Monthly Update 10.2004
Lindsell Train Investment Trust PLC
15 November 2004
The Lindsell Train Investment Trust PLC
As at 31 October 2004
Fund Objective
To maximise long-term total returns subject to the avoidance of loss of absolute
value and with a minimum objective to maintain the real purchasing power of
Sterling capital, as measured by the annual average yield on the 2.5%
Consolidated Loan Stock.
Share Price GBP 103.50
Net Asset Value GBP 111.28
Premium (Discount) (7.0%)
Market Capitalisation GBP 20.7mn
Benchmark (21/2% Con Ann Avg Yield +5.0%) +0.4
Source: Bloomberg; NAV-Lindsell Train. Share Price
quoted is closing mid price. See Benchmark definition.
Performance History (based in GBP) 2004 YTD 2003 2002 2001 2000
Net Asset Value % +18.6 +3.0 -9.6 +3.2 n/a
Share Price % +22.4 -8.6 -19.8 +18.5 n/a
Source: Bloomberg. Based in GBP. Share Price quoted is closing mid price.
Performance years listed Jan - Dec. Launch date 22 Jan 2001. With dividends
added back.
** Please note performance data on reports prior to June 2004 did not include
dividends.
Past performance is not a guide to future performance. The price of units and
the income from them may go down as well as up. Investors may not get back what
they invested.
2003 Performance Jan 03 Feb 03 Mar 03 Apr 03 May 03 Jun 03 Jul 03 Aug 03 Sep 03 Oct 03 Nov 03 Dec 03
Net Asset Value % -3.8 +1.9 -0.6 +1.1 +3.4 +0.5 +2.0 +1.7 -2.7 -0.5 -0.7 +0.9
Share Price % +0.0 +0.5 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 -2.8 -1.1 +2.2 -4.3 +2.2 -10.9 +6.1
2004 Performance Jan 04 Feb 04 Mar 04 Apr 04 May 04 Jun 04 Jul 04 Aug 04 Sep 04 Oct 04 Nov 04 Dec 04
Net Asset Value % +1.8 +3.2 +1.7 +0.8 +0.0 +2.3 -2.2 +4.7 +3.7 +1.3
Share Price % -2.3 +5.9 -0.6 +0.6 +2.2 +2.7 +0.5 +0.5 +8.4 +2.9
Source: Bloomberg. Based in GBP. Performance years listed Jan - Dec. Launch date
22 Jan 2001. With dividends added back.
** Please note performance data on reports prior to June 2004 did not include
dividends.
Past performance is not a guide to future performance. The price of units and
the income from them may go down as well as up. Investors may not get back what
they invested.
Industry Breakdown % of NAV
Bonds 25.5
Preference Shares 14.2
Equity - Media 8.0
Equity - Banks & Investment Co. 3.6
Equity - Leisure & Ent. 9.5
Equity - Food & Beverage 33.0
Investment Fund 23.5
Cash & Equivalent (17.3)
Total 100.0
Source: Lindsell Train
Top 10 Holdings % of NAV
Glenmorangie A&B 14.5
US Gov Treasury 6.25% 11.4
Lindsell Train Global Media (Dist) 10.1
HBOS 9.25% Non Cum 9.6
Lindsell Train Japan (Dist) 9.5
Barr AG 8.8
21/2% Consolidated Loan Stock 8.1
UK Treasury 2.5% 6.0
Cadbury Schweppes 6.0
Wolverhampton & Dudley Breweries 5.2
Source: Lindsell Train
Fund Exposure Bonds Prefs Equity Funds Cash % of NAV
UK % 14.1 14.2 47.8 3.9 (17.7) 62.3
USA % 11.4 - 2.0 - 3.3 16.7
Europe (ex UK) % - - - - - -
Japan % - - 4.3 9.5 (2.9) 10.9
Global % - - - 10.1 - 10.1
Total 25.6 14.0 54.2 23.7 (17.5) 100.0
Source: Lindsell Train
Fund Manager's Comments
In a year when all major stock market indices have made negligible progress we
have been fortunate to own a concentrated list of investments, numbering 20
securities, where all but 2 are up, the exceptions being Dow Jones and Diageo.
Of the other 18, 2 of them, Reuters and Glenmorangie are up more than 50%. Other
than the bonds, most of the positions have risen with little association to any
particular economic trend. The positive performance is random and attributable
to the merits of the individual businesses and unconnected to general market
performance, a point we have made before in other monthly reports.
One group of companies that have performed particularly well in recent months
are those involved in mining, metals production and processing, oil extraction
and chemical production whose business fortunes are largely related to the trend
of rising commodity prices. We have invested in none of these believing that the
businesses add little value, are slaves to commodity price trends that are
volatile and unpredictable and are too capital intensive to generate adequate
sustainable cash flows for investors. Rising commodity prices can transform the
economics of the businesses for short periods of time as is happening today but
as long as capital is in plentiful supply, as it is also, with long term
interest rates so low, investment in new supply quickly acts to moderate or more
likely reverse the favourable pricing environment.
Normally rising commodity prices are associated with a rise in inflation. This
historical linkage explains many investors' bearishness on bonds. Thus far, in
this economic cycle the linkage seems to have broken down, as inflation as
measured by retail prices in most major economies remains remarkably quiescent.
For us this is not surprising. As we have made plain before, we think
disinflationary forces are far more powerful and will remain prevalent for as
far out into the future as we can practically conceive. As a result, when the
current inflation in commodity prices peaks, the prices will likely be far
higher from a relative sense than if the inflation in commodity prices had
occurred at a time of general inflation, as tended to be the case in the past.
This implies that when the cycle turns down, as supply exceeds demand, the
effect on prices could be that much worse.
Take the situation of the Japanese steel industry. Only 69% of Japan's
production is sold domestically. The rest is exported. Exporting steel is
unusual especially over large distances as normally the transport costs are
prohibitive. The exception is when demand for the product exceeds domestic
supply in the importing country as it has done over the last 2 years in China.
When this happens prices usually rise, raising returns on capital and
encouraging new investment. Now, new capacity is coming on stream at a time when
demand is moderating, curtailing imports from Japan. In August China's net
imports of steel fell to level last seen in 1995 having plunged 80% in a period
of just 6 months. What may be more worrying is that China may have invested so
much in new capacity, which is now larger than that of Japan and the USA put
together (at 230m tons versus 110m tons and 93m tons respectively), that supply
for some extended period of time may exceed demand in China causing prices to
fall domestically and to plummet in Japan as cheaply produced Chinese steel
undercuts the price of domestically supplied product as China becomes a net
exporter of steel. Overnight 31% of Japan's production that was exported has no
market. The 31% overcapacity in Japan's steel industry will decimate profits and
balance sheets until capacity is shut. The conditions in the industry could
quickly become worse than even at the bottom of the last recession in 1996/97.
In this way the current rise in commodity prices, driven in a large part by the
boom in fixed investment in China, will transform China from being an
inflationary force in the global market for industrial commodities to a
deflationary one, just as China is already a deflationary force in the global
market for finished goods. It emphasises and reinforces our long held view that
the markets' response to a steeply rising price trend on the supply demand
balance is such that avoiding investments in industries and markets with such
volatile pricing characteristics is as important as choosing those with stable
ones. In the Trust's holding of the Japan Fund, with its ability to short sell,
we can be somewhat more assertive and currently have 5% of the Fund short of
steel shares and a further 12% short of commodity linked businesses.
Fund Manager Launch Date Denomination
Nick Train 22 Jan 2001 GBP
Year End Dividend Benchmark
31st Mar Ex Date: June The annual average yield on the 21/2%
Payment: August Consolidated Loan Stock.
The Board Management Fees Registered Address
Rhoddy Swire Standard Fee: 0.65% Lindsell Train Investment Trust
Michael Mackenzie Performance Fee: 10% of annual increase 77A High Street
Donald Adamson in the share price, plus dividend, Brentwood
Michael Lindsell above the gross annual yield of the 2 ESSEX CM14 4RR
1/2% Consolidated Loan Stock.
ISIN Bloomberg Listing
GB0031977944 LTI LN London Stock Exchange
Disclaimer
This document is intended for use by persons who are authorised by the UK
Financial Services Authority ('FSA') and those who are permitted to receive such
information in the UK. The information contained in this document does not
constitute an offer or invitation to buy or sell any investments. Nothing in
this document constitutes investment, legal, tax or other advice. Lindsell Train
and/or persons connected with it may have an interest in this investment. The
value of any investment in securities or funds and the income generated from
them may go down as well as up and are not guaranteed. Past performance cannot
be used as a guide or guarantee of future performance. You may not get back the
original amount you have invested. Changes in foreign exchange rates may cause
the value of your investment to go up or down. Some funds with higher gearing
may be subject to higher volatility and the investment value may change
substantially. The net asset value (NAV) performance of an investment trust is
not the same as its market share price performance.
Issued by Lindsell Train Limited
Authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority
15 Nov 2004 LTL 000-021-4b
Lindsell Train Limited
35 Thurloe Street, London SW7 2LQ
Tel. +44 20 7225 6400 Fax. +44 20 7225 6499
info@lindselltrain.com www.lindselltrain.com
Lindsell Train Limited is authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority.
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