualified and did not contain statements under Section 237(2) or (3) of the Companies Act 1985 and which have been filed with the Registrar of Companies. The net asset value per Ordinary Share is based on net assets of £23,586,000 (2004: £20,014,000) and on 200,000 Ordinary Shares (2004: 200,000), being the number of Ordinary Shares in issue at the year end. Return per Ordinary Share: Revenue Return: The calculation of the revenue return per Ordinary Share is based on net revenue on ordinary activities after taxation of £431,000 (2004: £407,000) divided by 200,000 Ordinary Shares (2004: 200,000) being the weighted average number of Ordinary Shares in issue during the year. Capital Return: The calculation of the Capital Return per Ordinary Share is based on net capital gains for the financial year of £3,451,000 (2004: £1,983,000) divided by 200,000 Ordinary Shares (2004: 200,000) being the weighted average number of Ordinary Shares in issue during the year. It is the intention of the Directors to conduct the affairs of the Company so that it satisfies the conditions for approval as an investment trust company set out in section 842 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988. The Directors have proposed the payment of a final dividend of 155p (2004: 145p) per Ordinary Share payable on 14 July 2005 to shareholders registered on 17 June 2005 (ex-dividend 15 June 2005). This information is provided by RNS The company news service from the London Stock Exchange
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