Interim Results
Lindsell Train Investment Trust PLC
13 November 2001
Objective of the Company
To maximise long-term total returns subject to the avoidance of loss of
absolute value and with a minimum objective to maintain the real purchasing
power of Sterling capital, as measured by the annual average yield on the
2.5% Consolidated Loan Stock.
Financial highlights
Performance comparisons since establishment (22 January 2001 -
30 September 2001)
Middle market share price per ordinary share +3.5%
Net Asset Value per ordinary share -2.8%
Net Asset Value per ordinary share (adjusted for launch
expenses) -1.8%
Benchmark* +3.4%
MSCI World Index (Sterling) -25.0%
UK RPI Inflation +2.5%
Performance comparisons in the first performance period (22 January 2001 - 31
March 2001)
Middle market share price per ordinary share +14.0%
Benchmark* +1.0%
Performance comparisons in the current performance period (1 April 2001 - 30
September 2001)
Middle market share price per ordinary share -8.4%
Benchmark* +2.4%
* The index of the annual average yield on the 2.5% Consolidated Loan Stock
between the relevant dates
Chairman's Statement
The first eight months of the Company's existence has proved a traumatic time
for many of the markets in which it invests. The share price of your Company
rose in value by 3.5% since the establishment of the Company on 22 January
2001. However the net asset value (NAV) fell in value by 2.8% or 1.8% having
adjusted the starting NAV for the total costs of the launch.
Unusually this interim report covers two performance periods, one that began on
establishment of the Company and ended on 31 March 2001 and the other that
began on 1 April 2001 and will extend to 31 March 2002. The performance periods
are significant in that they determine the measurement of performance of your
Company's share price versus the benchmark index, the annual average yield on
the 2.5% Consolidated Loan Stock. Also at the end of a performance period the
benchmark will be adjusted upwards if a performance fee has been paid to the
Managers.
During the first performance period the share price outperformed the benchmark
rising 14% versus 1%. As the result the Managers were paid a performance fee of
£243,638. Also the Directors earned bonuses in addition to their fixed fees of
£24,364. Following the payment of the fee, the benchmark was reset at £113.13
for the beginning of the current performance period. In order for the Managers
to earn a performance fee in the current performance period the share price
needs to rise above this level plus the annual average yield of the 2.5%
Consolidated Loan Stock. At the current yield this would equate to £118.8.
The performance includes the Directors estimate of the value of Lindsell Train
Limited, which was the first investment bought by the Company on 22 January
2001. The cost of the 25% stake was £100 per share or £66,600 and its value on
30 September 2001 was £715 per share or £476,190. This represented 2.4% of the
NAV. The Directors' value of Lindsell Train was calculated with reference to
the formula detailed under 'Shareholder Information' on page 11 of the Placing
Memorandum.
The Directors' value, was last updated after the end of June and represented
the simple average of three separate valuation methodologies based on:
5% of funds under management. At the end of June Lindsell Train had £115m of
assets under management. Value per share from this methodology was £2,157 per
share.
Book value. Lindsell Train's book value was £59 per share at the end of June.
Earnings. The deemed earnings yield for the calculation was 7.93% (the annual
average 2.5% Consolidated Loan Stock yield plus 3%). However the moving average
of Lindsell Train's annualised monthly earnings was negative so this part of
the formula equalled zero.
The average of these three calculations was £739 per share. The 3 month moving
average of these monthly calculations reduced this figure to £715 per share.
The Managers Review addresses the structure of the portfolio and the investment
assumptions that lie behind it. Despite the recent fall in the NAV, I believe
this to be an encouraging start for your Company. Capital has been all but
preserved in the most difficult of environments and Lindsell Train has executed
its business plan with more success than anticipated in its first year of
operation. In addition to managing your assets Lindsell Train manages the
Finsbury Growth Trust and the Lindsell Train Japan Fund and plans a forthcoming
launch of a Global Media Fund. The latter two Funds are open ended 'hedge
funds' that have a greater flexibility to generate returns in poor market
conditions such as those today. Success in delivering these returns gives
Lindsell Train a chance to raise further assets to grow its revenue and
profits.
R Swire
Chairman
13 November 2001
Managers' Report
Shareholders will recall that the stated investment objective of the Company is
to earn an annual total return in excess of the annual average yield on the
2.5% Consolidated Loan Stock. Over the very long term we are convinced that
equities must generate the bulk of this required return. This is because the
yield on the Consol contains, we believe, a significant inflation risk premium
and any policy of owning low risk nominal assets, like cash or government or
corporate bonds, is unlikely to enable us to exceed that premium, except
tactically. Moreover, cash and government bonds deliver only net returns to an
investment trust and are taxed punitively, meaning they are even less likely to
help us to outstrip our gross hurdle.
Notwithstanding this conviction, the Company has today a far lower commitment
to equities than was suggested in the prospectus and lower, probably, than is
consistent with meeting our long run investment objective. Meanwhile, we own
more bonds than we expected, probably more than is tax-effective over the
medium term. It is important to disaggregate the reasons for this current
allocation, not least because the discussion gives clues about the likely
trigger and timing for an increased exposure to stocks. There are three.
First and perhaps least significant, we correctly judged that it was going to
be difficult to make money in global equities through the period immediately
subsequent to flotation. Given that recognition, it seemed rational to approach
the equity market with caution. However, we attach low confidence to our
ability to predict short term moves in the equity market but have rather higher
confidence that the equity of companies that meet our selection criteria will
handsomely beat the investment hurdle. For this reason, we have been adding to
existing holdings, on price falls, and will continue to do so. Thus, the
build-up of the equity allocation will be driven by our reaction to
increasingly attractive offers of stock, rather than any attempt to time a
market turn.
Second, for tactical reasons, say a twelve to eighteen month view, we favour a
'high' commitment to bonds. This is because we expect the fall-out in stock
markets to be associated with at least a deceleration in economic growth rates
in the developed world and a decline in inflation expectations, if not an
actual recession. We expect bond prices to rise as the evidence of this
slowdown ramifies. In fact, this expectation has not, as yet, proven
particularly rewarding for the Company, as bonds sold off during the first and
second quarters on optimism that interest rate reductions would stimulate
economies. It is only recently that renewed evidence of supply excesses and the
aftershock of the September 11 attacks have delivered capital profits on our US
bonds. We expect to trade out of a proportion of our bonds as economic
pessimism intensifies, especially if this environment creates better value in
stocks.
Finally, though, we have strategic reasons to hold a higher bond exposure than
we anticipated nine months ago. We place a high value on the certainty of the
income return we enjoy on the fixed interest assets we own and believe that
other investors, shocked by the severity of the equity bear market, may yet
come to crave such certainty and pay higher prices for it. For instance, over
the millennial bull market in US equities, investors ignored the TIP market,
the US Treasury Inflation Protected bond market. Prices for these assets
actually bottomed in January 2000, as the equity mania peaked. Who cared about
a guaranteed inflation proofed return of 4.0%, when stocks delivered
double-digits year after year? Now, however, conviction about the repeatability
of equity returns has subsided and the security of a TIP is alluring indeed.
The price of the bond the Company owns, the Treasury Inflation Protected 3.88%
2029, has risen from 93, on the eve of the new Millennium, to 107 today. The
current redemption yield on this instrument is 3.4% pa above whatever US
inflation averages over each of the next 28 years. In terms of price objective,
we believe the redemption yields on UK index-linked gilts represent a viable
objective for their US counterparts. The comparable redemption yield on a UK
bond is 2.3%, implying significant further capital gains. In the conventional
government fixed market we believe yields could fall to levels not seen since
the 1960s, at least 4.0% for the US 30 year, for instance. Already in 2001, UK
gilt yields have traded at or below 5.0% across the entire curve, a phenomenon
not witnessed for 30 years or more. The Company's growing exposure to the
Halifax Preferred Stock is another exploitation of this theme. Here we believe
this now 6.75% net yield, underwritten by the Halifax balance sheet, will
attract support from a new constituency of investors, who, like us, have never
bought a preference share before.
In summary, we expect our equity holdings to rise from the current 49%,
including the Japan Fund, to 70-75%. However, we may retain a core allocation
to very long-dated fixed interest for rather longer, at least until our
interest rate objectives are met. The Company's exposure to the US Dollar now
stands at 41% and, on balance, we believe this will benefit Sterling investors.
Current Equity Positions
Our current bond weightings are exceptional, which is why they are worthy of
justification. It is necessary to assert, in case of misunderstanding, that we
are enthusiastic about our equity holdings, and are excited by the
opportunities presented by the equity market malaise. Proof of that contention
is provided, perhaps, by our appetite for shares in companies that exhibit a
positive correlation to the stock market. We own and have added to positions in
Dow Jones, Reuters and Instinet not only because we regard them as durable,
growing and undervalued franchises, but also, specifically, because their
fortunes are aligned to the long-term fate of global capital markets. All three
companies have reported results somewhat shy of expectations, as market volumes
have declined, but each has used the downturn to strengthen its strategic
position.
Elsewhere, our holdings tend to be in companies that other investors perceive
as 'defensive', Cadbury, Wolters Kluwer, Halifax and the beverage and brewery
stocks, AG Barr and Wolverhampton & Dudley. We know what other investors mean,
but didn't purchase these stocks because they offer a temporary haven in
troubled markets. We bought them because we are attracted to the durability of
their businesses and potential for steady growth and we intend to hold them for
the foreseeable future, even when investors revert to 'growth'. In support of
this assertion, note that we did not accept the recent, failed offer for
Wolves, believing that we could not replace the asset with others of comparable
characteristics, at the price offered. Nintendo has different qualities to our
other holdings, offering access to an immature industry, from a competitive
position of some strength, but with undeniable technology risk. So far, the
rollout of Nintendo's new game platforms is meeting expectations.
In conclusion, we expect the next bull market in equities, whenever it
eventuates, to be led by companies that can profitably exploit broadband,
wireless and internet technologies. We believe that media companies are well
positioned to provide this leadership, as it is clear how technology is
improving the utility to customers of the services or products offered by
professional publishers, such as Dow Jones, Reuters, Wolters Kluwer and
entertainment creators like Nintendo. We expect to increase exposure to these
and comparable franchises, partly by making an investment in the soon to be
launched Lindsell Train Global Media Fund.
N Train
Trust Manager
13 November 2001
The Lindsell Train Investment
Trust plc
Statement of Total Return
Period ended
30 September 2001
Unaudited
Revenue Capital Total
£'000 £'000 £'000
Losses on investments - (463) (463)
Exchange differences - (11) (11)
Gains on forward sales of Yen - 45 45
Income 591 - 591
Investment management fee (94) - (94)
Managers performance fee (244) - (244)
Directors bonus (24) - (24)
Other expenses (349) (4) (353)
Net deficit before
finance costs and taxation (120) (433) (553)
Interest payable and similar
charges (1) - (1)
Deficit on ordinary
activities before tax (121) (433) (554)
Tax on ordinary activities (5) - (5)
Deficit on ordinary
activities after tax for the (126) (433) (559)
period
Dividends in respect of equity - - -
shares
Transfer from reserves (126) (433) (559)
Loss per ordinary share (pence): (63.18) (216.58) (279.76)
The revenue column of this statement is the profit and loss account of the
Company.
All revenue and capital items in the above statement derive from continuing
operations.
Balance Sheet
30 September
2001
Unaudited
£'000
Fixed assets
Investments 18,967
Current assets
Debtors 835
Cash at bank and short-term deposits 244
1,079
Creditors: amounts falling due within one year (605)
Net current assets 474
Total assets less current liabilities 19,441
Capital and reserves
Called up share capital 50
Share premium account 19,950
Capital reserve - realised 8
Capital reserve - unrealised (441)
Revenue reserve (126)
Equity shareholders' funds 19,441
Net asset value per ordinary share: £97.2024
Cash Flow Statement
Period ended
30 September
2001
Unaudited
£'000
Net cash outflow from operating activities (341)
Returns on investment and servicing of finance (1)
Taxation (3)
Financial investment (19,400)
(19,745)
Financing - Issue of Ordinary Shares 20,000
Increase in cash 255
Reconciliation of net cash flow to movement in net debt
Increase in cash in the period 255
Exchange movements (11)
Opening net debt -
Closing net funds 244
Represented by:
Cash at bank 244
Reconciliation of Movements in Shareholders' Funds
Period ended
30 September
2001
Unaudited
£'000
Opening shareholders' funds -
Net (deficit) / revenue for the period (126)
Issue of Ordinary Shares 22 January 2001 20,000
Capital deficit for the period (433)
Closing shareholders' funds 19,441
Notes to the Interim Accounts
1. The financial statements for the period to 30 September 2001 have been
prepared under the historical cost accounting convention, as modified by the
revaluation of investments, in compliance with the requirements of the
Companies Act 1985, and in accordance with applicable accounting standards.
2. The Statement of Total Return for the period to 30 September 2001 has been
prepared in accordance with the Statement of Recommended Practice 'Financial
Statements of Investment Trust Companies' issued by the Association of
Investment Trust Companies in December 1995 which have been adopted by the
Company.
3. The Statement of Total return includes the results of the Company and
together with the Balance Sheet and Cash Flow Statement at 30 September 2001,
are unaudited and do not constitute full statutory accounts within the meaning
of Section 240 of the Companies Act 1985.
4. The net asset value per ordinary share is based on net assets at 30
September 2001 of £19,440,485 and on 200,000 Ordinary Shares in issue at 30
September 2001.
5. Returns per Ordinary Share:
The calculation of the revenue return per Ordinary Share of 25 pence each is
based on net revenue deficit on ordinary activities after taxation of £
(126,348) for the period ended 30 September 2001 divided by 200,000 being the
weighted average number of Ordinary Shares in issue during the period.
The calculation of the capital return per Ordinary Share of 25 pence each is
based on net capital losses of £(433,167) for the period ended 30 September
2001 divided by 200,000 being the weighted average number of Ordinary Shares in
issue during the period.
6. It is the intention of the Directors to conduct the affairs of the Company
so that it satisfies the conditions for approval as an investment trust company
set out in Section 842 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988.
7. The Interim Report will be sent to shareholders shortly.