Monthly Update

Lindsell Train Investment Trust PLC 13 July 2007 The Lindsell Train Investment Trust PLC As at 30 June 2007 Fund Objective To maximise long-term total returns subject to the avoidance of loss of absolute value and with a minimum objective to maintain the real purchasing power of Sterling capital, as measured by the annual average yield on the 2.5% Consolidated Loan Stock. Net Asset Value GBP 163.48 Share Price GBP 171.50 Premium (Discount) 4.91% Market Capitalisation GBP 34.3mn Benchmark (21/2% Con Ann Avg Yield +5.0%) +0.4 Source: Bloomberg; NAV-Lindsell Train. Share Price quoted is closing mid price. See Benchmark definition. Performance History (based in 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 YTD 2007 GBP) Net Asset Value TR% -9.6 +3.1 +23.7 +16.5 +13.7 +11.5 Share Price TR% -19.8 -8.7 +20.6 +27.5 +20.1 +14.8 Source: LTL and Bloomberg. Performance years listed Jan - Dec. Launch date 22 Jan 2001. TR=Total Return (with dividends reinvested) Past performance is not a guide to future performance. The price of units and the income from them may go down as well as up. Investors may not get back what they invested. 2006 Performance Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Net Asset Value TR% +0.9 +1.9 +1.2 -1.8 -2.0 +1.8 +1.7 +2.1 +3.2 +0.5 +0.2 +2.8 Share Price TR% -3.0 +7.5 +1.5 +3.4 -1.5 -2.6 +3.2 +4.1 +5.7 +3.0 +3.6 -1.6 Source: LTL and S&P Micropal unless otherwise indicated. Performance years listed Jan - Dec. Launch date 22 Jan 2001. TR=Total Return (with dividends reinvested) 2007 Performance Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Net Asset Value TR% +2.0 +0.8* +1.9 +2.6 +4.5 -3.1 Share Price TR% -1.3 +4.0 +3.1 +4.5 +2.0 +0.6 Source: LTL and Bloomberg unless otherwise indicated. Performance years listed Jan - Dec. Launch date 22 Jan 2001. TR= Total Return (with dividends reinvested) *Source: Lindsell Train Ltd . Past performance is not a guide to future performance. The price of units and the income from them may go down as well as up. Investors may not get back what they invested. Industry Breakdown % of NAV Bonds 13.5 Preference Shares 10.3 Equity - Media 13.6 Equity - Banks & Investment Co. 6.4 Equity - Leisure & Ent. 15.3 Equity - Food & Beverage 30.9 Equity - Consumer Goods 2.0 Equity - Internet 1.4 Investment Fund 20.7 Cash & Equivalent (14.1) Total 100.0 Source: Lindsell Train Top 10 Holdings % of NAV Lindsell Train Global Media (Dist) 11.1 Barr AG 10.6 HBOS 9.25% 10.3 Cadbury Schweppes 10.1 Nintendo 9.1 Diageo 7.4 Lindsell Train Ltd 6.4 Marston's 6.2 Lindsell Train Japan (Dist) 5.3 21/2% Consolidated Loan Stock 5.2 Source: Lindsell Train Fund Exposure Bonds Prefs Equity Funds Cash % of NAV UK % 9.1 10.3 52.7 4.2 (14.7) 61.6 USA % 4.4 - 3.0 - 4.8 12.2 Europe (ex UK) % - - 4.9 - (2.3) 2.6 Japan % - - 9.1 5.3 (1.9) 12.5 Global % - - - 11.1 - 11.1 Total 13.5 10.3 69.7 20.6 (14.1) 100.0 Source: Lindsell Train Fund Manager's Comments June was not a good month for your Company, with the NAV falling 3.1%. UK inflation expectations rose in the month, meaning that long dated government bond prices fell (as continued to be the case in the US). This turned out to be bad news for the portfolio for three reasons. First, of course, our fixed interest holdings declined. Next, the rise in interest rates appears to threaten the financial viability of putative Private Equity bids, because the cost of that industry's extensive borrowings has increased. A number of our holdings are, rightly or wrongly, perceived as candidates for private equity capital and suffered sharp declines - led by brewer Marstons, which had a double digit drop, but also our Media interests and Cadbury. Finally, rising inflation expectations are simply bad news for equities in general, with the possible exception of obvious 'inflation hedges', such as commodity extractors. The P/E for the market tends to fall when inflation is going up and the 4.7% slide in Diageo shares, after a perfectly satisfactory trading statement 28th of June, is a nasty reminder of the impact that valuation contraction can have on good and bad companies alike. We do not expect a reversion to a period of sustained, ruinous inflation - we do not believe that either the capital markets or the central banks will permit it. But we definitely do not want to experience such a period - we remember starting our careers after a prolonged inflationary episode, when the UK stock market was valued at a P/E not much higher than its dividend yield and it would be dismal to return to these conditions. After June's turmoil, we think it helpful to draw a distinction between two different types of takeover activity. Private equity represents one class of deal. As a generalisation these are asset-stripping exercises, involving a lot of debt and a more or less urgent requirement to justify the trade by disposals or relisting. The other category are transactions between corporations, designed to deliver permanent improvement in the strategic positioning of either or both entities. It is instructive to observe both elements at work in the current battle to own Cadbury's beverage division. Private Equity is interested in its predictable cash flows, which can indeed sustain a mountain of debt, while, as has been reported, Coke and Tata Tea are keen to access Cadbury's brands (Snapple in the case of Coke) because to do so will strengthen their product portfolios, for decades to come. We agree that the prospects for successful private equity transactions may have dimmed somewhat, after June. However, it appears to us that the impetus for strategic consolidation between corporations is as strong as ever. This impetus results from the insecurity we believe many companies feel in the face of globalisation. Most are simply too small to exploit the opportunities or withstand the competitive threats arising from freer world trade in goods, services and labour. Accordingly they look to merge, in order to create globally competitive units. This is a multi-year phenomenon, which benefits investors in London-listed securities in particular, because this market remains a place where 'deals can be done'. Transactions between News International and Dow Jones, Reuters and Thomson and the LSE and the Italian Borse can be analysed in this context - each bringing immediate and, we expect, future value for the portfolio (LSE is a major position in the Media Fund). June saw several other confirming developments. First, in the last few days, there has been another transaction in the global branded consumer goods sector. Kraft has bid for Danone's predominantly European biscuit business - at a high price that has amazed the analytical community. Kraft's willingness to pay up demonstrates, we are sure, how difficult it is to create such consumer brands from scratch. The price represents 2.5 times the division's annual sales. A straight read through to Cadbury, of 2.5x its annual sales, would confirm a warranted share price for Cadbury, if it were caught up in a bid, of over £9.00 per share, compared to the current £6.65. Yet Cadbury's global confectionery is far more valuable, in our opinion, than a collection of national biscuit brands Brad Greenspan is the joint founder of MySpace.com and last month he offered to match Rupert Murdoch's bid for Dow Jones of $60 per share, at least up to 25.0% of the whole. Greenspan justified his proposal as follows - 'Over the next couple of years, if we can get just 10.0% of existing people who touch Dow Jones' brands every day to watch online a Dow Jones branded Internet video or broadcast, suddenly we'd be #1 in that world.' In our opinion, this is crucial stuff, confirming that the Media industry is in the early stages of a reshaping, as industrialists look to build or acquire online brands that will attract 'sticky' and sizable audiences. Pearson and Reed Elsevier have both given back their share price gains in the immediate aftermath of May's bids for Dow Jones and Reuters. We think this is wrong and that events are moving quickly in the real world, leaving stock market valuations behind. Incisive Media, a private media company, announced the acquisition of some US legal publishing assets this week, at a price that represents over 3.0x annual sales. Our quoted properties are valued far below this multiple. Finally, we note these comments from Matt Barratt, former chairman of Barclay's Bank, in a June conference address. 'There will be consolidation in Europe. If not you'll have the barbarians at the gate. Europeans will get picked off by the surging behemoths from the US. Europe is massively over-banked and there are a lot of inefficiencies. There is the potential for four or five globally competitive banks to emerge from Europe.' We are sure that Barratt is correct, indeed the actions of his former employer, Barclays, in bidding cross-border to acquire ABN AMRO proves him to be so. There is indeed a relatively short term macro-economic reason to be cautious about UK bank shares, however, there is also a medium term reason to be very bullish. The price that Barclays and RBS are bidding for ABN is up to 80.0% higher than that that stock market investors accord British banks today. This is an important theme in our UK Equity portfolios, including Finsbury Growth and Income Trust. We do not 'invest for the bid'. Nonetheless, our instincts are telling us that there is great ferment in the corporate world, across many industry sectors. We are also certain that the market positions developed by many of our holdings offer great value to competing companies and offer great value in stock market terms. We hope the rest of the year vindicates this assertion. Fund Manager Launch Date Denomination Nick Train 22 Jan 2001 GBP Year End Dividend Benchmark 31st Mar Ex Date: June The annual average yield on the 21/2% Payment: August Consolidated Loan Stock. The Board Management Fees Registered Address Rhoddy Swire Standard Fee: 0.65% Lindsell Train Investment Trust Donald Adamson Performance Fee: 10% of annual increase Springfield Lodge, Colchester Road Dominic Caldecott in the share price above the gross Chelmsford Michael Lindsell annual yield of the 21/2% Consolidated ESSEX CM2 5PW Michael Mackenzie Loan Stock. ISIN Secretary Listing GB0031977944 Phoenix Administration Services Limited London Stock Exchange Bloomberg LTI LN Disclaimer Risk Warning This factsheet is intended for use by shareholders of the Lindsell Train Investment Trust ('LTIT') and/or persons who are authorised by the UK Financial Services Authority or those who are permitted to receive such information in the UK. Any opinion expressed whether in general or both on the performance of individual securities and in a wider economic context represents Lindsell Train's views at the time of preparation. They are subject to change without notice and should not be construed as investment advice or investment recommendation. Past performance is not a guide to future performance and may not be repeated. The value of investments and income from them can go down as well as up and you may not get back the amount originally invested. Lindsell Train Investment Trust plc is an investment trust company listed on the London Stock Exchange. Investment trusts have the ability to borrow to invest which is commonly referred to as gearing. Companies with higher gearing are subject to higher risks and therefore the investment value may change substantially. The net asset value ('NAV') per share and its performance of an investment trust may not be the same as its market share price per share and performance. Issued by Lindsell Train Limited Authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority 11 July 2007 LTL 000-050-6 Lindsell Train Limited 2 Queen Anne's Gate Buildings, Dartmouth Street, London SW1H 9BP U.K. Tel. +44 20 7227 8200 Fax. +44 20 7227 8299 enquiry@lindselltrain.com www.lindselltrain.com Lindsell Train Limited is authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority. This information is provided by RNS The company news service from the London Stock Exchange
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