Monthly Update - 11.2004
Lindsell Train Investment Trust PLC
17 December 2004
The Lindsell Train Investment Trust PLC
As at 30th November 2004
Fund Objective
To maximise long-term total returns subject to the avoidance of loss of absolute value and with a minimum objective to
maintain the real purchasing power of Sterling capital, as measured by the annual average yield on the 2.5% Consolidated
Loan Stock.
Share Price GBP 101.50
Net Asset Value GBP 111.30
Premium (Discount) (8.8%)
Market Capitalisation GBP 20.3mn
Benchmark (21/2% Con Ann Avg Yield +4.9%) +0.4
Source: Bloomberg; NAV-Lindsell Train. Share Price
quoted is closing mid price. See Benchmark definition.
Performance History (based in GBP) 2004 YTD 2003 2002 2001 2000
Net Asset Value % +19.7 +3.5 -9.6 +3.2 n/a
Share Price % +21.1 -8.4 -19.8 +18.5 n/a
Source: S&P Micropal. Based in GBP. Performance years listed Jan - Dec. Launch date 22 Jan 2001. With dividends added
back.
Past performance is not a guide to future performance. The price of units and the income from them may go down as well
as up. Investors may not get back what they invested.
2003 Performance Jan 03 Feb 03 Mar 03 Apr 03 May 03 Jun 03 Jul 03 Aug 03 Sep 03 Oct 03 Nov 03 Dec 03
Net Asset Value % -3.8 +1.9 -2.0 +2.0 +4.0 +0.9 +2.7 +1.0 -2.7 -0.5 -0.7 +1.0
Share Price % +0.5 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 -2.5 -1.1 +2.2 -4.3 +2.3 -11.0 +6.2
2004 Performance Jan 04 Feb 04 Mar 04 Apr 04 May 04 Jun 04 Jul 04 Aug 04 Sep 04 Oct 04 Nov 04 Dec 04
Net Asset Value +1.8 +3.3 +0.3 +2.3 -0.1 +2.5 -2.0 +4.8 +3.8 +0.7* +1.0*
Share Price % -2.3 +6.0 -0.6 +0.6 +2.3 +3.2 +0.5 +0.5 +8.6 +3.0 -1.9
Source: S&P Micropal unless otherwise indicated. Based in GBP. Performance years listed Jan - Dec. Launch date 22 Jan
2001. With dividends added back. *Source: Lindsell Train Limited.
Past performance is not a guide to future performance. The price of units and the income from them may go down as well
as up. Investors may not get back what they invested.
Industry Breakdown % of NAV
Bonds 25.0
Preference Shares 14.4
Equity - Media 8.1
Equity - Banks & Investment Co. 3.6
Equity - Leisure & Ent. 9.6
Equity - Food & Beverage 33.5
Investment Fund 23.2
Cash & Equivalent (17.4)
Total 100.0
Source: Lindsell Train
Top 10 Holdings % of NAV
Glenmorangie A&B 14.6
US Gov Treasury 6.25% 10.6
Lindsell Train Global Media (Dist) 10.0
HBOS 9.25% Non Cum 9.7
Lindsell Train Japan (Dist) 9.2
Barr AG 9.0
21/2% Consolidated Loan Stock 8.3
Cadbury Schweppes 6.2
UK Treasury 2.5% 6.1
Wolverhampton & Dudley Breweries 5.2
Source: Lindsell Train
Fund Exposure Bonds Prefs Equity Funds Cash % of NAV
UK % 14.4 14.4 48.6 4.0 (17.3) 64.1
USA % 10.6 - 1.8 - 3.4 15.8
Europe (ex UK) % - - - - - -
Japan % - - 4.4 9.2 (3.5) 10.1
Global % - - - 10.0 - 10.0
Total 25.0 14.4 54.8 23.2 (17.4) 100.0
Source: Lindsell Train
Fund Manager's Comments
The NAV rose modestly during November, in line with a 0.7% gain in the MSCI World Index in Sterling, but behind a 2.3%
rally in the FT All-Share index. Our return was hampered by the weakness in the US Dollar, which declined by 4.0%
against the Pound through November. The Trust's current 'look-through'* exposure to the Dollar is c26%, meaning the net
impact on the NAV was in the order of 1% negative. We note that our Dollar exposure is somewhat lower in percentage
terms, than the proportion of the FTSE 100 Index that now pays dividends in cents, rather than pennies. The FTSE is 28%
made up of companies that have ceased or never paid Sterling dividends, led by BP, HSBC, AstraZeneca and pretty much all
the miners and to our mind, these stocks can effectively be regarded as US corporations. The fall in the Dollar is
thereby having a far greater impact on UK investors' spending power than they perhaps realise and definitely crimping
dividend growth for the market as a whole. In addition, UK earnings derived from the US probably account for a further
10-12% of the FTSE's value, for a rough 40% total exposure to the US for UK corporations. Our point here is not to make
excuses for the level of Dollar exposure we have in the Trust, which is self-inflicted and has not been a glorious
allocation of capital, even if it is, for instance, less than might be found in a UK Index Tracker Fund. Rather, to
observe that it is hard for all investors in any developed world stock market to avoid the implications of a weak
Dollar.
Another constraint on the NAV through November and beyond is the scale of our closing investment in Glenmorangie, to
which we bid farewell to in January with regret. The 15% holding was unchanged in November, already having reflected the
full value of the Moet Hennessy bid, less the time value of the money. Once the capital is redeployed we hope to earn a
more competitive return.
Over the month we added to our holding in Reed Elsevier, which has fallen back to the levels we began buying it at 12
months ago. Reed has declined for similar reasons to last year and we return to it for the same too. The bears rest
their case on the fact that Reed is a significant US Dollar earner, some 60.0% of revenues and acts as a convenient
whipping boy for currency speculators. In addition, 28.0% of its revenues derive from its market-dominating Scientific
Publishing division, where investors have concerns that the business model may be shifting, to the disadvantage of all
academic publishers. Finally, we sense a vague disdain in the market currently for Reed's franchises, because they are
overwhelmingly subscription based. Subscription revenues may be admirably predictable, the essence of their attraction
for us, but at times are dismissed as 'stodgy', to use the headline of the most recent piece of Morgan Stanley research
on the company. The FT's Lex column articulated these concerns after Reed's recent trading update, then damned the
company's dividend as 'miserly'.
We attended a presentation by Reed's CEO, Crispin Davis last month and came away with our quite opposite impressions of
the company much enhanced, while always accepting the short-term influence of the currency. In fact, we believe Reed is
one of the few genuine growth companies within the FTSE 100 Index, that its earnings are set to expand markedly over the
next 5 years and that its low-teen P/E multiple could expand materially to boot. In short, trading today at £4.65, Reed
has the potential to be a £10.00 stock.
Our enthusiasm is founded on the opportunity presented to Reed by the Internet, to extend the reach of its franchises
and to, at least, maintain its exceptional levels of profitability. Reed is already one of the largest Internet
companies in the world by revenues, specifically with its on-line Science Direct service, its Lexis Nexis legal
information business (used by every major US legal practice, according to Davis) and its business-to-business ('B2B')
publishing assets, around which Reed is building on-line communities. As evidence of its serious bona fides as an
Internet stock, consider the recent joint venture announced between one of Reed's B2B subsidiaries, KellySearch and
Google. Kellysearch is an on-line directory that has grown out of a business publication established in 1799 (not a
misprint). It provides data on 2 million companies and their products worldwide, receiving 17 million user requests
a month, drawn by KellySearch's 'unrivalled taxonomy of 140,000 different search items'. Google has, effectively,
recognised its inadequacy in the face of superior technology and entrenched user-pool and is paying Reed for the
privilege of putting its own links onto KellySearch. Davis was recently quoted as saying about Google - 'We have had a
lot of discussion over whether Google is an ally or a competitor. But there is a logic to working with Google in one
or two areas. Google brings its size and we bring our content'.
In Science, in Legal and in parts of its Business division, Reed has as rich and frequently visited 'cyber real estate'
as any. Such territory is highly valuable, as is confirmed not only by the extraordinary valuations of the pure US
Internet companies, like Google, but those of US business publishers that are successfully exploiting the Net, such as
Dun & Bradstreet, P/E 22.0x, McGraw Hill, 25.0x, the recently acquired Marketwatch, 60.0x and best comparator
for Reed, Thomson Corporation, 27.5x. Reed's historic rating of 15.0x looks quite anomalously low.
Lex of the FT was recently critical of Reed's dividend policy. The company only pays out roughly one third of its
earnings, compared to the market average ratio of 50.0%. If Reed chose to increase its payout ratio to that of the FT
All-Share, its dividend yield would in fact be 15.0% higher than that of the average company. Given its operating
margins of 26.0%, its ROE of 30.0%, the debt on the balance sheet and its growth opportunity, though, Reed, in our
view, is justified to restrict its payments at the moment. Certainly today's dividends are more generous than its US
competitors who pay skimpier or in
some cases none at all.
The current holding in Reed is 3.0% of the Trust's assets, although this understates the true exposure, because it is a
major position in both the Lindsell Train Media Fund and the Finsbury Growth and Income Trust (the 'look-through'
exposure is above 4.5%) and we expect it to grow, both by the purchase of more shares, if they fall and, ultimately, by
capital appreciation.
* Adjusting exposures to holdings of similar assets in the Funds held by the Trust.
Fund Manager Launch Date Denomination
Nick Train 22 Jan 2001 GBP
Year End Dividend Benchmark
31st Mar Ex Date: June The annual average yield on the 21/2%
Payment: August Consolidated Loan Stock.
The Board Management Fees Registered Address
Rhoddy Swire Standard Fee: 0.65% Lindsell Train Investment Trust
Michael Mackenzie Performance Fee: 10% of annual increase 77A High Street
Donald Adamson in the share price, plus dividend, Brentwood
Michael Lindsell above the gross annual yield of the 2 ESSEX CM14 4RR
1/2% Consolidated Loan Stock.
ISIN Bloomberg Listing
GB0031977944 LTI LN London Stock Exchange
Disclaimer
This document is intended for use by persons who are authorised by the UK Financial Services Authority ('FSA') and those
who are permitted to receive such information in the UK. The information contained in this document does not constitute
an offer or invitation to buy or sell any investments. Nothing in this document constitutes investment, legal, tax or
other advice. Lindsell Train and/or persons connected with it may have an interest in this investment. The value of any
investment in securities or funds and the income generated from them may go down as well as up and are not guaranteed.
Past performance cannot be used as a guide or guarantee of future performance. You may not get back the original amount
you have invested. Changes in foreign exchange rates may cause the value of your investment to go up or down. Some funds
with higher gearing may be subject to higher volatility and the investment value may change substantially. The net asset
value (NAV) performance of an investment trust is not the same as its market share price performance.
Issued by Lindsell Train Limited
Authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority
16 Dec 2004 LTL 000-022-2b
Lindsell Train Limited
35 Thurloe Street, London SW7 2LQ
Tel. +44 20 7225 6400 Fax. +44 20 7225 6499
info@lindselltrain.com http://www.lindselltrain.com/
Lindsell Train Limited is authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority.
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