Monthly Update 10.2004

Lindsell Train Investment Trust PLC 15 November 2004 The Lindsell Train Investment Trust PLC As at 31 October 2004 Fund Objective To maximise long-term total returns subject to the avoidance of loss of absolute value and with a minimum objective to maintain the real purchasing power of Sterling capital, as measured by the annual average yield on the 2.5% Consolidated Loan Stock. Share Price GBP 103.50 Net Asset Value GBP 111.28 Premium (Discount) (7.0%) Market Capitalisation GBP 20.7mn Benchmark (21/2% Con Ann Avg Yield +5.0%) +0.4 Source: Bloomberg; NAV-Lindsell Train. Share Price quoted is closing mid price. See Benchmark definition. Performance History (based in GBP) 2004 YTD 2003 2002 2001 2000 Net Asset Value % +18.6 +3.0 -9.6 +3.2 n/a Share Price % +22.4 -8.6 -19.8 +18.5 n/a Source: Bloomberg. Based in GBP. Share Price quoted is closing mid price. Performance years listed Jan - Dec. Launch date 22 Jan 2001. With dividends added back. ** Please note performance data on reports prior to June 2004 did not include dividends. Past performance is not a guide to future performance. The price of units and the income from them may go down as well as up. Investors may not get back what they invested. 2003 Performance Jan 03 Feb 03 Mar 03 Apr 03 May 03 Jun 03 Jul 03 Aug 03 Sep 03 Oct 03 Nov 03 Dec 03 Net Asset Value % -3.8 +1.9 -0.6 +1.1 +3.4 +0.5 +2.0 +1.7 -2.7 -0.5 -0.7 +0.9 Share Price % +0.0 +0.5 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 -2.8 -1.1 +2.2 -4.3 +2.2 -10.9 +6.1 2004 Performance Jan 04 Feb 04 Mar 04 Apr 04 May 04 Jun 04 Jul 04 Aug 04 Sep 04 Oct 04 Nov 04 Dec 04 Net Asset Value % +1.8 +3.2 +1.7 +0.8 +0.0 +2.3 -2.2 +4.7 +3.7 +1.3 Share Price % -2.3 +5.9 -0.6 +0.6 +2.2 +2.7 +0.5 +0.5 +8.4 +2.9 Source: Bloomberg. Based in GBP. Performance years listed Jan - Dec. Launch date 22 Jan 2001. With dividends added back. ** Please note performance data on reports prior to June 2004 did not include dividends. Past performance is not a guide to future performance. The price of units and the income from them may go down as well as up. Investors may not get back what they invested. Industry Breakdown % of NAV Bonds 25.5 Preference Shares 14.2 Equity - Media 8.0 Equity - Banks & Investment Co. 3.6 Equity - Leisure & Ent. 9.5 Equity - Food & Beverage 33.0 Investment Fund 23.5 Cash & Equivalent (17.3) Total 100.0 Source: Lindsell Train Top 10 Holdings % of NAV Glenmorangie A&B 14.5 US Gov Treasury 6.25% 11.4 Lindsell Train Global Media (Dist) 10.1 HBOS 9.25% Non Cum 9.6 Lindsell Train Japan (Dist) 9.5 Barr AG 8.8 21/2% Consolidated Loan Stock 8.1 UK Treasury 2.5% 6.0 Cadbury Schweppes 6.0 Wolverhampton & Dudley Breweries 5.2 Source: Lindsell Train Fund Exposure Bonds Prefs Equity Funds Cash % of NAV UK % 14.1 14.2 47.8 3.9 (17.7) 62.3 USA % 11.4 - 2.0 - 3.3 16.7 Europe (ex UK) % - - - - - - Japan % - - 4.3 9.5 (2.9) 10.9 Global % - - - 10.1 - 10.1 Total 25.6 14.0 54.2 23.7 (17.5) 100.0 Source: Lindsell Train Fund Manager's Comments In a year when all major stock market indices have made negligible progress we have been fortunate to own a concentrated list of investments, numbering 20 securities, where all but 2 are up, the exceptions being Dow Jones and Diageo. Of the other 18, 2 of them, Reuters and Glenmorangie are up more than 50%. Other than the bonds, most of the positions have risen with little association to any particular economic trend. The positive performance is random and attributable to the merits of the individual businesses and unconnected to general market performance, a point we have made before in other monthly reports. One group of companies that have performed particularly well in recent months are those involved in mining, metals production and processing, oil extraction and chemical production whose business fortunes are largely related to the trend of rising commodity prices. We have invested in none of these believing that the businesses add little value, are slaves to commodity price trends that are volatile and unpredictable and are too capital intensive to generate adequate sustainable cash flows for investors. Rising commodity prices can transform the economics of the businesses for short periods of time as is happening today but as long as capital is in plentiful supply, as it is also, with long term interest rates so low, investment in new supply quickly acts to moderate or more likely reverse the favourable pricing environment. Normally rising commodity prices are associated with a rise in inflation. This historical linkage explains many investors' bearishness on bonds. Thus far, in this economic cycle the linkage seems to have broken down, as inflation as measured by retail prices in most major economies remains remarkably quiescent. For us this is not surprising. As we have made plain before, we think disinflationary forces are far more powerful and will remain prevalent for as far out into the future as we can practically conceive. As a result, when the current inflation in commodity prices peaks, the prices will likely be far higher from a relative sense than if the inflation in commodity prices had occurred at a time of general inflation, as tended to be the case in the past. This implies that when the cycle turns down, as supply exceeds demand, the effect on prices could be that much worse. Take the situation of the Japanese steel industry. Only 69% of Japan's production is sold domestically. The rest is exported. Exporting steel is unusual especially over large distances as normally the transport costs are prohibitive. The exception is when demand for the product exceeds domestic supply in the importing country as it has done over the last 2 years in China. When this happens prices usually rise, raising returns on capital and encouraging new investment. Now, new capacity is coming on stream at a time when demand is moderating, curtailing imports from Japan. In August China's net imports of steel fell to level last seen in 1995 having plunged 80% in a period of just 6 months. What may be more worrying is that China may have invested so much in new capacity, which is now larger than that of Japan and the USA put together (at 230m tons versus 110m tons and 93m tons respectively), that supply for some extended period of time may exceed demand in China causing prices to fall domestically and to plummet in Japan as cheaply produced Chinese steel undercuts the price of domestically supplied product as China becomes a net exporter of steel. Overnight 31% of Japan's production that was exported has no market. The 31% overcapacity in Japan's steel industry will decimate profits and balance sheets until capacity is shut. The conditions in the industry could quickly become worse than even at the bottom of the last recession in 1996/97. In this way the current rise in commodity prices, driven in a large part by the boom in fixed investment in China, will transform China from being an inflationary force in the global market for industrial commodities to a deflationary one, just as China is already a deflationary force in the global market for finished goods. It emphasises and reinforces our long held view that the markets' response to a steeply rising price trend on the supply demand balance is such that avoiding investments in industries and markets with such volatile pricing characteristics is as important as choosing those with stable ones. In the Trust's holding of the Japan Fund, with its ability to short sell, we can be somewhat more assertive and currently have 5% of the Fund short of steel shares and a further 12% short of commodity linked businesses. Fund Manager Launch Date Denomination Nick Train 22 Jan 2001 GBP Year End Dividend Benchmark 31st Mar Ex Date: June The annual average yield on the 21/2% Payment: August Consolidated Loan Stock. The Board Management Fees Registered Address Rhoddy Swire Standard Fee: 0.65% Lindsell Train Investment Trust Michael Mackenzie Performance Fee: 10% of annual increase 77A High Street Donald Adamson in the share price, plus dividend, Brentwood Michael Lindsell above the gross annual yield of the 2 ESSEX CM14 4RR 1/2% Consolidated Loan Stock. ISIN Bloomberg Listing GB0031977944 LTI LN London Stock Exchange Disclaimer This document is intended for use by persons who are authorised by the UK Financial Services Authority ('FSA') and those who are permitted to receive such information in the UK. The information contained in this document does not constitute an offer or invitation to buy or sell any investments. Nothing in this document constitutes investment, legal, tax or other advice. Lindsell Train and/or persons connected with it may have an interest in this investment. The value of any investment in securities or funds and the income generated from them may go down as well as up and are not guaranteed. Past performance cannot be used as a guide or guarantee of future performance. You may not get back the original amount you have invested. Changes in foreign exchange rates may cause the value of your investment to go up or down. Some funds with higher gearing may be subject to higher volatility and the investment value may change substantially. The net asset value (NAV) performance of an investment trust is not the same as its market share price performance. Issued by Lindsell Train Limited Authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority 15 Nov 2004 LTL 000-021-4b Lindsell Train Limited 35 Thurloe Street, London SW7 2LQ Tel. +44 20 7225 6400 Fax. +44 20 7225 6499 info@lindselltrain.com www.lindselltrain.com Lindsell Train Limited is authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority. This information is provided by RNS The company news service from the London Stock Exchange
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