Interim Management Statement
Lindsell Train Investment Trust PLC
10 August 2007
The Lindsell Train Investment Trust PLC
As at 31 July 2007
Fund Objective
To maximise long-term total returns subject to the avoidance of loss of absolute value and with a minimum objective to
maintain the real purchasing power of Sterling capital, as measured by the annual average yield on the 2.5%
Consolidated Loan Stock.
Net Asset Value GBP 166.02
Share Price GBP 165.50
Premium (Discount) (0.31%)
Market Capitalisation GBP 33.1mn
Benchmark (21/2% Con Ann Avg Yield +4.8%) +0.4
Source: Bloomberg; NAV-Lindsell Train. Share Price
quoted is closing mid price. See Benchmark definition.
Performance History (based in 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 YTD 2007
GBP)
Net Asset Value TR% -9.6 +3.1 +23.7 +16.5 +13.7 +13.3
Share Price TR% -19.8 -8.7 +20.6 +27.5 +20.1 +11.8
Source: LTL and Bloomberg. Performance years listed Jan - Dec. Launch date 22 Jan 2001. TR=Total Return (with dividends
reinvested) Past performance is not a guide to future performance. The price of units and the income from them may go
down as well as up. Investors may not get back what they invested.
2006 Performance Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Net Asset Value TR% +0.9 +1.9 +1.2 -1.8 -2.0 +1.8 +1.7 +2.1 +3.2 +0.5 +0.2 +2.8
Share Price TR% -3.0 +7.5 +1.5 +3.4 -1.5 -2.6 +3.2 +4.1 +5.7 +3.0 +3.6 -1.6
Source: LTL and S&P Micropal unless otherwise indicated. Performance years listed Jan - Dec. Launch date 22 Jan 2001.
TR=Total Return (with dividends reinvested)
2007 Performance Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Net Asset Value TR% +2.0 +0.8* +1.9 +2.6 +4.5 -3.1 +2.5
Share Price TR% -1.3 +4.0 +3.1 +4.5 +2.0 +0.6 -2.4
Source: LTL and Bloomberg unless otherwise indicated. Performance years listed Jan - Dec. Launch date 22 Jan 2001. TR=
Total Return (with dividends reinvested) *Source: Lindsell Train Ltd .
Past performance is not a guide to future performance. The price of units and the income from them may go down as well
as up. Investors may not get back what they invested.
Industry Breakdown % of NAV
Bonds 13.8
Preference Shares 10.1
Equity - Media 13.0
Equity - Banks & Investment Co. 7.1
Equity - Leisure & Ent. 18.0
Equity - Food & Beverage 29.6
Equity - Consumer Goods 1.8
Equity - Internet 1.4
Investment Funds 20.1
Cash & Equivalent (14.9)
Total 100.0
Source: Lindsell Train
Top 10 Holdings % of NAV
Nintendo 11.9
Lindsell Train Global Media (Dist) 10.8
Barr AG 10.4
HBOS 9.25% Non Cum Pref 10.1
Cadbury Schweppes 9.1
Lindsell Train Ltd 7.1
Diageo 7.1
Marston's 6.0
21/2% Consolidated Loan Stock 5.4
Lindsell Train Japan (Dist) 5.3
Source: Lindsell Train
Fund Exposure Bonds Prefs Equity Funds Cash % of NAV
UK % 9.5 10.1 51.3 4.0 (15.5) 59.4
USA % 4.4 - 2.9 - 4.8 12.1
Europe (ex UK) % - - 4.7 - (2.3) 2.4
Japan % - - 11.9 5.3 (1.9) 15.3
Global % - - - 10.8 - 10.8
Total 13.9 10.1 70.8 20.1 (14.9) 100.0
Source: Lindsell
Train
Interim Management Statement
The FSA now require the Company to publish interim management statements ('IMS') quarterly. At the half year and year
end a detailed account of the Company's performance, financial position and prospects is published in the Company's
semi-annual and annual reports to shareholders. It is not intended to duplicate these. In the future we will publish an
IMS in respect of the three month periods to June and December incorporated in the respective monthly reports. I will
provide a brief summary of the Company's performance and activity over the quarter in addition to the regular breakdown
of the Company's financial position and the Manager's report for that month. There will be links to the other monthly
reports relevant for that quarter. In this way the shareholders will be informed without being inundated with
repetitive information.
My first report covers the four months to July 2007. During that time your Company's NAV advanced by 5.3%. Behind this
advance was a significant uplift in the value of two holdings Reuters and Dow Jones, both subject to takeover
approaches, and a continued strong performance from Nintendo, which now represents 16% of NAV on a 'look through'
basis. A material rise in long bond yields has acted to depress the price of our fixed interest holdings. The Manager's
only activity was to increase the size of your Company's holding in Cadbury Schweppes to above 9% of NAV to take
advantage of the reorganisation of the company as it sells its US soft drinks interests and rationalises its
confectionary business. I am encouraged by these developments, especially the third party offers for various of the
Company's investments, as it validates both the long term and patient approach of our Manager and the successful
identification of undervalued assets sought after by corporate buyers.
Rhoddy Swire, Chairman
Fund Manager's Comments
This month, we are concentrating our report on Nintendo alone, given its strong influence on the portfolio.
Surprisingly the story starts in Wales. On Nick's ten day hike up the Offa's Dyke he visited a pub in Welshpool where,
like all pubs these days, the customers, who in this case were mostly over 50, were gawping at the television. Yet here
they were rather more animated than normal and on investigation they were not watching Sky Sports as he had suspected
but instead were playing Wii Bowling, in a vibrant and engaging way (with no screaming abuse at underperforming players
or match officials). If Wii has become the early evening entertainment of the drinking folk of Welshpool we have plenty
to go for with our holding in Nintendo. Almost to the day after that chance discovery Nintendo's share price began to
rise quickly and by the end of the month the shares were up 29%, leading to a doubling of price since the beginning of
the year. Of course, the reason for the shares rising was the company's announcement of an upward revision to sales,
profits and dividends, only three months into the fiscal year, but to our minds the anecdote of Welshpool was just as,
if not more, important. It provided yet more confirmation, if observing the activity in one's own household was not
enough, that Nintendo's strategy of extending the appeal of its games to non-traditional customers is creating a huge
untapped market place that is currently populated by no-one else. Yet more confirmation was provided by the advertising
companies in Japan, who were recently complaining of how poor viewing figures were for prime time shows in the early
evening and are blaming the slump on families choosing to play Wii games rather than ogling the box.
Playstation 2 was the winner in the last generation of video games consoles. So far it has sold 120m units worldwide
with that number still rising, albeit at a slower rate now that the next console generation has begun. In this
generation Wii has sold at a rate faster than the Playstation 2 did in the last and so far has only sold 9m units.
Could it sell as much a Playstation 2? Could it sell more? After all, the video games industry is growing at a 20%
clip. Why should Nintendo not sell at least 100m units? They are appealing to a new market of casual gamers many times
the size of the traditional market and yet many traditional gamers are fans of the product anyway. If the answer to any
of these questions is affirmative (or even 'maybe') Nintendo's price has more upside yet.
Unlike Sony, Nintendo has made a profit from the start on selling its hardware, even though its businesses model is to
make most profits from selling software - which Sony hardly produces. So, when Sony succeeded with Playstation 2 its
price hardly reacted but, as we have seen in the last two years, the effect of success on Nintendo's stock market
value, which was a smaller company without any other underperforming businesses, has been dramatic. At the moment
profitability is improving with operating margins rising, we think, from 20% to 30% from FY 2005 to FY 2008 driven by
stable pricing, larger than expected sales of hardware, improving economies of scale and the network effects of greater
penetration creating a virtuous cycle of demand - similar to the factors that drove Playstation 2 penetration five
years ago that still endure today. But the real icing on the cake is the software. A large installed base of hardware
users almost guarantees huge sales of Nintendo produced software titles and obliges all third party developers to
develop titles for the casual gamer, boosting Nintendo's royalty income.
A hint of this 'difficult to quantify' potential has ignited the share price. Now Nintendo is the Company's biggest
equity holding, at 12% of NAV, and 16% on an indirect look-through basis (as we own big holdings in the Lindsell Train
Global Media and Japan Funds). Its performance helped the Company's net asset value ('NAV') to rise 1.6% in a month
where equity markets declined 3.7% (MSCI Index in Sterling), with most of our other equities reflecting that decline.
In a future month, it may well be that the Company's NAV is subject to increased volatility as a result of Nintendo's
price reacting to investors' latest views on its potential, but that, in our judgement, should be worth sitting through
as we think the ultimate gains from owning this extraordinary franchise will continue to accrue significant long-term
value for the Company for many years to come.
Fund Manager Launch Date Denomination
Nick Train 22 Jan 2001 GBP
Year End Dividend Benchmark
31st Mar Ex Date: June The annual average yield on the 21/2%
Payment: August Consolidated Loan Stock.
The Board Management Fees Registered Address
Rhoddy Swire Standard Fee: 0.65% Lindsell Train Investment Trust
Donald Adamson Performance Fee: 10% of annual increase Springfield Lodge, Colchester Road
Dominic Caldecott in the share price above the gross Chelmsford
Michael Lindsell annual yield of the 21/2% Consolidated ESSEX CM2 5PW
Michael Mackenzie Loan Stock.
ISIN Secretary Listing
GB0031977944 Phoenix Administration Services Limited London Stock Exchange
Bloomberg
LTI LN
Disclaimer
Risk Warning This factsheet is intended for use by shareholders of the Lindsell Train Investment Trust ('LTIT') and/or
persons who are authorised by the UK Financial Services Authority or those who are permitted to receive such
information in the UK. Any opinion expressed whether in general or both on the performance of individual securities and
in a wider economic context represents Lindsell Train's views at the time of preparation. They are subject to change
without notice and should not be construed as investment advice or investment recommendation. Past performance is not a
guide to future performance and may not be repeated. The value of investments and income from them can go down as well
as up and you may not get back the amount originally invested. Lindsell Train Investment Trust plc is an investment
trust company listed on the London Stock Exchange. Investment trusts have the ability to borrow to invest which is
commonly referred to as gearing. Companies with higher gearing are subject to higher risks and therefore the investment
value may change substantially. The net asset value ('NAV') per share and its performance of an investment trust may
not be the same as its market share price per share and performance.
Issued by Lindsell Train Limited
Authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority
10 Aug 2007 LTL 000-051-1
Lindsell Train Limited
2 Queen Anne's Gate Buildings, Dartmouth Street, London SW1H 9BP U.K.
Tel. +44 20 7227 8200 Fax. +44 20 7227 8299
enquiry@lindselltrain.com www.lindselltrain.com
Lindsell Train Limited is authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority.
This information is provided by RNS
The company news service from the London Stock Exchange
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