Lindsell Train Investment Trust PLC
23 September 2005
The Lindsell Train Investment Trust PLC
As at 31st August 2005
Fund Objective
To maximise long-term total returns subject to the avoidance of loss of absolute value and with a minimum objective to
maintain the real purchasing power of Sterling capital, as measured by the annual average yield on the 2.5%
Consolidated Loan Stock.
Share Price GBP 122.50
Net Asset Value GBP 126.22
Premium (Discount) (3.0%)
Market Capitalisation GBP 24.5mn
Benchmark (21/2% Con Ann Avg Yield +4.6%) +0.4
Source: Bloomberg; NAV-Lindsell Train. Share Price
quoted is closing mid price. See Benchmark definition.
Performance History (based in 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 YTD 2005
GBP)
Net Asset Value % n/a +3.2 -9.6 +3.1 +23.7 +11.2
Share Price % n/a +18.5 -19.8 -8.7 +20.6 +22.9
Source: S&P Micropal. Based in GBP. Performance years listed Jan - Dec. Launch date 22 Jan 2001. With dividends
reinvested. *Source: Lindsell Train Ltd.
Past performance is not a guide to future performance. The price of units and the income from them may go down as well
as up. Investors may not get back what they invested.
2004 Performance Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Net Asset Value % +1.8 +3.3 +0.3 +2.3 -0.1 +2.1 -2.0 +4.8 +3.8 +1.4* +0.0* +3.7
Share Price % -2.3 +6.0 -0.6 +0.6 +2.3 +2.7 +0.5 +0.5 +8.6 +3.0 -1.9 +0.0
Source: S&P Micropal unless otherwise indicated. Based in GBP. Performance years listed Jan - Dec. Launch date 22 Jan
2001. With dividends reinvested. *Source: Lindsell Train Limited.
2005 Performance Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Net Asset Value % +1.4 +0.3 +1.7 +0.8 +3.0 3.0 +1.1 +0.5 - - - -
Share Price % +8.9 +3.6 -3.5 +1.8 +2.7 +9.6 +0.4 -2.4 - - - -
Source: S&P Micropal unless otherwise indicated. Based in GBP. Performance years listed Jan - Dec. Launch date 22 Jan
2001. With dividends reinvested. *Source: Lindsell Train Ltd.
Past performance is not a guide to future performance. The price of units and the income from them may go down as well
as up. Investors may not get back what they invested.
Industry Breakdown % of NAV
Bonds 24.4
Preference Shares 14.5
Equity - Media 8.5
Equity - Banks & Investment Co. 4.6
Equity - Leisure & Ent. 9.4
Equity - Food & Beverage 26.7
Investment Fund 22.2
Cash & Equivalent (10.3)
Total 100.0
Source: Lindsell Train
Top 10 Holdings % of NAV
HBOS 9.25% Non Cum 11.1
US Gov Treasury 6.25% 11.0
Barr AG 10.7
Lindsell Train Global Media (Dist) 9.7
Lindsell Train Japan (Dist) 8.2
Cadbury Schweppes 7.8
2 1/2% Consolidated Loan Stock 7.7
Diageo 6.4
Wolverhampton & Dudley Breweries 5.8
UK Treasury 2.5% 5.7
Source: Lindsell Train
Fund Exposure Bonds Prefs Equity Funds Cash % of NAV
UK % 13.4 14.5 42.1 4.2 (10.3) 63.9
USA % 11.0 - 1.6 - 3.6 16.2
Europe (ex UK) % - - 1.8 - (0.5) 1.3
Japan % - - 3.7 8.2 (3.1) 8.8
Global % - - - 9.8 - 9.8
Total 24.4 14.5 49.2 22.2 (10.3) 100.0
Source: Lindsell Train
Fund Manager's Comments
Our holding in Dow Jones has come to life again after falling in the first half of the year. The price today is $40
having been as low as $32 in April. We originally bought it at an average price of $57, which, unfortunately, makes it
one of the Fund's worst investments to date. The company owns some terrific franchises including the Wall Street
Journal, Barrons and the Ottaway Group of local US Newspapers. The company's current market capitalisation is $3.3bn.
One-way of thinking about whether this is a fair value for the business is to consider whether it is readily replicable
for an equivalent sum. Today one might wonder whether anyone wanted to replicate it given the competition for
advertisement spending from new on-line media. After 3 years of a rising asset markets and despite booming volumes and
profits on Wall Street, advertising revenues for the Wall Street Journal are still languishing at 1985 levels. The
problems are not confined to USA. The Financial Times, its main global competitor is similarly affected. Rupert Murdoch
addressed this malaise in a speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors when he claimed newspapers were '
remarkably complacent' about the effect of growing Internet use on the newsprint industry. He cited research, which
showed that 'consumers between the ages of 18-34 are increasingly using the web as their medium of choice for news
consumption', adding that 'Internet portals are quickly becoming the favoured destination for news among young
consumers'. He goes on to acknowledge that 'the threat of losing advertising dollars to online media is very real'.
These comments were primarily aimed at mass circulation newspaper editors.
Nevertheless the slump in classified advertisements for them and financial advertising for The Wall Street Journal
suggests a wider problem. The Wall Street Journal and the FT need to protect their franchises by using technology as
they have done in the past to engage with on-line financial news consumers. Dow Jones's developed its own in-house,
on-line website, WSJ on-line. Even though it has established the largest circulation for any paid subscription news
site on the web, it only increased its 689,000 subscribers by 3% in 2004-2005, which must be considered disappointing
given the increase in web usage by news consumers generally. As the management gropes for the right strategy to
reinvigorate their Internet offering investors become disillusioned as the company spends precious cash flow paying
seemingly high prices for on-line acquisitions. Dow Jones needs to upgrade its Internet presence so that it is
compelling enough for more financial customers to make it their home page of choice. We are giving them the benefit of
doubt and think they will succeed, largely because they have such an overwhelming advantage of having a recognisable
franchise behind them. While we wait the gyrations of the share price are likely to continue, influenced as well by the
rumours that the controlling Bancroft family may put up the company for sale. All we do know is that when advertising
eventually recovers the marginal return on any increase for Dow Jones is likely to be huge, reinforcing the value of
such a unique franchise and our determination to add to this holding if the share price falls back into the low $30's
once again.
A more recent disappointing holding for the Fund has been that in the Lindsell Train Japan Fund. Although the Fund was
initially successful in preserving value and generating modest returns in a bear market, since the Japanese market has
recovered the Fund has stagnated. This August the Fund fell in value, as the short portfolio was hit. The short
portfolio is dominated by cyclical businesses that have recently led the market higher. We hope that either this trend
will reverse or that our long portfolio will rally strongly. Whatever occurs, we expect more volatility, with potential
further risk on the downside.
The strategy of the Fund is predicated on the continued fall in the ownership of Japanese shares by relationship
investors (cross-shareholders) whose prime motivation for owning shares is to derive tangible business benefits from
such ownership, rather than earn any specific financial return, and a continued rise in the ownership of shares by
portfolio investors, whose priority is to earn a competitive medium term financial return. As this transfer of
ownership plays out, we expect the cash generative companies that comprise the long portfolio will likely pay higher
dividends and increase returns on retained earnings. This is already happening and has led to good performance from
some individual long positions. More importantly the changing landscape for share ownership will require cash
consumptive companies, such as the ones that dominate our short portfolio, to improve equity ratios, reduce debt and
pay higher dividends. At the moment such companies are able to do all three because of an ongoing short-term cyclical
boost to profitability. As a result rising share prices have generated losses offsetting the gains from the long
portfolio. But when the cycle turns down and profitability falls, returning to normal levels, the cyclical companies
will find that maintaining dividends may not even be possible let alone reducing debt. At such a juncture this growing
part of the strategy should contribute handsomely to returns.
Fund Manager Launch Date Denomination
Nick Train 22 Jan 2001 GBP
Year End Dividend Benchmark
31st Mar Ex Date: June The annual average yield on the 21/2%
Payment: August Consolidated Loan Stock.
The Board Management Fees Registered Address
Rhoddy Swire Standard Fee: 0.65% Lindsell Train Investment Trust
Michael Mackenzie Performance Fee: 10% of annual increase 77A High Street
Donald Adamson in the share price, plus dividend, Brentwood
above the gross annual yield of the 2 ESSEX CM14 4RR
1/2% Consolidated Loan Stock.
ISIN Bloomberg Listing
GB0031977944 LTI LN London Stock Exchange
Disclaimer
This document is intended for use by persons who are authorised by the UK Financial Services Authority ('FSA') and
those who are permitted to receive such information in the UK. The information contained in this document does not
constitute an offer or invitation to buy or sell any investments. Nothing in this document constitutes investment,
legal, tax or other advice. Lindsell Train and/or persons connected with it may have an interest in this investment.
The value of any investment in securities or funds and the income generated from them may go down as well as up and are
not guaranteed. Past performance cannot be used as a guide or guarantee of future performance. You may not get back the
original amount you have invested. Changes in foreign exchange rates may cause the value of your investment to go up or
down. Some funds with higher gearing may be subject to higher volatility and the investment value may change
substantially. The net asset value (NAV) performance of an investment trust is not the same as its market share price
performance.
Issued by Lindsell Train Limited
Authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority
18 Aug 2005 LTL 000-029-5b
Lindsell Train Limited
35 Thurloe Street, London SW7 2LQ
Tel. +44 20 7225 6400 Fax. +44 20 7225 6499
enquiry@lindselltrain.com http://www.lindselltrain.com/
Lindsell Train Limited is authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority.
This information is provided by RNS
The company news service from the London Stock Exchange
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