Response to Mannesmann's Defence
Vodafone AirTouch PLC
18 January 2000
PART I
Vodafone AirTouch Responds to Mannesmann's Defence
Mannesmann is avoiding the real strategic issues
Demerger of Orange supported by independent legal opinions
Vodafone AirTouch is today publishing a letter to Mannesmann
Shareholders from its Chief Executive, Chris Gent.
This letter reminds Mannesmann Shareholders of the real choice
they have to make before the Vodafone AirTouch Offer closes.
It also responds in detail to the claims made by Mannesmann in
its defence document.
By 7 February 2000, Mannesmann Shareholders must choose
between owning 100 per cent of Mannesmann and owning 47.2 per
cent of a combined Mannesmann and Vodafone AirTouch. Their
decision should focus on the enhanced growth opportunities
provided by the global presence of the Combined Group.
Creating this global scale and reach today will deliver to
Mannesmann Shareholders who accept the Offer, more growth and
proportionate telecoms EBITDA than Mannesmann's go it alone
strategy.
Vodafone is a stronger platform in the UK than Orange
Mannesmann has made a number of claims that do not stand up to
scrutiny. In particular, it has argued that Orange is better
placed in the UK than Vodafone UK. As the firmly established
market leader, Vodafone offers the best platform in the UK.
Vodafone UK:
* has a 33 per cent share of the market as compared to only 20
per cent for Orange, the third operator
* has 50 per cent more customers than Orange in both the
contract and the pre-pay markets
* added 3.1 million customers in 1999 while Orange added only
2.7 million
* is a leader in the provision of data services
* is significantly more profitable than Orange, generating
70 per cent more EBITDA per customer
Orange can be demerged with only 50 per cent
Mannesmann has also argued that Vodafone AirTouch will not be
able to demerge Orange without a domination agreement
requiring a substantial cash payment. This is simply not
true.
* There is no requirement for a domination agreement to
demerge Orange and, accordingly, there is no requirement for
a cash payment. Even Mannesmann argues that a domination
agreement would only be required if Vodafone AirTouch
intends to disadvantage Mannesmann. Vodafone AirTouch
intends to demerge Orange without disadvantaging Mannesmann.
* Vodafone AirTouch intends to effect the demerger of Orange
by the transfer of Orange from Mannesmann to Vodafone
AirTouch in exchange for cash and assets equal to the fair
value of Orange to Mannesmann as determined in accordance
with German law. As a result, this transfer will not
disadvantage Mannesmann or any minority shareholders.
Vodafone AirTouch would then distribute Orange shares to the
enlarged shareholder base of Vodafone AirTouch (including
the former Mannesmann Shareholders who have accepted the
Offer).
* Vodafone AirTouch has received clear advice from its German
legal advisers and four leading German Professors of
Corporate Law (Professors Hirte, Huffer, Noack and Ulmer)
that it can demerge Orange with a simple 50 per cent
majority and without a domination agreement.
Chris Gent, Chief Executive of Vodafone AirTouch commented.
'My letter to Mannesmann Shareholders highlights once again
the outstanding opportunity for them in creating a global
mobile telecoms leader. Mannesmann Shareholders should not be
distracted by the structural issues raised by Mannesmann. We
have received clear advice from leading German Professors that
our plan to demerge Orange works. Mannesmann Shareholders
should now focus on the real strategic choice. I urge them to
accept our Offer without delay'
Enquiries:
Vodafone AirTouch
Terry Barwick, Corporate Affairs Director
Tim Brown, Investor Relations Director
Melissa Stimpson, Senior Investor Relations Manager
Mike Caldwell, Corporate Communications Director
Tel: +44 (0) 1635 33 251
Goldman Sachs International
Scott Mead
Simon Dingemans
Tel: +44 (0) 171 774 1000
Warburg Dillon Read
Warren Finegold
Mark Lewisohn
Tel: +44 (0) 171 567 8000
Tavistock Communications
Lulu Bridges
Tel: +44 (0) 171 600 2288
Financial Dynamics
Perry Hall
Tel: +49 (0) 69 971 68123
PART II
Letter from the Chief Executive of Vodafone AirTouch
Dear Mannesmann Shareholder,
On 14 January, Mannesmann published its formal response to
Vodafone AirTouch's Offer. Mannesmann has failed to address
the real comparison shareholders need to make - between
Mannesmann alone and Mannesmann combined with Vodafone
AirTouch.
Not one of the arguments Mannesmann presented in its defence
has addressed the key advantages a combined Vodafone AirTouch
and Mannesmann would have as the world's leading global
mobile operator. A combination of the two companies will
bring Mannesmann the scale and geographic presence it
currently lacks by creating a global footprint covering 25
countries, including a leading presence in the key US market.
By 7 February 2000, you must choose between owning 100 per
cent of Mannesmann and owning 47.2 per cent of a combined
Mannesmann and Vodafone AirTouch. Your decision should focus
on the enhanced growth opportunities provided by the global
presence of the Combined Group. Creating this global scale
and reach today will deliver to Mannesmann Shareholders who
accept the Offer, more growth and proportionate telecoms
EBITDA than Mannesmann's go it alone strategy.
Mannesmann's defence has made a number of claims:
Claim Number 1 - Superior Growth
Mannesmann has taken a selective and inconsistent sample of
analysts' forecasts to suggest that Vodafone AirTouch is
growing at a significantly slower rate. The forecasts
Mannesmann is using for Vodafone AirTouch largely exclude
data and internet revenues. Mannesmann has also recently
increased its growth forecasts for the period 2000 to 2003
from 30 per cent to 34 per cent and now 39 per cent. The
differences between these forecasts for Vodafone AirTouch and
Mannesmann are not credible.
* The businesses of Vodafone AirTouch and Mannesmann are
essentially similar and have similar growth prospects -
Mannesmann expects almost all of its proportionate telecoms
EBITDA in 2000 to come from mobile services.
* Any difference in growth is largely short term as
Mannesmann's immature fixed line businesses and Orange move
from loss to profit.
* Both Vodafone AirTouch and Mannesmann are strongly placed to
benefit from the fast growing data and internet markets.
Mannesmann's comparison also misses the point. Mannesmann
Shareholders are not being offered a share in Vodafone
AirTouch today but a share in the combined businesses of the
two groups. In addition to similar growth prospects to start
with, the Combined Group will enjoy substantial revenue
benefits from voice, data and internet services that will
significantly enhance its growth prospects. This is why 100
per cent of Mannesmann alone cannot match the 47.2 per cent
share of the Combined Group's proportionate EBITDA that
Mannesmann's Shareholders are being offered. This is true
today and will be true tomorrow.
Claim Number 2 - Superior Assets
Europe
Mannesmann claims an outstanding platform in Europe.
* Mannesmann controls operators in only 4 of its 7 markets
in Europe.
* A combined Vodafone AirTouch and Mannesmann would control
operators in 10 out of its 15 markets in Europe including in
all 3 of Mannesmann's major markets as well as a much broader
range of other growth markets around Europe.
Europe's telecommunications markets are important, but
increasingly global coverage will be an essential requirement
for the future leaders in the market for mobile internet
services. Partners and suppliers will focus on those
operators able to access the largest customer base and
customers will demand a seamless service wherever they
travel. Vodafone AirTouch is the only operator with that
global coverage today, with interests in 24 markets and over
35 million proportionate customers.
A combined Vodafone AirTouch and Mannesmann would provide
Mannesmann Shareholders with immediate access to a global
network. Mannesmann's go it alone strategy cannot come close
to matching the reach and opportunities available to the
Combined Group.
Orange
Mannesmann also claims that Orange is the best platform in
the UK.
* Vodafone UK remains firmly established as the UK market
leader with a 33 per cent market share compared with only 20
per cent for Orange, which is in third place behind Vodafone
UK and BT Cellnet.
* Vodafone UK has 50 per cent more customers than Orange in
both the contract and pre-pay markets.
* Vodafone UK added 3.1 million customers in 1999, more than
any other operator (Orange added only 2.7 million).
* Vodafone UK has always been a leader in the development of
data services and currently operates the UK's only
commercially successful packet radio network, handling over 1
billion data calls per year.
* Vodafone UK tests show the GSM call completion success rate
for data calls to ISDN services is significantly greater on
Vodafone UK's network than on Orange's network.
* Vodafone UK is currently holding the largest 3G trials
outside Japan.
* Vodafone UK is significantly more profitable than Orange.
Vodafone UK achieves higher ARPU in both the contract and pre-
pay markets and generates over 70 per cent more EBITDA per
customer.
In creating a global network with the most effective
positioning for the future mobile data and internet markets,
Vodafone UK is clearly better placed in the UK than the
country's third operator, Orange.
Mannesmann has also failed to explain that shareholders who
accept the Offer will get exposure to the benefits and growth
of both networks given that Vodafone AirTouch intends to
demerge Orange to its enlarged shareholder base following its
Offer.
Claim Number 3 - Superior Strategy
Data and Internet
Mannesmann claims to be a leader in internet and has focused
its shareholders' attention on the 2.6 million fixed line
internet subscribers it suggests it has in Germany and Italy.
Vodafone AirTouch believes that the real growth opportunity
is in the market for mobile internet, which is expected to
reach 350 million users globally by the year 2003.
* While customers will require access to the internet via both
fixed and mobile devices, their choice of internet service
provider will increasingly be determined by the quality,
security and reliability of the mobile network.
* In targeting the mobile internet opportunity, Vodafone
AirTouch's global internet platform will enhance its
competitive position, allowing its customers to access
personalised internet content and to undertake transactions
anywhere in the world.
* Vodafone AirTouch's global mobile internet platform will also
allow content providers to access globally the largest mobile
customer base in the world.
* Mannesmann has at present no alternative global mobile
internet platform on offer to D2, Omnitel, Orange or their
customers.
* Vodafone AirTouch is already a leader in mobile internet
services. Operators in which Vodafone AirTouch has an
interest have launched mobile internet based services in 10
countries. One of Europe's leading operators of advanced
mobile data and internet services is Europolitan, Vodafone
AirTouch's subsidiary in Sweden. Vodafone AirTouch has
recently appointed Tomas Isaksson, President and CEO of
Europolitan, as President of its global platform and internet
services.
Fixed and Mobile Integration
Mannesmann claims that Vodafone AirTouch fails to understand
the potential of the integration of fixed line services with
mobile.
* Vodafone AirTouch believes that voice and data traffic will
increasingly migrate to mobile as transmission speeds
increase. Vodafone AirTouch fully understands that some
customers will continue to want fixed line access and that
some may want integrated services.
* Vodafone AirTouch already provides integrated services to
customers in a number of markets, including the UK, and
intends to continue to do so in the future. Vodafone
AirTouch believes that it is not necessary to own the fixed
infrastructure to provide an integrated service. In Germany
and Italy, however, the economics of owning fixed
infrastructure are attractive and Vodafone AirTouch will
therefore retain a majority interest in these businesses
following their planned initial public offering. Ownership
of Mannesmann's fixed line businesses within the new group is
wholly consistent with Vodafone AirTouch's strategy of
providing integrated services on the best terms to its
customers.
* Mannesmann has confirmed that it intends to operate Orange in
the UK without owning a fixed line network. This is
consistent with Vodafone AirTouch's own approach to fixed and
mobile integration.
* Vodafone AirTouch's new global mobile internet platform has
been specifically designed to be fully accessible by both
mobile and fixed line devices in order to provide the
broadest range of customers with a seamless service from any
device, anytime, anywhere.
Claim Number 4 - Control
Mannesmann argues that its control of 4 European markets is
the key to delivering greater value to its shareholders than
Vodafone AirTouch's Offer.
Vodafone AirTouch agrees that control does have value. The
value of control is, however subject to the terms of the
relevant shareholder agreements. In fact, Mannesmann shares
control in D2 and Omnitel with Vodafone AirTouch. Vodafone
AirTouch has a 34.8 per cent stake in D2 and a 21.6 per cent
stake in Omnitel. These stakes give Vodafone AirTouch
appropriate minority rights, including for instance the right
to approve the business plan. As a result, in certain key
areas, Mannesmann is not able to force D2 into arrangements
to which Vodafone AirTouch might object.
Just as control will not allow Vodafone AirTouch to
disadvantage any minority in Mannesmann, so Mannesmann's
control in D2 and Omnitel must also respect its partners'
rights.
Claim Number 5 - Superior Value
Mannesmann argues that its shares have a potential value of
EUR350 despite being prepared to issue over EUR18 billion of
new equity at EUR157.8 per share for the recent acquisition
of Orange. This increase in projected value is not credible
without also increasing the projected value of the entire
mobile telecoms sector, including Vodafone AirTouch, on the
same basis.
Mannesmann's projected share price is subject to risks and
uncertainties not fully disclosed by Mannesmann. Mannesmann
compares this target price to the value of Vodafone
AirTouch's Offer based on Vodafone AirTouch's current share
price. This comparison is misleading.
A more appropriate comparison with Mannesmann's projected
share price is the projected value for shares in the Combined
Group over a similar timescale.
The projected value of Vodafone AirTouch shares following a
combination with Mannesmann must take into account; (i) the
greater potential upside from internet and data opportunities
available to the Combined Group compared with that available
to Mannesmann on a standalone basis; and (ii) the greater
revenue benefits and synergies available to the Combined
Group compared with those available from the combination of
Mannesmann and Orange.
Another objective measure of the value of Vodafone AirTouch's
Offer would compare the relative values of Vodafone
AirTouch's business and Mannesmann's business.
* Vodafone AirTouch and Mannesmann operate similar businesses
with similar growth prospects and should be valued on a
similar basis, as indeed they were before Vodafone AirTouch's
Offer.
* Mannesmann contributes only 31 per cent of the new group's
proportionate telecoms EBITDA and 36 per cent of the Combined
Group's pre-bid market capitalisation.
Vodafone AirTouch's Offer would provide Mannesmann
Shareholders with 47.2 per cent of the Combined Group, which
represents a substantial premium to any other measure of
Mannesmann's contribution to the combination. This
highlights why Mannesmann Shareholders should accept the
Offer.
Claim Number 6 - Value Destruction
Mannesmann argues that accepting the Offer will lead to
significant value destruction for its shareholders.
Mannesmann's claims do not stand up to scrutiny.
* Mannesmann's EUR200 million (£125 million) of cost and
capital expenditure synergies are pre tax and compare to
estimated post tax cost and capital expenditure synergies of
EUR717 million (£450 million) (75 per cent of the estimated
£600 million total) for Vodafone AirTouch and Mannesmann by
2004.
* Mannesmann has estimated EUR1 billion of pre tax revenue
synergies with Orange. Vodafone AirTouch's revenue synergies
do not include the potential benefit of a global platform for
internet and data. The potential revenue benefits between
Vodafone AirTouch and Mannesmann should be greater than the
synergies achievable between Mannesmann and Orange given that
Vodafone AirTouch has 7 times more proportionate customers
than Orange, and a larger UK business.
* Vodafone AirTouch intends to retain a majority interest in
Mannesmann's fixed line businesses, so synergies available
from fixed line mobile convergence will be preserved.
* While certain categories of shareholders may be liable for
capital gains tax costs, Vodafone AirTouch believes that the
actual percentage of shareholders affected is relatively
small.
Mannesmann makes no mention of the substantial costs of
implementing its own independent strategy and of completing
its footprint in Europe alone.
* Just buying Orange cost over EUR18 billion in new equity and
EUR12 billion in additional debt. Mannesmann's share price
fell approximately 8 per cent on the announcement of the
offer for Orange and its credit rating was downgraded,
restricting Mannesmann's access to the capital markets and
increasing the cost of future borrowings.
* Funding required for further acquisitions is likely to dilute
Mannesmann Shareholders' interests.
Claim Number 7 - Uncertainty
Vodafone AirTouch has already provided detailed answers to
the areas of uncertainty that Mannesmann highlights.
Demerger of Orange
Mannesmann argues that Vodafone AirTouch will not be able to
demerge Orange without a domination agreement requiring a
substantial cash payment. Mannesmann has also argued that
there are significant competition issues involved in a
combination of Vodafone AirTouch and Mannesmann.
* There is no requirement for a domination agreement to demerge
Orange and accordingly, there is no requirement for a cash
payment. Even Mannesmann argues that a domination agreement
would only be required if Vodafone AirTouch intends to
disadvantage Mannesmann. Vodafone AirTouch intends to
demerge Orange without disadvantaging Mannesmann.
* Vodafone AirTouch intends to effect the demerger of Orange by
the transfer of Orange from Mannesmann to Vodafone AirTouch
in exchange for cash and assets equal to the fair value of
Orange to Mannesmann as determined in accordance with German
law. As a result, this transfer will not disadvantage
Mannesmann or any minority shareholders. Vodafone AirTouch
would then distribute Orange shares to the enlarged
shareholder base of Vodafone AirTouch (including the former
Mannesmann Shareholders who have accepted the Offer).
* Vodafone AirTouch has received clear advice from its German
legal advisers and four leading German Professors of
Corporate Law (Professors Hirte, Huffer, Noack and Ulmer)
that it can demerge Orange with a simple 50 per cent majority
and without a domination agreement.
* Vodafone AirTouch remains confident in the advice it has
received from its lawyers that the EU competition issues can
be dealt with during the course of a Phase I enquiry.
* Vodafone AirTouch has always made it clear that its views on
EU competition matters are entirely its own, supported by its
legal advisers. Mannesmann instead provides a number of
quotes from members of the European Commission, taken out of
context, designed to suggest that the Brussels competition
authorities have indicated a view on this issue.
3G Condition
One of the conditions of the Offer, as set out in the Offer
Document of 23 December 1999, relates to the entitlement of
affiliates of Vodafone AirTouch and Orange to prequalify for
and, if successful in the auction, to be granted a licence in
the UK auction of 3G spectrum. Vodafone AirTouch has
received advice from its legal advisers that they believe
Vodafone AirTouch can meet the requirements of the Secretary
of State such that, if successful in its Offer for
Mannesmann, both Vodafone UK and Orange will be eligible to
bid for 3G spectrum.
On this basis, Vodafone AirTouch has decided that the Offer
will no longer be conditional on confirmation by the
Secretary of State of the entitlement of Vodafone AirTouch
and Orange, or their affiliates, to bid for 3G spectrum.
Minority Position
Mannesmann has suggested that Vodafone AirTouch might only
achieve a minority position in Mannesmann. Vodafone
AirTouch's stated objective since the original announcement
of its Offer for Mannesmann has been to acquire more than 50
per cent of the shares of Mannesmann. This remains Vodafone
AirTouch's objective.
Withdrawal Rights
Mannesmann states that Vodafone AirTouch could reduce the
value of its Offer without allowing shareholders to withdraw
their acceptances. This is not true. Under German law,
Vodafone AirTouch is not entitled to reduce the value of its
Offer.
Further, under the terms of the German Takeover Code,
Mannesmann Shareholders who have tendered their shares will
have the right to withdraw their acceptances in the event of
a higher competing offer that is not matched by Vodafone
AirTouch within 10 days of such other offer. Tendering
shareholders will also have the ability to trade tendered
shares under a separate Mannesmann Tendered Shares trading
line in accordance with German practice.
Summary
Mannesmann's response failed to address adequately the real
strategic choices facing its shareholders.
1. Who else can offer Mannesmann Shareholders the global
reach that Vodafone AirTouch delivers in voice, data and
internet services?
2. How much more capital will Mannesmann need to implement
its strategy across Europe?
3. How can Mannesmann be a leading technology business
without a US presence and apparently with no interest in
obtaining one?
4. Which will provide Mannesmann Shareholders with more
proportionate EBITDA now and in the future: owning 47.2 per
cent of the Combined Group or owning 100 per cent of
Mannesmann?
5. What are the risks to Mannesmann Shareholders of not
accepting the Offer?
6. What can Mannesmann do alone that it cannot do better
together with Vodafone AirTouch?
We urge shareholders to focus on the strategic issues and the
premium we are offering. Accept Vodafone AirTouch's Offer
without delay.
Yours sincerely,
Chris Gent
Copies of this press release and the documentation published
in connection with the Offer can be obtained from the Vodafone
AirTouch merger website, www.vodafone-update.com, or by
calling one of the dedicated helplines, toll-free, on 0800 169
2853 in the United Kingdom or 0800 088 77 66 in Germany.
Enquiries:
Vodafone AirTouch
Terry Barwick, Corporate Affairs Director
Tim Brown, Investor Relations Director
Melissa Stimpson, Senior Investor Relations Manager
Mike Caldwell, Corporate Communications Director
Tel: +44 (0) 1635 33 251
Goldman Sachs International
Scott Mead
Simon Dingemans
Tel: +44 (0) 171 774 1000
Warburg Dillon Read
Warren Finegold
Mark Lewisohn
Tel: +44 (0) 171 567 8000
Tavistock Communications
Lulu Bridges
Tel: +44 (0) 171 600 2288
Financial Dynamics
Perry Hall
Tel: +49 (0) 69 971 68123
This press release does not constitute an offer to exchange or
sell or an offer to exchange or buy any securities.
The contents of this announcement have been approved by
Goldman Sachs International and Warburg Dillon Read, the
investment banking division of UBS AG, solely for the purposes
of Section 57 of the Financial Services Act 1986. Goldman
Sachs International and Warburg Dillon Read, each of which is
regulated in the United Kingdom by The Securities and Futures
Authority Limited, are acting for Vodafone AirTouch and for no
one else in connection with the Offer and will not be
responsible to anyone other than Vodafone AirTouch for
providing the protections afforded to customers of Goldman
Sachs International or Warburg Dillon Read or for giving
advice in relation to the Offer.
The Offer in the United States is being made through a
prospectus which is part of an effective registration
statement filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission. Mannesmann Shareholders who are U.S. persons or
are located in the United States are advised to read the
registration statement because it contains important
information relating to the Offer. You can inspect and copy
the registration statement relating to the Offer and documents
incorporated by reference therein at the public reference
facilities maintained by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission at 450 Fifth Street, N.W., Room 1024, Washington
D.C. 20549. In addition, copies of the US Offer Document are
available from The Bank of New York, 101 Barclay Street, Lobby
Window, New York, NY 10286.
For additional information regarding risks, see the
Registration Statement on Form F-4 and other reports of
Vodafone AirTouch Plc on file with the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Copies of these filings are available on request
directed to Vodafone AirTouch, Investor Relations, Tim Brown
(tel: + 44 1635 682 373).
It is the responsibility of any person receiving a copy of
this announcement in any jurisdiction other than the United
Kingdom, Germany and the United States to satisfy themselves
as to the full observance of the laws and regulatory
requirements of the relevant jurisdiction, including the
obtaining of any governmental or other consent which may be
required or observing any other formalities needing to be
observed in such jurisdiction. Receipt of this announcement
will not constitute an offer in those jurisdictions in which
it would be illegal to make such an offer and in such
circumstances it will be deemed to have been sent for
information purposes only.
Statements in this press release relating to future status or
circumstances, including statements regarding future
performance, costs, revenues, cash flows, earnings,
divestments, growth and other trend projections and the
synergistic benefits of the merger are forward-looking
statements. These statements may generally, but not always, be
identified by the use of words such as 'anticipates',
'should', 'expects', 'estimates', 'believes', or similar
expressions. By their nature, forward-looking statements
involve risk and uncertainty because they relate to events and
depend on circumstances that will occur in the future. There
can be no assurance that actual results will not differ
materially from those expressed or implied by these forward-
looking statements due to many factors, many of which are
outside Vodafone AirTouch's control, including steps that
Mannesmann's management may take to frustrate Vodafone
AirTouch's efforts to obtain managerial control of Mannesmann,
increase the costs or reduce the benefits of the transaction,
the triggering of change of control provisions in Mannesmann's
licences or other agreements, the ability to obtain regulatory
approvals without onerous conditions, the impact of labour
disputes, the risk of negative impacts on Vodafone AirTouch's
credit ratings, the potential costs, including tax costs, of
divesting Orange and Mannesmann's industrial businesses,
limitations on Vodafone AirTouch's ability to control
Mannesmann due to voting restrictions and other provisions of
Mannesmann's charter and German law, general economic
conditions, competition, technical difficulties and the need
for increased capital expenditure (such as that resulting from
increased demand for usage, new business opportunities and
deployment of new technologies) and the ability to realise
benefits from entering into partnerships for developing data
and internet services.
Appendix I
Sources and Bases of Information
1. Estimate of 350 million mobile internet customers in 2003
is sourced from Kurt Hellstrom, President of Ericsson.
2. The issuance of new equity for the acquisition of Orange
is based on a Mannesmann closing price of EUR157.8 on the Xetra
exchange on 20 October 1999, an exchange ratio of 0.0965 New
Mannesmann Shares per Orange share and 1,212,738,350 fully
diluted Orange shares outstanding. The cost of EUR12 billion in
additional debt on Mannesmann's acquisition of Orange is based
on the cash element of the offer of £6.40 per share,
1,212,738,350 fully diluted Orange shares outstanding and an
exchange rate of EUR1.5612 to £1.00.
3. The proportions of the Combined Group owned by the
shareholders of Mannesmann and Vodafone AirTouch respectively
are calculated on the basis of Mannesmann Share Capital of
517.8 million and 31.1 billion Vodafone AirTouch Shares in
issue at 18 November 1999.
4. Unless otherwise stated, all currency conversions between
pounds sterling and euros have been made at a rate of EUR1.594
to £1.00, the rate used by Mannesmann in its defence document
dated 14 January 2000.
5. Mannesmann's contribution of 36 per cent to the Combined
Group's pre-bid market capitalisation is based on Mannesmann's
Share Capital and Vodafone AirTouch Shares in issue as set out
in 3. above and closing share prices and exchange rates on 21
October 1999 (the day following the announcement of
Mannesmann's formal offer for Orange).
6. Mannesmann's contribution of 31 per cent to the Combined
Group's proportionate telecoms EBITDA is calculated based on
estimated year ended 31 December 1999 pro-forma EBITDA for
Mannesmann (including Orange) calculated using a 50 per cent
growth rate in 1999-2000 and a 2000 estimate for proportionate
telecoms EBITDA of EUR3.8 billion and pro-forma proportionate
EBITDA for Vodafone AirTouch for the twelve months ended 30
September 1999.
7. Customer numbers for Vodafone AirTouch and Orange are
based on 35.5 million proportionate customers for Vodafone
AirTouch and 4.9 million customers for Orange based on the
respective companies' press announcements dated 5 January
2000.
8. To calculate EBITDA per customer for Vodafone UK and
Orange, average subscriber numbers for the period (March to
September 1999 for Vodafone UK, December 1998 to June 1999 for
Orange) were used. These were extracted from the interim
financial statements of Vodafone AirTouch and Orange. The
EBITDA figures used come from the interim statement for
Vodafone AirTouch for the six months ended 30 September 1999
and for Orange, from Mannesmann's presentation dated 29
November 1999, after taking into account subscriber
acquisition costs.
9. ARPU figures are based on figures for the rolling twelve
months ended 30 June 1999 for Orange and for the rolling
twelve months ended 30 September 1999 for Vodafone AirTouch.
Orange figures are from Mannesmann's presentation dated 29
November 1999 and for Vodafone AirTouch from its interim
report for the six months ended 30 September 1999.
Appendix II
Definitions
The following definitions apply throughout this announcement
unless the context requires otherwise:
'ARPU' Average Revenue Per User
'Combined Group' Vodafone AirTouch as enlarged as a result of
the merger with Mannesmann pursuant to the
Offer
'D2' Mannesmann Mobilfunk GmbH
'EBITDA' Earnings before interest, taxation,
depreciation and amortisation
'EU' European Union
'European Commission' The European Commission established by
Article 4 of the Treaty of Rome
'German GAAP' Generally accepted accounting principles in
the Federal Republic of Germany
'German Takeover Code' The German Takeover Code of the Exchange
Expert Commission at the Federal Ministry of
Finance
'London Stock Exchange' London Stock Exchange Limited
'Mannesmann' Mannesmann Aktiengesellschaft and its
subsidiary and associated undertakings and,
where the context permits, each of them
'Mannesmann Share Capital' Entire issued share capital of Mannesmann
assuming full conversion of all outstanding
convertible bonds and full acceptance of the
Orange Offer
'Mannesmann Shareholders' Holders of Mannesmann Shares
'Mannesmann Shares' The existing ordinary shares of no par value
of Mannesmann (in registered form) and any
further such shares issued by the expiration
of the Offer
'Offer' The offer by Vodafone AirTouch to acquire
Mannesmann Shares not already owned by
Vodafone AirTouch at the time the Offer is
made on the terms and subject to the
conditions set out in the Offer Document
and, where the context permits, any
subsequent revision, variation,
reintroduction, extension or renewal thereof
'Offer Document' The document containing the Offer dated 23
December, 1999
'Omnitel' Omnitel Pronto Italia S.p.A.
'Orange' Orange plc and its subsidiary and associated
undertakings and, where the context permits,
each of them
'Orange Offer' The offer by Mannesmann for Orange as set
out in an offer document dated 1 November
1999
'Proportionate Customers' The number of customers of an operator
calculated by adding the number of dated
customers of each of the ventures in which
such operator has an interest, in each case
multiplied by such operator's percentage
ownership interest in the venture
'Proportionate EBITDA' Proportionate EBITDA is a pro-rata
consolidation which reflects either Vodafone
AirTouch's or Mannesmann's, as the case may
be, share of EBITDA in both its consolidated
and unconsolidated entities. Proportionate
EBITDA is not a recognised presentation
under either UK or German GAAP
'3G (Third Generation)' Also UMTS (Universal Mobile Telephony
System). Allows voice, video and multimedia
to be transmitted at speeds of up to 2
megabits per second to mobile users. It is
the planned standard for the world by 2002
'UK GAAP' Generally accepted accounting principles in
the United Kingdom
'US Offer Document' The document declared effective by the US
Securities and Exchange Commission addressed
to Mannesmann Shareholders in the US and
holders of Mannesmann American Depositary
Shares
'Vodafone AirTouch' Vodafone AirTouch Plc and its subsidiary and
associated undertakings and, where the
context permits, each of them
'Vodafone Shareholders' AirTouch Holders of Vodafone AirTouch Shares
'Vodafone AirTouch Shares' Vodafone AirTouch ordinary shares of US$0.10
each
'Vodafone UK' Vodafone Limited
'Warburg Dillon Read' Warburg Dillon Read, the investment banking
division of UBS AG
For the purposes of the above definitions, 'subsidiary' and
'associated undertaking' have the meanings given by the United
Kingdom Companies Act 1985 (but for these purposes ignoring
paragraph 20(1)(b) of Schedule 4A to the Companies Act 1985)
and given by Sections 15 et seq. German Stock Corporation Act,
and 'substantial interest' means a direct or indirect interest
in 20 per cent or more of the equity share capital of an
undertaking.