Mannesmann/Orange No Domination Agreement Required

Vodafone AirTouch PLC 24 January 2000 VODAFONE AIRTOUCH CONFIRMS NO DOMINATION AGREEMENT REQUIRED Vodafone AirTouch has today published the opinions of its leading German Counsel on its website, These opinions, the summaries of which are set out below, confirm that Vodafone AirTouch will not need to put in place a domination agreement in order to de-merge Orange. Accordingly no cash payment will be required to any minority shareholders in Mannesmann. Vodafone AirTouch has today published the opinions of its leading German counsel (Professors Ulmer, Hueffer, Hirte and Noack) on its website, www.vodafone- update.com. These opinions confirm that Vodafone AirTouch will not need to put in place a domination agreement in order to demerge Orange. Accordingly, no cash payment will be required to be made to any minority shareholders in Mannesmann. The conclusions of each opinion are summarised as follows: Professor Ulmer 'Vodafone, after gaining a majority interest in Mannesmann through the Offer, is not prevented under stock corporation law to cause the management board of Mannesmann to dispose of the Orange interest. This is an individual measure the economic consequences of which can be evaluated and to which Sec. 311 AktG applies and which therefore can be initiated by the controlling company. The conclusion of a domination agreement is not required for this purpose.' Professor Hueffer 'With regard to the present facts I cannot see that the lawful de-merger of Orange from Mannesman is a measure which legally requires a domination agreement. Financial obligations of Vodafone, if any, can be compensated for under sec. 311 AktG.' Professor Ulmer 'Vodafone, after gaining a majority interest in Mannesmann through the Offer, is not prevented under stock corporation law to cause the management board of Mannesmann to dispose of the Orange interest. This is an individual measure the economic consequences of which can be evaluated and to which Sec. 311 AktG applies and which therefore can be initiated by the controlling company. The conclusion of a domination agreement is not required for this purpose.' Professor Hueffer 'With regard to the present facts I cannot see that the lawful demerger of Orange from Mannesman is a measure which legally requires a domination agreement. Financial obligations of Vodafone, if any, can be compensated for under sec. 311 AktG.' Professor Hirte and Professor Noack 'The conclusion of a domination agreement is not required in order to gain control over a stock corporation.' 'The induced sale of the subsidiary 'Orange' for an adequate price is not a disadvantageous legal transaction according to sec. 311 para. 1 AktG (Aktiengesetz - German Stock Corporation Act). The term 'disadvantage' includes the situation where an orderly and conscientious director of an independent company should have abstained from that transaction. The sale of Orange could not be regarded as contrary to Mannesmann's board of directors' duties according to sec. 93 AktG. Therefore, no domination agreement is required for this transaction.' Vodafone AirTouch's legal advisers, together with Professors Ulmer, Hueffer, Hirte and Noack, have also reviewed the arguments put forward by Mannesmann and its legal counsel regarding the de-merger of Orange. The Vodafone AirTouch's legal advisers, together with Professors Ulmer, Hueffer, Hirte and Noack, have also reviewed the arguments put forward by Mannesmann and its legal counsel regarding the demerger of Orange. The statement by the Mannesmann Management Board, made in its press release of 19 January 2000, that a domination agreement is required to de-merge Orange, is an incorrect statement of German Corporate Law. The Mannesmann position is based principally principally on the argument that the value of Orange to Mannesmann cannot be quantified. However, the requirements of the German Stock Corporation Act are satisfied if a value can be determined based on business plan projections. Such projections are part of the normal responsibility of a company's management board. Mannesmann's argument is plainly wrong and contradictoryclearly misleading: * Only three months ago, the Mannesmann Management Board valued Orange in connection with its acquisition. This valuation must have reflected an assessment of the value of any strategic benefits and synergies arising from the future combination of Mannesmann and Orange. * The valuation of a company such as Orange is a standard exercise. Such valuations are routinely carried out in Germany by professional auditors and take into account the value of any strategic benefits and synergies. * Independent research analysts are able to attribute a value to Orange as part of the Mannesmann group. * In its own defence document, the Mannesmann Management Board has published synergies attributable to Orange. In addition, Mannesmann valued its mobile business including Orange. Furthermore, Mannesmann has attempted to justify specific share price targets based, in part, on the quantifiable impact of Orange on Mannesmann. In contrast, Mannesmann's key legal argument has been that any estimate of the impact of Orange on Mannesmann '.would be merely arbitrary' (quote from the legal opinion referred to in the Mannesmann press release dated 19 January 2000). * The flaws in the Mannesmann Management Board's argument are highlighted by the fact that there would need to be a valuation of Mannesmann, including Orange, in order to compensate minority shareholders if a domination agreement between Vodafone AirTouch and Mannesmann were to be implemented. This would require a valuation of Mannesmann, including Orange, taking into account any strategic benefits and synergies arising from the combination. However, this is precisely what Mannesmann's Management Board claims is not possible. The legal opinions of Professors Ulmer, Hueffer, Hirte and Noack can be obtained from the Vodafone AirTouch website, www.vodafone-update.com.Chris Gent, Chief Executive of Vodafone AirTouch, commented: 'Mannesmann management's reliance on flawed legal arguments demonstrates its lack of conviction in its strategic and valuation arguments. We have received clear German legal advice that our plan to de-merge Orange works. Mannesmann shareholders should not be distracted and should instead focus on the outstanding opportunity presented to them to create a global mobile telecoms leader. I urge them to accept our offer without delay.' Appendix 1: German Legal Professors' Biographies Professor Ulmer Prof. Dr. Dr. (multiple Honorary Degrees) Peter Ulmer, 67, has been Professor of Commercial and Corporate Law at the Ruprecht Karls University of Heidelberg since 1975, and was also Rector of the University for several years. He is also Director of the Institute for German and European Corporate and Commercial Law, and editor and author of leading commentaries on German Corporate Law. Prof. Ulmer was rated the most highly-regarded German Law Professor in 1997 by Manager Magazine. Professor Hueffer Prof. Dr. Uwe Hueffer, 65, has been Professor of Civil and Commercial Law at the Ruhr University of Bochum since 1985. He is Judge of the Hamm High Court, and the author of one of the leading commentaries on the German Stock Corporation Law (Uwe Hueffer, Aktiengesetz, 4th edition, 1999). Professor Hirte Prof. Dr. Heribert Hirte LL.M (Berkeley), 41, is Professor of German and European Civil and Commercial Law at the Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, a post he has held since 1993. He has been deputy Chairman of the German- American Association of Lawyers since 1994, and is the author of several publications on Corporate Law, e.g. aThe tTextbook on Stock Corporation Law, and co-author of a commentary on Stock Corporation Law (Grosskommentars zum Aktiengesetz). Professor Hueffer Prof. Dr. Uwe Hueffer, 65, has been Professor of Civil and Commercial Law at the Ruhr University of Bochum since 1985. He is Judge of the Hamm High Court, and the author of one of the leading commentaries on the German Stock Corporation Law (Uwe Hueffer, Aktiengesetz, 4th edition, 1999). Professor Noack Prof. Dr. Ulrich Noack, 44, is Professor of Civil and Commercial Law at the Heinrich Heine University of Duesseldorf, a position he has awarded in 1994. He is a Board member of the German Association for Shareholder Protection (DSW, Deutsche Schutzvereinigung fuer Wertpapierbesitz), and the co-author of one of the leading commentaries on the German Stock Corporation Law (Kolner Kommentar). Copies of this press release and the documentation published in connection with the Offer can be obtained from the Vodafone AirTouch website, www.vodafone-update.com, or by calling one of the dedicated helplines, toll-free, on 0800 169 2853 in the United Kingdom or 0800 088 7766 in Germany. Enquiries: Vodafone AirTouch Terry Barwick Director of Corporate Affairs Tim Brown Investor Relations Director Melissa Stimpson Senior Investor Relations Manager Mike Caldwell Corporate Communications Director Tel: +44 (0)1635 33 251 Goldman Sachs International Scott Mead Simon Dingemans Tel: +44 (0)171 774 1000 Warburg Dillon Read Warren Finegold Mark Lewisohn Tel: +44 (0)171 567 8000 Tavistock Communications Lulu Bridges Tel: +44 (0)171 600 2288 Financial Dynamics Perry Hall Tel: +49 69 971 68123 Words defined in the press release dated 18 January 2000 shall have the same meaning in this announcement unless the context requires otherwise. This press release does not constitute an offer to exchange or sell or an offer to exchange or buy any securities. The contents of this announcement have been approved by Goldman Sachs International and Warburg Dillon Read, the investment banking division of UBS AG, solely for the purposes of Section 57 of the Financial Services Act 1986. Goldman Sachs International and Warburg Dillon Read, each of which is regulated in the United Kingdom by The Securities and Futures Authority Limited, are acting for Vodafone AirTouch and for no one else in connection with the Offer and will not be responsible to anyone other than Vodafone AirTouch for providing the protections afforded to customers of Goldman Sachs International or Warburg Dillon Read or for giving advice in relation to the Offer. The Offer in the United States is being made through a prospectus which is part of an effective registration statement filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. Mannesmann Shareholders who are U.S. persons or are located in the United States are advised to read the registration statement because it contains important information relating to the Offer. You can inspect and copy the registration statement relating to the Offer and documents incorporated by reference therein at the public reference facilities maintained by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission at 450 Fifth Street, N.W., Room 1024, Washington D.C. 20549. In addition, copies of the US Offer Document are available from The Bank of New York, 101 Barclay Street, Lobby Window, New York, NY 10286. For additional information regarding risks, see the Registration Statement on Form F-4 and other reports of Vodafone AirTouch Plc on file with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Copies of these filings are available on request directed to Vodafone AirTouch, Investor Relations, Tim Brown (tel: + 44 1635 682 373). It is the responsibility of any person receiving a copy of this announcement in any jurisdiction other than the United Kingdom, Germany and the United States to satisfy themselves as to the full observance of the laws and regulatory requirements of the relevant jurisdiction, including the obtaining of any governmental or other consent which may be required or observing any other formalities needing to be observed in such jurisdiction. Receipt of this announcement will not constitute an offer in those jurisdictions in which it would be illegal to make such an offer and in such circumstances it will be deemed to have been sent for information purposes only. Statements in this press release relating to future status or circumstances, including statements regarding future performance, costs, revenues, cash flows, earnings, divestments, growth and other trend projections and the synergistic benefits of the merger are forward-looking statements. These statements may generally, but not always, be identified by the use of words such as 'anticipates', 'should', 'expects', 'estimates', 'believes', or similar expressions. By their nature, forward-looking statements involve risk and uncertainty because they relate to events and depend on circumstances that will occur in the future. There can be no assurance that actual results will not differ materially from those expressed or implied by these forward-looking statements due to many factors, many of which are outside Vodafone AirTouch's control, including steps that Mannesmann's management may take to frustrate Vodafone AirTouch's efforts to obtain managerial control of Mannesmann, increase the costs or reduce the benefits of the transaction, the triggering of change of control provisions in Mannesmann's licences or other agreements, the ability to obtain regulatory approvals without onerous conditions, the impact of labour disputes, the risk of negative impacts on Vodafone AirTouch's credit ratings, the potential costs, including tax costs, of divesting Orange and Mannesmann's industrial businesses, limitations on Vodafone AirTouch's ability to control Mannesmann due to voting restrictions and other provisions of Mannesmann's charter and German law, general economic conditions, competition, technical difficulties and the need for increased capital expenditure (such as that resulting from increased demand for usage, new business opportunities and deployment of new technologies) and the ability to realise benefits from entering into partnerships for developing data and internet services.
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