Interim Management Statement

Lindsell Train Investment Trust PLC 23 January 2008 The Lindsell Train Investment Trust PLC As at 31 December 2007 Fund Objective To maximise long-term total returns subject to the avoidance of loss of absolute value and with a minimum objective to maintain the real purchasing power of Sterling capital, as measured by the annual average yield on the 2.5% Consolidated Loan Stock. Net Asset Value GBP 171.42 Share Price GBP 161.50 Premium (Discount) (5.79%) Market Capitalisation GBP 33.1mn Benchmark (2 1/2% Con Ann Avg Yield +4.5%) +0.4 Source: Bloomberg; NAV-Lindsell Train. Share Price quoted is closing mid price. See Benchmark definition. Performance History (based in 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 YTD 2007 GBP) Net Asset Value TR% -9.6 +3.1 +23.7 +16.5 +13.7 +17.7 Share Price TR% -19.8 -8.7 +20.6 +27.5 +20.1 +8.1 Source: LTL and Bloomberg. Performance years listed Jan - Dec. Launch date 22 Jan 2001. TR=Total Return (with dividends reinvested) Past performance is not a guide to future performance. The price of units and the income from them may go down as well as up. Investors may not get back what they invested. 2006 Performance Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Net Asset Value TR% +0.9 +1.9 +1.2 -1.8 -2.0 +1.8 +1.7 +2.1 +3.2 +0.5 +0.2 +2.8 Share Price TR% -3.0 +7.5 +1.5 +3.4 -1.5 -2.6 +3.2 +4.1 +5.7 +3.0 +3.6 -1.6 Source: LTL and S&P Micropal unless otherwise indicated. Performance years listed Jan - Dec. Launch date 22 Jan 2001. TR=Total Return (with dividends reinvested) 2007 Performance Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Net Asset Value TR% +2.0 +0.8* +1.9 +2.6 +4.5 -3.1 +2.5 -1.6 +0.6 +3.6 -0.1 +0.6 Share Price TR% -1.3 +4.0 +3.1 +4.5 +2.0 +0.6 -2.4 +5.2 +0.3 +5.2 -10.1 -2.0 Source: LTL and Bloomberg unless otherwise indicated. Performance years listed Jan - Dec. Launch date 22 Jan 2001. TR= Total Return (with dividends reinvested) *Source: Lindsell Train Ltd . Past performance is not a guide to future performance. The price of units and the income from them may go down as well as up. Investors may not get back what they invested. Industry Breakdown % of NAV Bonds 14.2 Preference Shares 8.6 Equity - Media 24.4 Equity - Banks & Investment Co. 7.2 Equity - Leisure & Ent. 4.9 Equity - Food & Beverage 27.5 Equity - Consumer Goods 1.9 Equity - Internet 1.4 Investment Funds 21.2 Cash & Equivalent (11.3) Total 100.0 Source: Lindsell Train Top 10 Holdings % of NAV Nintendo 13.1 Lindsell Train Global Media (Dist) 11.8 Cadbury Schweppes 8.8 HBOS 9.25% Non Cum Pref 8.6 Barr AG 8.3 Diageo 7.3 Lindsell Train Ltd 7.2 Morgan Stanley USD 6.4 Lindsell Train Japan (Dist) 5.9 2 1/2% Consolidated Loan Stock 5.5 Source: Lindsell Train Fund Exposure Bonds Prefs Equity Funds Cash % of NAV UK % 9.7 8.6 47.9 3.4 (13.2) 56.4 USA % 4.6 - 1.4 - 6.4 12.4 Europe (ex UK) % - - 4.9 - (2.6) 2.3 Japan % - - 13.1 5.9 (1.9) 17.1 Global % - - - 11.8 - 11.8 Total 14.3 8.6 67.3 21.1 (11.3) 100.0 Source: Lindsell Train Interim Management Statement Over the final quarter of calendar year 2007 the NAV gained 4.3%. This performance came against a dull backdrop for capital markets, with most major equity indices down. The Company continues, therefore, to generate differentiated returns, consistent with the Managers' focus on long-term wealth preservation, rather than the targeting of any particular relative measure of return. Performance was benefited by another double digit gain in Nintendo shares, an exceptional investment for the Company, but now where some profits have been taken. In addition, the two Lindsell Train funds made progress, led by the Japan Fund, whose strategy anticipated a difficult period for Japanese equities, as has materialized. The government fixed interest holdings delivered positive returns, as inflation expectations fell, along with consumer confidence in Anglo-Saxon economies. Finally, a rally in the US Dollar, or a fall in Sterling, helped the NAV, given the cumulative exposure to Dollar assets in the portfolio - the two funds, bonds, individual equities and some cash. The Managers believe further weakness in Sterling is possible. Rhoddy Swire, Chairman Fund Manager's Comments The NAV closed the year at an all-time high of £171.4, up 0.6% on the month and nearly 18% for the year with dividends. We were pleased with its resilience during the second half, when losing money, particularly on individual equities, was disturbingly easy. The strain was taken by the non-equity assets and non-consensus positions we hold. There are three worthy of mention. First, the government bonds, where the gilts gained over 10% in H2, compared to a 3.5% decline in the FT All-Share, with the US Treasuries up 9.0%. We can imagine bond prices rising further into 2008, as evidence mounts of a serious contraction in Anglo-Saxon consumer demand and as insurance against systemic risk for global banks. Given the unarguable presence of such risk, it is not surprising, though disappointing for us, that the HBOS preference shares performed poorly in H2, down 12%. We hope this important holding has potential in 2008, if long and short rates continue to fall and the credit crunch eases. Next, the hedge funds both enjoyed banner years, each returning, coincidentally, c28% in US Dollars. The conditions were ideal for the Japan Fund, being net short in a bear market and short, in the main, of cyclicals, often with weak balance sheets and the NAV rose 15% since end June. The Media Fund is net long, but the shorts contributed, as increased competition undermined the shares of US cable and satellite companies. Meanwhile, much of the long book has missed out the bull market of recent years (so out of favour has the Media sector been) and therefore bore up pretty well. The focus of the long books for each fund is cash-generative, non-cyclical growth companies and we hope these will be attractive to other investors in 2008. Finally, the weakness of Sterling has helped, hitting new lows against the Euro and breaking below $2.00, boosting the capital value and income streams from the Euro and Yen equities and, especially, the dollar denominated hedge funds, bonds and some Dollar cash (augmented last month by the proceeds from the takeover of Dow Jones). Pontification by us about currency trends in earlier years proved predictably vapid and we will not risk any more than to observe that further Sterling weakness against the Dollar would surprise market participants and that this unexpectedness gives scope for it to be of greater extent and duration than otherwise. During December there was a welcome 11% gain in Reed Elsevier's share price - welcome because it is a significant holding not only in your Company and the Media Fund, but across our UK portfolios too. The jump was occasioned by Reed's confirmation of its sale of its education division, with an imminent distribution to shareholders of the realized cash. Of more significance, Reed reassured on current trading for its remaining interests in scientific, legal and business publishing. We think Reed is in a very sweet spot currently. It is a conservatively financed, big Dollar earner, sitting in a stock market sector where expectations are low, with a secular growth opportunity that investors have yet to give it credit for. Here is the essence of that opportunity, described by CEO Crispin Davis in a recent interview - 'Two or three years ago, Lexis-Nexis (Reed's legal publishing unit) was a legal publishing research company, full stop. By and large, a typical lawyer would spend half an hour a day using our products. Now it is more like two to three hours. What we have done is expand into much more of his work flow.' In 2004, Davis noted, the market for legal research was $18bn pa, today 'legal solutions' is a $48bn pa opportunity. Reed rose 24% in 2007, after years of share price stagnation and underperformance. We hope for more and more from Nintendo, Pearson and Reuters, all, like Reed, exploiting advances in distribution technology to enhance their products and widen their markets. Also in December, Nelson Peltz' vehicle, Trian, not only announced an increase in its stake in Cadbury to 4.5%, it also publicized a letter to Cadbury's board, detailing criticisms and proposals for improving profitability. It intrigued us that Trian's indicated strategic target price for Cadbury of £9.70 is so close to Lindsell Train's longstanding price objective of £10.00. Trian gets to its number with more aggressive financial leverage than we would be comfortable with, while our work assumes a lower cost of equity than Trian's. Whichever, at £6.05, Cadbury stock is far off both goals. I added modestly to my family's holding in the Lindsell Train Investment Trust early in 2008 (using up ISA allowances). This despite the unsettled outlook for capital markets and a mixed year for LT Ltd investment performance (with Japan outstanding, but the UK underperforming its benchmarks). On balance, though, we expect lower interest rates to spur markets into 2008 and believe the management company still has great potential to add assets - to the benefit of your Company's 25% stake. We'd be pleased if that combination allowed us to deliver a return to match last years. Fund Manager Launch Date Denomination Nick Train 22 Jan 2001 GBP Year End Dividend Benchmark 31st Mar Ex Date: June The annual average yield on the 21/2% Payment: August Consolidated Loan Stock. The Board Management Fees Registered Address Rhoddy Swire Standard Fee: 0.65% Lindsell Train Investment Trust Donald Adamson Performance Fee: 10% of annual increase Springfield Lodge, Colchester Road Dominic Caldecott in the share price above the gross Chelmsford Michael Lindsell annual yield of the 21/2% Consolidated ESSEX CM2 5PW Michael Mackenzie Loan Stock. ISIN Secretary Listing GB0031977944 Phoenix Administration Services Limited London Stock Exchange Bloomberg LTI LN Disclaimer Risk Warning This factsheet is intended for use by shareholders of the Lindsell Train Investment Trust ('LTIT') and/or persons who are authorised by the UK Financial Services Authority or those who are permitted to receive such information in the UK. Any opinion expressed whether in general or both on the performance of individual securities and in a wider economic context represents Lindsell Train's views at the time of preparation. They are subject to change without notice and should not be construed as investment advice or investment recommendation. Past performance is not a guide to future performance and may not be repeated. The value of investments and income from them can go down as well as up and you may not get back the amount originally invested. Lindsell Train Investment Trust plc is an investment trust company listed on the London Stock Exchange. Investment trusts have the ability to borrow to invest which is commonly referred to as gearing. Companies with higher gearing are subject to higher risks and therefore the investment value may change substantially. The net asset value ('NAV') per share and its performance of an investment trust may not be the same as its market share price per share and performance. Issued by Lindsell Train Limited Authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority 17 Jan 2007 LTL 000-057-1 Lindsell Train Limited 2 Queen Anne's Gate Buildings, Dartmouth Street, London SW1H 9BP U.K. Tel. +44 20 7227 8200 Fax. +44 20 7227 8299 enquiry@lindselltrain.com www.lindselltrain.com Lindsell Train Limited is authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority. This information is provided by RNS The company news service from the London Stock Exchange
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